

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX



2014

MEASURING AND UNDERSTANDING
THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM

INSTITUTE FOR
ECONOMICS
& PEACE



QUANTIFYING PEACE AND ITS BENEFITS

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SPECIAL THANKS to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) headquartered at the University of Maryland for their cooperation on this study and for providing the Institute for Economics and Peace with their Global Terrorism Database (GTD) datasets on terrorism.

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OTHER PUBLICATIONS FROM THE INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMICS AND PEACE

2014 Global Peace Index Report

Institute for Economics and Peace
– February 2014

The 2014 GPI Report analyses the state of peace around the world and identifies countries most at risk of becoming less peaceful.



Global Terrorism Index 2012

Institute for Economic and Peace –
December 2012

The Global Terrorism Index is the first index to systematically rank and compare 158 countries according to the impact of terrorism.



The Economic Cost of Violence Containment

Institute for Economics and Peace
– February 2014

A new methodology that calculates the cost of preventing and containing violence in over 150 countries.



Violence Containment Spending in the United States

Institute for Economics and Peace
– September 2012

Violence Containment Spending provides a new methodology to categorise and account for the public and private expenditure on containing violence.



Mexico Peace Index

Institute for Economics and Peace
– November 2013

The Mexico Peace Index measures the state of peace in all 32 Mexican states analysing trends and drivers of peace over the last ten years.



Global Peace Index 2012

Institute for Economics and Peace
– June 2012

The Global Peace Index is the world's preeminent measure of peacefulness. This is the 6th edition of the Global Peace Index.



Pillars of Peace

Institute for Economics and Peace
– September 2013

Pillars of Peace is a new conceptual framework for understanding and describing the factors that create a peaceful society.



United States Peace Index 2012

Institute for Economics and Peace
– April 2012

The 2012 United States Peace Index has found that the U.S. is more peaceful now than at any other time over the last twenty years.



Global Peace Index 2013

Institute for Economics and Peace
– June 2013

The 2013 GPI Report analyses the state of peace around the world, identifying trends in violence and conflict, as well as the key drivers of peace.



Economic Consequences of War on the U.S. Economy

Institute for Economics and Peace
– February 2012

The Economic Consequences of War on the U.S. Economy analyses the macroeconomic effects of U.S. government spending on wars since World War II.



United Kingdom Peace Index 2013

Institute for Economic and Peace
– April 2013

The UK Peace Index report analyses the fabric of peace in the UK over the last decade and has found that since 2003 the UK has become more peaceful.



Measuring Peace in the Media 2011

Institute for Economics and Peace and
Media Tenor – January 2012

For the second year, IEP and Media Tenor have jointly analysed global television networks' coverage of peace and violence issues; it covers over 160,000 news items from 31 news and current affairs programs that air on four continents.



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the second edition of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) report which provides a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism over the last 14 years beginning in 2000 and ending in 2013.

Produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), the GTI is based on data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) which is collected and collated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). The GTD is considered to be the most comprehensive dataset on terrorist activity globally and has codified over 125,000 terrorist incidents.

The report summarises trends in terrorism over time and analyses its changing patterns in terms of geographic activity, methods of attack, organisations involved and the national economic and political context. The index has also been compared to a range of socio-economic indicators to determine the key factors most closely associated with terrorism.

In 2013 terrorist activity increased substantially with the total number of deaths rising from 11,133 in 2012 to 17,958 in 2013, a 61 per cent increase. Over the same period, the number of countries that experienced more than 50 deaths rose from 15 to 24. This highlights that not only is the intensity of terrorism increasing, its breadth is increasing as well.

Terrorism is both highly concentrated as well as a globally distributed phenomenon. Over 80 per cent of the lives lost to terrorist activity in 2013 occurred in only five countries - Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria. However, another 55 countries recorded one or more deaths from terrorist activity.

SINCE 2000 THERE HAS BEEN OVER A FIVE-FOLD INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE KILLED BY TERRORISM.



82%

KILLED IN TERRORIST ATTACKS WERE IN JUST FIVE COUNTRIES:

**IRAQ
AFGHANISTAN
PAKISTAN
NIGERIA
SYRIA**

Since 2000 there has been over a five-fold increase in the number of deaths from terrorism, rising from 3,361 in 2000 to 17,958 in 2013. However for four years, starting in 2007, there had been modest decreases in terrorist deaths and also a slight decrease in the number of countries experiencing greater than 50 deaths from terrorism per annum. The latest jump in terrorist activity coincided with the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011.

The threat of terrorist activity is a major if not the major national security risk for many countries. The recent rise of ultra-violent groups such as ISIL in Syria and Iraq is underpinned by greater territorial ambitions in the Levant which include the countries of Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Palestine, as well as Southern Turkey, thereby increasing the risk of further destabilisation in the Middle East region.

The majority of claimed deaths from terrorist attacks, 66 per cent in 2013, are claimed by only four terrorist organisations; ISIL, Boko Haram, the Taliban and al-Qa'ida and its affiliates. Variations of religious ideologies based on extreme interpretations of Wahhabi Islam are the key commonality for all four groups; however their strategic goals are not necessarily the same. To counteract the rise of religious extremism, moderate Sunni theologies need to be cultivated by credible forces within Islam. The current political context underscores the importance of moderate Sunni countries

and not outside influences leading such a response. One such example was the Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies led by Shaykh Abdallah Bin Bayyah in March 2014 which brought together 250 Islamic scholars to promote a unified peaceful response to the current violence issuing a Fatwa in response to ISIL.

Religious ideology as the motivation for terrorism is only partly a global phenomenon. While it is predominant in Sub-Saharan Africa, MENA and South Asia, in the rest of the world terrorism is more likely to be driven by political or nationalistic and separatist movements. These forms of terrorism have remained fairly constant over the last 14 years and are still substantial.

While drivers of terrorist activity are often complex and multidimensional, there are several generalised and significant socio-economic correlates of terrorism. Countries with higher levels of terrorism were found to have three statistically significant factors:

- Greater social hostilities between different ethnic, religious and linguistic groups, lack of intergroup cohesion and high levels of group grievances.
- Presence of state sponsored violence such as extrajudicial killings, political terror and gross human rights abuses.
- Higher levels of other forms of violence including deaths from organised conflict, likelihood of violent demonstrations, levels of violent crime and perceptions of criminality.

Importantly, poverty and many other economic factors have little explanatory power on the onset of terrorism. This includes several broader development factors such as mean years of schooling and life expectancy. This underpins the fact that weak political systems, a lack of political legitimacy and the presence of state-sponsored violence are more influential for explaining the rise of terrorist organisations than the broader economic environment.

The strong relationship between terrorism and other forms of violence underlines how the persistent targeting of police forces and instability generated by terrorist activity can undermine the rule of law and lead to increases in other forms of violence.

There are many peaceful Muslim majority countries that do not suffer from terrorism such as Qatar, the U.A.E. and

Kuwait, underscoring how there are other social, political and geopolitical factors at play other than religion in breeding terrorist activity.

The findings in this report are also helpful in providing guidance for assessing the risk of future terrorist attacks in countries where there are currently low levels of activity. By measuring and comparing various political, social and violence indicators, countries at risk of a substantial increase in terrorism can be identified. This report has highlighted 13 countries as being at risk. These countries are Angola, Bangladesh, Burundi, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Iran, Israel, Mali, Mexico, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Uganda.

The two most successful strategies for ending terrorist groups since the late 1960s have been either policing or the initiation of a political process. These strategies were the main reason for the ending of over 80 per cent of terrorist organisations that ceased operation. Only ten per cent of terrorist groups could be said to have achieved their goals and only seven per cent were eliminated by full military engagement.

Over the last 14 years five per cent of all terrorist deaths have occurred in OECD countries. Excluding the United States on September 11, Turkey and Israel experienced the highest number of deaths. There were eight OECD countries that experienced deadly attacks in 2013, this compares to 20 OECD countries which have had deadly attacks since 2000.

Although terrorism is on the increase and a major concern compared to other forms of violence, it is relatively small when compared to the 437,000 people killed by homicides in 2012, this being 40 times greater.

The findings of this report emphasise the increasing intensity and spread of terrorist activity globally and highlight the key underlying factors that give rise to terrorism. Short term counter-terrorism and policing strategies can often be critical to prevent the potential of large and unexpected acts of mass violence; however, longer term approaches are essential. These longer term priorities include the need to address group grievances, ending gross physical rights abuses by the state and improving access to justice and the rule of law. Extremist Islamic movements that encourage the use of terrorism need to be counteracted with moderate theologies within Islam that advocate other non-violent methods of addressing legitimate political grievances.

Putting terrorism in context

- Around five per cent of all the 107,000 terrorist fatalities since 2000 have occurred in OECD countries.
- Homicide claims 40 times more people globally than terrorism with 437,000 lives lost due to homicide in 2012, compared to 11,000 terrorist deaths in 2012.
- Approximately 50 per cent of terrorist attacks claim no lives.
- The long term indirect costs of terrorism can be 10 to 20 times larger than the direct costs.

Tactics and patterns

- The primary target of terrorism has consistently been private property and citizens.
- 60 per cent of all attacks involve the use of explosives, 30 per cent use firearms and 10 per cent used other tactics including incendiary devices, melee attacks and sabotage of equipment.
- Religion as a driving ideology for terrorism has dramatically increased since 2000. Prior to 2000 nationalist separatist agendas were the biggest drivers of terrorist organisations.
- Political and national separatist movements are still significant in 2013 but have seen little change over the 14 year period.
- Explosives accounted for the majority of attacks, while suicide bombings accounted for less than five per cent of all terrorist attacks since 2000.

Risk of terrorism

- IEP has identified the following 13 countries as being at risk of increased terrorist activity from current levels:
 - Angola
 - Bangladesh
 - Burundi
 - Central African Republic
 - Cote d'Ivoire
 - Ethiopia
 - Iran
 - Israel
 - Mali
 - Mexico
 - Myanmar
 - Sri Lanka
 - Uganda

Key trends

- In 2013 more than 80 per cent of the lives lost to terrorism occurred in only five countries; Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria.
- The largest year-on-year increase in deaths from terrorism was recorded between 2012 and 2013 increasing from 11,133 to 17,958.
- 102 of 162 countries covered in this study experienced no deaths from terrorism in 2013, while 60 countries recorded one or more deaths from terrorism.
- 87 countries experienced a terrorist incident in 2013, slightly up from 81 in 2012.
- The number of countries experiencing over 50 deaths in one year hit an all-time high in 2013 at 24, five greater than the previous high of 19 countries in 2008.

Correlates of terrorism

- From thousands of socio-economic, governance and attitudinal variables analysed, three groupings of indicators show a multivariate significant relationship with the GTI:
 - Political stability
 - Intergroup cohesion
 - Legitimacy of the state
- There is no systematic link to poverty measures, nor to several broader economic development factors such as the Human Development Index or its subcomponents such as mean years of schooling, or life expectancy. Similarly economic indicators such as year to year GDP growth do not correlate.
- Trade as a percentage of GDP is the only economic indicator to show moderate correlation at $R = -0.40$.

ABOUT THE REPORT

The Results Section summarises overall trends in terrorism and includes detailed country profiles for the ten countries with the highest levels of terrorist activity in 2013. These countries experienced 90 per cent of global terrorist activity. This section also provides an overview of the global trends in terrorism and details the significant increases since 2000.

The Trends Section highlights the countries that have had the largest improvements and deteriorations in terrorist activity and maps in detail the patterns and characteristics of terrorist activity in terms of its targets, weapons used and ideological drivers. This section includes a brief statistical summary of the patterns and prevalence of suicide attacks as a terrorist tactic, trends in terrorist activity among OECD countries, and also compares this to other forms of violent activity. The key terrorist actors operating in OECD nations are also mapped and summarised.

The Risk Section assesses the risk of countries experiencing high levels of terrorism. The research utilises GTI data and other existing datasets to statistically analyse the future likelihood of terrorist activity based on an analysis of the socio-economic conditions most closely associated with terrorism. A brief literature review assesses the economic costs of terrorism and the potential direct and indirect costs as well as an analysis of the effects of terrorism on foreign direct investment.

The Terrorist Group Case Studies Section focuses on the four major terrorist groups covering their ideology, history, capacity and resources with key networks described as well. The numbers of foreign fighters from several OECD countries and the Middle East are outlined based on existing research highlighting both high and low estimates. This section also references existing research on how terrorist groups end and the tactics and strategies that have been successful for addressing this form of violence in the past.

The Correlates of Terrorism Section uses multivariate statistical analysis and other statistical techniques to derive the key socio-economic correlations associated with terrorism and to better understand the factors most closely associated with terrorist environments.

The Expert Contributions Section includes four essays from leading academics and applied researchers in the fields of development, public policy, peace and conflict and terrorism studies.

Larry Attree from Saferworld and David Keen from the London School of Economics, outline a series of counter-terrorism approaches that should be scaled back and present six constructive alternatives that could help reverse the alarming rise in global terrorism.

Henry Dodd and Steve Smith from Action on Armed Violence, provide an important contribution from another perspective to the research provided in this report. They detail the horrific human impact of a single suicide attack in a Pakistan marketplace in 2009, contextualising the broader physical, psychological and financial consequences of this form of violence.

Ekaterina Stepanova from the Institute of World Economy & International Relations, outlines a shift in two main trends, the broader network fragmentation of the global jihadi movement and shift from top-down to bottom-up regionalization of violent Islamic groups. She also tracks the complex evolution of ISIL as a regional force in the Middle East, and what its continued growth means for the world and region.

Finally, Samantha Pitts-Kiefer from the Nuclear Threat Initiative, outlines the history and current reality of a nuclear terrorist threat, suggesting approaches for strengthening global nuclear security, highlighting the urgent need to improve global nuclear security.

ABOUT THE GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX

The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) is a comprehensive study that accounts for the direct and indirect impact of terrorism in 162 countries in terms of lives lost, injuries, property damage and the psychological after-effects of terrorism. This study covers 99.6 per cent of the world's population.

It aggregates the most authoritative data source on terrorism today, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) into a composite score in order to provide an ordinal ranking of nations on the negative impact of terrorism. The GTD is unique in that it consists of systematically and comprehensively coded data on domestic as well as international terrorist incidents and now includes more than 125,000 cases.

Given the resources committed to counter-terrorism efforts internationally, it is important to analyse and aggregate available data related to terrorism to better understand its various properties such as:

- The differing socio-economic conditions under which it occurs.
- The geopolitical drivers associated with terrorism and ideological aims of terrorists groups.
- The types of strategies deployed, tactical terrorist targets and how these evolve over time.

In this context, one of the key aims of the GTI is to examine these trends to help inform a positive and

practical debate about the future of terrorism and the required policy responses.

The GTI was developed in consultation with the GPI Expert Panel, and in particular with the advice of Expert Panel member and terrorism expert Dr Ekaterina Stepanova, Head of the Peace and Conflict Studies Unit at the Institute of World Economy & International Relations.

Defining terrorism is not a straightforward matter. There is no single internationally accepted definition of what constitutes terrorism, and the terrorism literature abounds with competing definitions and typologies. IEP accepts the terminology and definitions agreed to by the authors of the GTD, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) researchers and its advisory panel. The GTI therefore defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.” This definition recognises that terrorism is not only the physical act of an attack, but also the psychological impact it has on a society for many years after.

In order to be included as an incident in the GTD the act has to be: “an intentional act of violence or threat of violence by a non-state actor.” This means an incident has to meet three criteria in order for it to be counted as a terrorist act:

THE GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX IS A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY THAT ACCOUNTS FOR THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT IMPACT OF TERRORISM IN 162 COUNTRIES IN TERMS OF LIVES LOST, INJURIES, PROPERTY DAMAGE AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AFTER-EFFECTS OF TERRORISM. THIS STUDY COVERS 99.6 PER CENT OF THE WORLD'S POPULATION.

1. The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.
2. The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence – including property violence, as well as violence against people.
3. The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors. This database does not include acts of state terrorism.


In addition to this baseline definition, two of the following three criteria have to be met in order to be included in the START database from 1997:

- The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.
- The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) other than the immediate victims.
- The violent act was outside the precepts of international humanitarian law.


In cases where there is insufficient information to make a definitive distinction about whether it is a terrorist incident within the confines of the definition, the database codes these incidents as 'doubt terrorism proper'. In order to only count unambiguous incidents of terrorism, the GTI does not include doubted incidents.

It is important to understand how incidents are counted. According to the GTD codebook: "incidents occurring in both the same geographic and temporal point will be regarded as a single incident, but if either the time of the occurrence of the incidents or their locations are discontinuous, the events will be regarded as separate incidents." Illustrative examples from the GTD codebook are as follows:¹


- Four truck bombs explode nearly simultaneously in different parts of a major city. This represents four incidents.
- A bomb goes off, and while police are working on the scene the next day, they are attacked by terrorists with automatic weapons. These are two separate incidents, as they were not continuous, given the time lag between the two events.
- A group of militants shoot and kill five guards at a perimeter checkpoint of a petroleum refinery and then proceeds to set explosives and destroy the refinery. This is one incident since it occurred in a single location (the petroleum refinery) and was one continuous event.
- A group of hijackers diverts a plane to Senegal and, while at an airport in Senegal, shoots two Senegalese policemen. This is one incident, since the hijacking was still in progress at the time of the shooting and hence the two events occurred at the same time and in the same place.



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RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE
1	Iraq	10
2	Afghanistan	9.39
3	Pakistan	9.37
4	Nigeria	8.58
5	Syria	8.12
6	India	7.86
7	Somalia	7.41
8	Yemen	7.31
9	Philippines	7.29
10	Thailand	7.19
11	Russia	6.76
12	Kenya	6.58
13	Egypt	6.5
14	Lebanon	6.4
15	Libya	6.25
16	Colombia	6.24
17	Turkey	5.98
18	Democratic Republic of the Congo	5.9
19	Sudan	5.77
20	South Sudan	5.6
21	Algeria	5.52
22	Mali	5.29
23	Bangladesh	5.25
24	Nepal	5.23
25	China	5.21
26	Central African Republic	5.19
27	United Kingdom	5.17
28	Iran	4.9
29	Greece	4.73
30	United States	4.71
31	Indonesia	4.67
32	Israel	4.66
32	Mexico	4.66
34	Bahrain	4.41
35	Myanmar	4.24
36	Mozambique	4.01
36	Sri Lanka	4.01
38	Rwanda	4
39	Burundi	3.97
40	Cote d'Ivoire	3.76
41	Tanzania	3.71
42	Ethiopia	3.7
43	Paraguay	3.63
44	Norway	3.57
45	Senegal	3.55
46	Tunisia	3.29
47	Ireland	3.09
48	Malaysia	3.04
48	South Africa	3.04
50	Peru	2.96
51	Ukraine	2.95
52	Uganda	2.93
53	Belarus	2.85
54	Kosovo	2.73
55	Saudi Arabia	2.71
56	France	2.67
57	Guatemala	2.61
58	Chile	2.59
58	Niger	2.59
60	Bulgaria	2.58
60	Georgia	2.58
62	Italy	2.55
63	Eritrea	2.45
64	Honduras	2.38
65	Kazakhstan	2.37
66	Cyprus	2.3
67	Morocco	2.11
68	Tajikistan	1.99
69	Spain	1.84
70	Jordan	1.76
71	Argentina	1.73
72	Brazil	1.72
73	Republic of the Congo	1.59
74	Trinidad and Tobago	1.54
75	Cameroon	1.45
75	Macedonia (FYR)	1.45
77	Switzerland	1.34
78	Madagascar	1.26
79	Ecuador	1.18
80	Zimbabwe	1.16
81	Guinea	1.12
82	Sweden	1.07
83	Germany	1.02
84	Canada	0.95




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RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE
85	Czech Republic	0.81
86	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.76
87	Burkina Faso	0.7
87	Montenegro	0.7
89	Netherlands	0.58
89	Serbia	0.58
91	Mauritania	0.56
92	Venezuela	0.54
93	Belgium	0.53
94	Dominican Republic	0.47
95	Angola	0.41
95	Australia	0.41
97	Guinea-Bissau	0.35
98	Cambodia	0.31
98	Taiwan	0.31
100	United Arab Emirates	0.29
101	Moldova	0.28
102	Armenia	0.27
103	Austria	0.24
103	Bolivia	0.24
105	Croatia	0.23
105	Portugal	0.23
107	Albania	0.19
107	Denmark	0.19
109	Bhutan	0.16
109	Estonia	0.16
111	Uzbekistan	0.14
112	Kyrgyzstan	0.1

113	Iceland	0.08
113	Laos	0.08
113	Liberia	0.08
116	Hungary	0.07
117	Azerbaijan	0.06
118	Chad	0.05
119	Kuwait	0.04
119	Panama	0.04
121	Equatorial Guinea	0.01
121	Japan	0.01
121	Lesotho	0.01
124	Benin	0
124	Botswana	0
124	Costa Rica	0
124	Cuba	0
124	Djibouti	0
124	El Salvador	0
124	Finland	0
124	Gabon	0
124	Gambia	0
124	Ghana	0
124	Guyana	0
124	Haiti	0
124	Jamaica	0
124	Latvia	0
124	Lithuania	0
124	Malawi	0
124	Mauritius	0

124	Mongolia	0
124	Namibia	0
124	New Zealand	0
124	Nicaragua	0
124	North Korea	0
124	Oman	0
124	Papua New Guinea	0
124	Poland	0
124	Qatar	0
124	Romania	0
124	Sierra Leone	0
124	Singapore	0
124	Slovakia	0
124	Slovenia	0
124	South Korea	0
124	Swaziland	0
124	Timor-Leste	0
124	Togo	0
124	Turkmenistan	0
124	Uruguay	0
124	Vietnam	0
124	Zambia	0




TERRORIST INCIDENTS MAP 2000-2013

- All attacks since 2000 scaled by number of fatalities
- Worst attacks in 2013

THE 20 WORST ATTACKS OF 2013

DATE	COUNTRY	LOCATION	F*	I*	GROUP	DESCRIPTION
17/09/2013	Nigeria	Beni Shiek	142	-	Boko Haram	Gunmen dressed in military uniforms set up illegal checkpoints and shot civilians.
22/07/2013	Syria	Khan Al-Assal	123	-	Al-Nusrah Front	Assailants attacked soldiers and civilians in the town of Khan al-assal.
10/01/2013	Pakistan	Quetta	107	169	Lashkar-E-Jhangvi	Suicide bombers detonated inside of a snooker hall and attacked responders to the first explosion.
16/08/2013	Pakistan	Quetta	91	169	Lashkar-E-Jhangvi	An explosives-laden water tanker detonated in a vegetable market.
22/09/2013	Pakistan	Peshawar	87	131	Jundallah	Two suicide bombers detonated outside of all saints church in Peshawar City.
2/08/2013	Afghanistan	Sherzad District	82	-	Taliban	Assailants ambushed a joint military and police convoy.
18/08/2013	Afghanistan	Gulistan District	82	22	Taliban	Assailants attacked a police convoy in Gulistan district.
21/09/2013	Kenya	Nairobi	72	201	Al-Shabaab	Assailants with automatic weapons and grenades attacked the westgate mall in Nairobi and held patrons hostage.
11/06/2013	Syria	Hatla	70	-	Al-Nusrah Front	Gunmen attacked the shiite village of Hatla.
20/12/2013	Nigeria	Bama	70	-	Boko Haram	300 Assailants attacked a Nigerian army barracks and kidnapped some soldiers.
16/01/2013	Algeria	In Amenas	69	8	Al-Mua'qi'oon Biddam Brigade (Those who Sign with Blood)	Terrorists seized a British Petroleum gas complex and held 800 people hostage.

* F= FATALITIES, I = INJURIES



TERRORIST INCIDENTS MAP 2000-2013

- All attacks since 2000 scaled by number of fatalities
- Worst attacks in 2013

DATE	COUNTRY	LOCATION	F*	I*	GROUP	DESCRIPTION
5/12/2013	Yemen	Sanaa	68	215	Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	A suicide bomber then 12 gunmen attacked the Ministry of Defense.
21/02/2013	Syria	Damascus	62	201	Unknown	A car bomb exploded near the baath party offices in Damascus City.
6/02/2013	Syria	Al-Buraq	61	-	Al-Nusrah Front	An explosives-laden vehicle detonated at a bus stop near a military factory killing civilian employees.
5/12/2013	Central African Republic	Bangui	54	-	Anti-Balaka Militia	Gunman attacked a mosque in km-five neighborhood, Bangui City.
3/04/2013	Afghanistan	Farah	53	95	Taliban	A suicide bomber and nine assailants dressed as soldiers and armed with guns and grenades attacked a courthouse.
21/03/2013	Syria	Damascus	50	84	Unknown	A suicide bomber detonated himself at al-eman mosque in Damascus City.
24/04/2013	Iraq	Mosul	46	-	Unknown	Assailants attacked a police headquarters and held 17 hostage.
6/07/2013	Nigeria	Mamudo	46	4	Boko Haram	Assailants set fire to a school and shot at students and staff who were fleeing the burning building.
3/03/2013	Pakistan	Karachi	45	151	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	An explosives-laden car detonated in outside a shiite mosque.

* F= FATALITIES, I = INJURIES

RESULTS

GLOBAL LEVELS OF TERRORISM

In total there have been over 48,000 terrorist incidents over the last 14 years claiming over 107,000 lives. Terrorism has increased dramatically with even conservative estimates suggesting a fivefold surge since the year 2000.²

In 2013 alone, almost 10,000 terrorist incidents were recorded, resulting in approximately 18,000 deaths. The significant majority of these incidents, over 60 per cent, occurred in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria. The increase is due mainly to terrorist activity within these five countries. As a consequence, these countries have experienced a dramatic increase in the loss of life in 2013 with fatalities reaching 14,722 collectively.

Excluding these five countries in 2013, there were almost 4,000 attacks in the rest of the world killing 3,236 people. This represents an increase of 54 per cent over the prior year.

Other than the five most affected countries, the trend over the last 14 years is upward with terrorist attacks substantially increasing by 180 per cent. Furthermore, terrorists are largely successful in carrying out their tactical objectives. Figure 3 shows that in 2013 the success rate was over 85 per cent. However this does represent a decrease since 2011 when over 90 per cent of attacks were successful.

The rise in terrorist activity coincided with the US invasion of Iraq. This created large power vacuums in the country allowing different factions to surface and become violent. Despite the fact that a government was formed and elections held, the country and region has been unstable ever since.

In 2006 Nouri al-Maliki was appointed Prime Minister of Iraq. In the following year amid sectarian tensions Iraq suffered the worst year of terrorist activity recorded since 2000. It was only in 2013 with the rise of ISIL that Iraq suffered this same level of terrorism again.

Terrorism has also been increasing on the borders of Pakistan and Afghanistan where the Taliban has escalated attacks over the last three years. Tensions in Pakistan escalated in 2007 when Presidential candidate Benazir Bhutto was assassinated, and deaths have increased by 20 per cent over the last two years. In India, there remains significant terrorist activity, including on the border between India and Pakistan.

The rise of terrorism in Nigeria is largely centred around the terrorist group Boko Haram which started to engage in significant violence from 2009 onwards. As a result, Nigeria has had the fourth highest number of deaths from terrorism over the last three years. Figure 1 plots these events against trends in terrorism since 2000.


COUNTRIES WITH GREATER THAN 50 TERRORIST DEATHS

In 2013 the number of countries that lost over 50 lives to terrorist attacks reached 24, the most it has been in the 14 years covered in this report. It also represents an additional nine countries when compared to 2012. These countries are Algeria, Central African Republic, China, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Sudan and South Sudan. This is a notable change from the 2008 trend that showed that the number of countries with greater than 50 deaths had been decreasing while the overall 12 year trend to 2012 was basically flat.

Terrorism is a global phenomenon and in 2013 attacks were carried out in 87 countries with 60 of these experiencing deaths from terrorism.

FIGURE 1 DEATHS FROM TERRORISM, 2000–2013


The number people who have died from terrorist activity has increased fivefold since the year 2000.



Source: GTD Notes: The dashed part of the trend line represents a change in data collection methodology for terrorist acts. The methodology change did not materially alter the results as the increase in terrorism is verifiable, see methodological note in Appendix C for further details.

FIGURE 2 TERRORIST INCIDENTS, 2000–2013


In 2013, 60 per cent of all attacks occurred in five countries; Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria. However the rest of the world suffered a 54 per cent increase in terrorist incidents in 2013.



Source: GTD

FIGURE 3 SUCCESS RATES OF TERRORIST ATTACKS


In 2013 over 85 per cent of all recorded incidents were successful. This represents an improvement from 2011 when over 90 per cent of attacks were successful.



Source: GTD Note: Success is defined in respect to the tangible effects of an incident, not the overall strategic goal. For example, a bomb attack is deemed successful if the bomb is detonated regardless of whether the detonation achieves greater aims such as destroying a building or killing a specific person.

FIGURE 4 NUMBER OF COUNTRIES THAT EXPERIENCE SEVERE LOSSES FROM TERRORISM

The number of countries that have lost more than 50 lives hit an all-time high in 2013.



Source: GTD

TEN COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM


The ten countries ranked at the top of the 2014 Global Terrorism Index have all suffered from terrorism for many years. Every one of the ten most affected countries, with the exception of Syria, has had terrorist attacks consecutively for at least fifteen years. In 2013 the most impacted five countries accounted for more than 80 per cent of all terrorist deaths.

The overwhelming majority of deaths from terrorism in 2013 occurred in Iraq, accounting for 35 per cent of all deaths. In nine out of the last ten years Iraq has been the country with the most deaths from terrorism. The only exception was in 2012 when Afghanistan had 300 more deaths than Iraq.

Syria is the country that has had the largest percentage increase in terrorism, with a combined total of 27 deaths from 1998 to 2010. Since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Syria has had over a hundred deaths from terrorism in both 2011 and 2012, jumping to over 1,000 deaths in 2013.

FIGURE 5 COUNTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF DEATHS BY TERRORISM, PERCENTAGE OF GLOBAL TERRORIST DEATHS FOR 2013

Five countries account for more than 80 per cent of global terrorist deaths.




Source: GTD



IRAQ

GTI RANK: 1
GTI SCORE: 10/10



Iraq continues to be the country that is most impacted by terrorism. Terrorist incidents have increased significantly in Iraq in 2013 with the number of deaths rising 162 per cent from 2012. No group claimed responsibility for the majority of terrorist activity. However, six terrorist groups were responsible for the 1,670 claimed deaths. These groups are all Islamic extremist with relatively short histories. 77 per cent of attacks for which a group claimed responsibility were conducted by ISIL. The oldest group, Ansar al-Islam, was formed in 2001 but has subsequently joined ISIL. Some of the groups are relatively new such as Mukhtar Army, a Shia Iraqi militia group formed in early 2013, and Al-Nusrah Front, a branch of al-Qa'ida formed in 2012.


The majority of terrorist groups in Iraq are Sunni and are opposed to the Shia dominated government. In the 2014 parliamentary elections 53 per cent of the seats were won by Shia parties as opposed to just 11 per cent of seats for Sunni parties. The remaining seats were won by Kurds or secular parties. The demographic split between Shia and Sunni is 66 per cent and 34 per cent respectively.

As is characteristic of terrorist attacks generally, the majority of incidents were not claimed by any group. In 2013, 4,660 people were killed by terrorist acts by unknown actors, representing 73 per cent of all attacks. The tactics used by terrorist groups in Iraq remain almost exclusively confined to bombings and explosions. This method was responsible for 87 per cent of deaths and 97 per

2,492 INCIDENTS



INCREASE IN DEATHS SINCE 2002



MAJOR ATTACK

WORST ATTACK

47 killed and 85 injured when a suicide bomber targeted Shiite pilgrims. ISIL suspected.



cent of injuries. Suicide attacks also continue to be used with a very high cost on human lives, with an average of over seven deaths per suicide attack. There were 232 suicide attacks, which were responsible for 27 per cent of fatalities. ISIL took responsibility for the majority of suicide bombings, averaging nearly 10 deaths and 18 injuries per attack.


Political assassinations were less likely to be successful, accounting for nearly half of the 165 failed terrorist attacks. There were more than 430 casualties from attempted political assassinations. The majority of assassinations targeted political figures, but police, private citizens and leaders of other terrorist groups were also targeted.

Of all terrorist attacks, 25 per cent took place in Baghdad, with Mosul, Baqubah, Kirkuk and Tuz Khormato also experiencing considerable activity. There were 135 cities that had one terrorist attack and 115 cities that had two or more attacks. This demonstrates how widespread terrorism is across the country.

Of the 19 provinces in Iraq, 17 experienced terrorism. The two provinces without terrorism were both in the Iraqi Kurdistan region. There were 1,424 attacks and 3,414 deaths in the four provinces of Al Anbar, Diyala, Nineveh and Saladin. These four provinces also had more than twice as many terrorist attacks than the capital of Baghdad. The number of attacks in these provinces doubled in 2013 while the number of deaths was two and a half times higher.

AFGHANISTAN

GTI RANK: 2
GTI SCORE: 9.39/10





1,148 INCIDENTS

DEAD 3,111

INJURED 3,721

INCREASE IN DEATHS SINCE 2002



Terrorism is increasing in Afghanistan, with ten per cent more terrorist attacks and 13 per cent more fatalities in 2013 than 2012. Whilst there were seven different terrorist groups active in Afghanistan, one group, the Taliban, was responsible for the majority of attacks and casualties. The Taliban remains one of the most deadly terrorist groups in the world. In both 2012 and 2013 the Taliban was responsible for 75 per cent of all terrorist fatalities in Afghanistan. In 2013 unknown actors accounted for 23 per cent of deaths by terrorism. The remainder of fatalities were claimed by six terrorist groups.

In 2013 there were terrorist acts in over 440 different cities in Afghanistan, clearly highlighting the breadth of terrorism across the country. However 304 cities suffered only one terrorist attack. There were 36 attacks in the capital Kabul and 25 attacks in the old capital of Kandahar. Police are the targets of most attacks, being targeted 46 per cent of the time and suffering 53 per cent of the deaths. Private citizens are the second biggest target group, with 21 per cent of attacks and 19 per cent of deaths.

Although attacks on schools and educational institutions account for only two per cent of attacks they result in one of the highest injury rates per attack averaging nearly ten injuries but only one death. The Taliban is opposed to the education of girls and when in power banned girls above the age of eight from attending school. In 2013 the Taliban conducted at least seven


attacks targeting girls attending school, mostly in the north, resulting in over 160 casualties.

Bombings and explosions were the most common tactic used in Afghanistan, accounting for over half of all attacks and fatalities. A quarter of all terrorist attacks were armed assaults, with 37 per cent of deaths attributed to this tactic. Almost all armed assaults were with firearms, although there were a few instances of knives and axe attacks with at least 19 beheadings. There were over 100 suicide bombings in 2013, mostly by the Taliban. Suicide bombings were very deadly, averaging five deaths and ten injuries per attack.



PAKISTAN

GTI RANK: 3
GTI SCORE: 9.37/10



Terrorism in Pakistan is strongly influenced by its proximity to Afghanistan with most attacks occurring near the border involving the Taliban. Like in Afghanistan, terrorism increased significantly in Pakistan in 2013, with a 37 per cent increase in deaths and 28 per cent increase in injuries since 2012. Nearly half of all attacks had no groups that have claimed responsibility. The deadliest group in Pakistan in 2013, responsible for almost a quarter of all deaths and 49 per cent of all claimed attacks, is Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistani Taliban.

Terrorism in Pakistan has a diverse array of actors. In 2013 there were 23 different terrorist groups, down from 29 groups in 2012. However, 11 groups account for the majority of the 270 claimed attacks. While many of these groups are Islamist there are also other organisations such as separatist movements for Baloch, the Bettani tribe and Sindhi people.



Over 60 per cent of fatalities were from bombings and explosions and around 26 per cent from firearms. A quarter of targets and deaths were against private citizens, with police accounting for 20 per cent of targets and deaths. The deadliest attacks were against religious figures and institutions which, on average, killed over five people and injured over 11 per attack. This includes the killing of 87 people attending All Saints Church in Peshawar city from two suicide bombs by a sub-group of the Pakistani Taliban.

1,933 INCIDENTS

DEAD **2,345**


INJURED **5,035**

INCREASE IN DEATHS SINCE 2002




The Pakistani Taliban also, like the Taliban in Afghanistan, is opposed to the western education and the education of girls and has targeted schools and advocates of equal education. This issue gained worldwide recognition in October 2012 when a 15 year old school girl and advocate of female education, Malala Yousafzai, was shot by gunmen from the Pakistani Taliban on a school bus in the northwest. In 2014 Malala Yousafzai, along with the Indian activist Kailash Satyarthi campaigning against forced childhood labour, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Despite the international attention brought to the issue, violence continues and in 2013 there were over 100 attacks on educational institutions, with a total of 150 casualties. Suicide bombings were used by the Pakistani Taliban and three other groups, all of which have some affiliation with the Pakistani Taliban. In 2013 there were 71 suicide attacks responsible for around 2,740 casualties.

More than 500 cities in Pakistan had at least one terrorist incident in 2013, with two or more incidents occurring in 180 cities. Of all attacks 16 per cent occurred in the largest city of Karachi in the south. However, the majority of attacks occurred in the north closer to the border with Afghanistan. This includes cities such as Peshawar, Quetta and Jamrud, which combined, had more attacks than Karachi. The city of Parachinar in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the closest point in Pakistan to Kabul in Afghanistan, has among the highest rates of deaths per incident in Pakistan with 87 people killed from seven incidents.





GTI RANK: 4
GTI SCORE: 8.58/10



303 INCIDENTS

DEAD **1,826** **INJURED** **457**

INCREASE IN DEATHS SINCE 2002



The dramatic increase in terrorism in Nigeria can be attributed to the rise of Boko Haram. Boko Haram can be translated to mean ‘western education is forbidden’. In 2013 this Islamist terrorist group killed at least 1,587 people and claimed responsibility for nearly 90 per cent of all terrorist acts in Nigeria. They are one of the most deadly terrorist groups in the world with an average of close to eight deaths per terrorist attack.

The nature of terrorism in Nigeria is different to Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Terrorist activity in Nigeria has more in common with the tactics of organised crime and gangs, focusing on armed assaults using firearms and knives than the bombing or suicide tactics of other large terrorist groups. Armed assault has claimed 85 per cent of deaths in Nigeria while bombings or explosions account for five per cent of deaths. Suicide attacks are very rare, approximately 12 per cent of terrorist attacks are kidnappings or hostage takings.

The majority of these kidnappings are by Boko Haram. In 2013 targets included business leaders such as the Manager of the Nigerian Flour Mills; senior police officers such the Divisional Police Officer of Borno State; people with government connections like the former minister of Petroleum Resources;


members of the military; and women and children. This includes the more than 200 Chibok girls kidnapped in northern Nigeria in early 2014 from their school. Boko Haram announced the girls were to become slaves and wives for their members.

Most terrorist attacks were in the northeast of Nigeria where Boko Haram is based, with 16 per cent of attacks in the regional capital of Maiduguri.

Apart from Boko Haram, six other terrorist groups were responsible for attacks in 2013. Three of these groups are Islamist and the other groups are separatists or oppositional groups. One of the largest terrorist groups in Nigeria, with an estimated membership of 15,000, is the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, who were responsible for 14 fatalities in 2013. This group has been active since 2004 and aims to force oil revenues to be shared with impoverished regions. Whilst they have a larger membership than Boko Haram, they are responsible for fewer deaths, killing 268 people since 2006.



GTI RANK: 5
GTI SCORE: 8.12/10



The dramatic rise of terrorism in Syria is a direct result of the Syrian civil war. There were no recorded acts of terrorism in the two years prior to the civil war commencing in 2011. By 2012 there were 136 terrorist attacks and over 600 deaths. In 2013, this has increased to 217 attacks and over 1,000 deaths. There are at least ten different terrorist groups active in Syria, many of which are Sunni and opposed to the Alawite Assad regime.

It is estimated that the civil war has led to between 180,000 and 260,000 deaths and the displacement of over 35 per cent of the population of the country. The majority of these deaths are classified as a result of conventional warfare rather than acts of terrorism. However, terrorism has been deployed as a tactic by some of the rebel forces to bring about a political, economic, religious, or social goal rather than purely military objectives.



It is unknown which group was responsible for half of the terrorist attacks in Syria in 2013, and as a result of the civil war the number of attacks may be underreported. Some of the biggest groups in Syria include ISIL, the Free Syrian Army, Hizballah and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Gen Cmd (PFLP-GC).

The Sunni and al-Qa'ida linked Al-Nusra Front claimed responsibility for more than 40 per cent of deaths from terrorism in 2013. This group regularly uses suicide attacks,

217 INCIDENTS

DEAD **1,078** **INJURED** **1,776**

INCREASE IN DEATHS SINCE 2002



employing suicide bombing in nearly a third of their attacks. They are also one of the most deadly groups, averaging nearly 19 deaths per attack.


The most common form of terrorist attacks are bombings or explosions, which account for 70 per cent of attacks that are generally targeted at private citizens. Kidnappings account for 18 per cent of all incidents. Most of the kidnappings are of journalists, although NGO workers and UN Peacekeepers have all been kidnapped in 2013. Syria is the only country among those most impacted by terrorism where journalists are a major target of terrorist attacks. Nearly 70 per cent of all journalists killed last year in Syria were Syrian citizens.

In 2013 at least 16 European journalists were kidnapped, including Danish, French, Italian, Polish, Spanish and Swedish journalists. Two American journalists who were kidnapped in Syria, James Foley and Steven Sotloff, were both murdered in late 2014 by ISIL.

Although the entire country is affected by a very severe civil conflict, terrorism is largely centralised. There were 57 cities that had a terrorist attack, of which only 16 cities had more than one attack. Terrorism is largely concentrated around large cities, with 42 per cent of attacks taking place in the capital of Damascus and 12 per cent in the largest city of Aleppo.




GTI RANK: 6
GTI SCORE: 7.86/10



624 INCIDENTS

DEAD 404 **INJURED 719**

DECREASE IN DEATHS SINCE 2002




Terrorism increased by 70 per cent in India from 2012 to 2013, with the number of deaths increasing from 238 to 404. The number of attacks also increased, with 55 more attacks in 2013 than 2012. However, the majority of terrorist attacks in India have low casualties. In 2013 around 70 per cent of attacks were non-lethal. There were attacks by 43 different terrorist groups who can be categorised into three groups: Islamists; separatists; and communists.

Communist terrorist groups are by far the most frequent perpetrators and the main cause of deaths in India. Three Maoist communist groups claimed responsibility for 192 deaths in 2013, which was nearly half of all deaths from terrorism in India. Police are overwhelmingly the biggest targets of Maoists, accounting for half of all deaths and injuries. This is mainly through armed assaults, which killed 85, and bombings and explosions, which killed 43. Kidnapping is also a common tactic of the Maoists where it is often used as political tool to force the government to release Maoist prisoners. The majority of Maoist attacks occurred in the provinces of Bihar, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand.


Generally, the dispute with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir is the source of Islamic terrorism. In 2013 three Islamist groups were responsible for around 15 per cent of deaths. This includes Hizbul Mujahideen, an Islamist group allegedly based in Pakistan with a membership of around 15,000. This group was the only group in India to use suicide tactics in 2013. Islamist groups in

India commonly use armed assaults targeting the police or bombings targeting private citizens. The majority of attacks occur in Hyderabad in the south, a city with a 40 per cent Muslim population, and Jammu and Kashmir in the north, an area which is nearly two thirds Muslim. In September 2014 al-Qa'ida announced a presence in India, hoping to unite other Islamist groups.

India's north east region has for the last three decades seen continual ethno-political unrest from ethnic secessionist movements. Separatist groups including in Assam, Bodoland, Kamtapur and Meghalaya were responsible for 16 per cent of deaths. Targeting private citizens, police and businesses, attacks are generally restricted to the geographic region as most of these groups are relatively small and have local claims.



GTI RANK: 7
GTI SCORE: 7.41/10



Somalia continues to face violence in the south with rebel forces and terrorist groups using terrorist tactics. The number of people killed in Somalia from terrorism increased by 32 per cent from 2012 to 2013. 2013 has been the deadliest year of the past 14 years with 405 people killed, up from 307 in 2012.


In 2013, the Al-Shabaab group was responsible for all claimed attacks. This militant group is allied with Al-Qa'ida and has an estimated 4,000 to 6,000 soldiers. Unlike some other Al-Qa'ida affiliates, there has been infighting in Al-Shabaab over whether it should focus on local and regional objectives rather than transcontinental jihad. Notably, this was one of the reasons why the American recruit to Al-Shabaab, Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki, was killed by Al-Shabaab in 2013 as he criticised the group for being too focused on Somali outcomes to the detriment of international jihad. Nevertheless, Al-Shabaab has attracted foreign fighters and has partnered with other groups.

Al-Shabaab was responsible for the Westgate shopping mall attack in September 2013 in Kenya, which resulted in 67 deaths and 175 injuries. This was reportedly in retaliation for the involvement of the Kenyan military in a military operation to eradicate the group in Somalia. The leadership of Al-Shabaab contains many Somalis trained in the Iraq and Afghani conflicts. Many of the organisation's leaders have been killed, including the overall leader, Moktar Ali Zubeyr killed by a U.S. drone strike in September 2014. There have been reports that members of

197 INCIDENTS

DEAD **405** **INJURED** **492**

INCREASE IN DEATHS SINCE 2002




Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram have trained together. Al-Shabaab has controlled several areas of Somalia including the capital Mogadishu in 2010. In recent times African Union support for the Somalia government has restricted their military operations.

Al-Shabaab generally uses guerrilla warfare and is structured as an insurgency force in three parts: intelligence gathering; law enforcement; and a military arm. Most of the attacks are bombings or explosions which average around two and a half deaths per attack. One in ten attacks are suicide bombings. Suicide assault teams have become a feature in attacks by Al-Shabaab. Suicide bombings are much more deadly than other explosions, with an average of nine and a half deaths per attack. Such attacks have been used primarily against the government but also the military and police. Private citizens are generally not the target of suicide bombings. Armed assaults are used nearly 20 per cent of the time and are mainly used against private citizens.

Southern Somalia has 90 per cent of attacks, with most of the remaining attacks occurring in Puntland in the north-east. Somaliland to the north-west saw the least terrorist activity. Almost half of all attacks were in the largest city and capital Mogadishu and 15 per cent of attacks in the port city of Kismayo in the south. Al-Shabaab announced it would further target the government in Puntland, with terrorist attacks in the Bari region increasing threefold from 2012 to 2013.



GTI RANK: 8
GTI SCORE: 7.31/10



Terrorist attacks and injuries increased by 50 per cent between 2012 and 2013. However, the attacks were less fatal with a 15 per cent reduction in fatalities to 291. Whilst there were nine different groups active in Yemen in 2013, two major terrorist groups committed over 80 per cent of terrorist acts. The other groups include tribesmen and separatists. It is unknown who committed 16 per cent of attacks in 2013. The two most active terrorist groups are the Houthis and al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The Houthis are the smaller group and claimed responsibility for 20 per cent of deaths in 2013 with 18 separate attacks, whereas AQAP claimed responsibility for 60 per cent of attacks in 2013 with 83 separate attacks. Both groups in Yemen are in conflict with the government and deploy terrorist tactics. Despite this, the Houthis and AQAP are opposed to each other and are based in separate parts of the country.

AQAP is an al-Qa'ida affiliate which is currently being led by Nasir al-Wuhayshi who was Usama bin Ladin's former secretary. The group was responsible for the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 which resulted in the deaths of 17 U.S. soldiers. It is considered to be one of the most active al-Qa'ida affiliates.³ AQAP mainly has operated in the south of Yemen and has been the target of U.S. predator drone attacks since 2002. AQAP are responsible for over 850 deaths from 300 terrorist attacks in the last four years. In 2013 they killed 177 people and they were the only group in Yemen to use suicide bombings. Suicide bombings were very

295 INCIDENTS

DEAD 291 **INJURED 583**

INCREASE IN DEATHS SINCE 2002



deadly, with an average of 11 deaths and nearly 30 injuries per attack. These bombings overwhelmingly targeted the government. This includes the bombing of the Ministry of Defence in Sana'a city, which resulted in 68 deaths and 215 injuries. AQAP focused attacks on Sana'a and the city of Dhamar in south-west Yemen.



The other major terrorist group, the Houthis, is a militant Islamist insurgency made up of followers of a Shia sect known as Zaydi. The Houthis are in conflict with the Yemen government opposing the Sunni-majority government and military. In September of 2014, the Houthis invaded the capital city demanding a change of government.

The Houthis are also opposed to AQAP, a Sunni group, and there have been several major battles between the two groups. Since 2009 the Houthis have killed 200 people in terrorist attacks from 28 separate attacks. The Houthis are a deadly terrorist group averaging over six deaths per attack. Their most deadly attack occurred in 2010 when 30 people were killed when they attacked pro-government Bin Aziz tribesmen. Most attacks by the Houthis target the capital city Sana'a, with all but one attack in 2013 occurring in Sana'a or in the administrative centre of Amanat Al Asimah. In late 2014 the Houthis had administrative control over parts of north-west Yemen including partial or full control over the governorates of Al Jawf, Al Mahwit, 'Amran, Hajjah, Saada and Sana'a.



PHILIPPINES

GTI RANK: 9
GTI SCORE: 7.29/10




Terrorism has increased significantly in the Philippines between 2012 and 2013, with almost twice as many incidents. The number of deaths has also more than doubled in this period increasing from 122 to 292. Terrorism in the Philippines is intrinsically tied with nationalist and separatist claims by people living in provinces in southern Philippines. However, terrorism is spread across the country. There were 438 cities that suffered a terrorist attack in 2013 of which only 104 had one attack. The city that saw the highest number of terrorist attacks was Cotabato City in Mindanao with 11 separate attacks that killed 11 people. 83 per cent of the 81 provinces of the Philippines had at least one terrorist attack in 2013.

Whilst there were seven known groups that carried out a terrorist act in 2013 most activity is carried out by the New People's Army, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The largest individual group was the New People's Army, a communist organisation, which claimed responsibility for 30 per cent of deaths in 2013. Armed assault represented nearly half of all fatalities, followed by assassinations, which constituted a quarter of all fatalities. This differs from many other parts of the world where use of explosives and bombings are more common.

499 INCIDENTS

DEAD 292 INJURED 444

INCREASE IN DEATHS SINCE 2002




MAJOR ATTACK
 WORST ATTACK
9 killed and 7 injured when police were targeted with a bomb and shooting. New People's Army (NPA) suspected.



Assassinations were prominent with 56 per cent of attempts successful. In total, 103 people were killed by assassinations in 2013 which is more than five times higher than 2012. The use of these tactics and targets demonstrates that many of the terrorist groups in the Philippines are seeking to directly change the political system. Around 34 per cent of deaths from terrorist attacks were targeting the government, with business leaders, private citizens and police representing between ten and seventeen per cent of deaths. Only the Islamist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) engaged in suicide bombing.

THAILAND

GTI RANK: 10
GTI SCORE: 7.19/10




In 2013 Thailand saw the lowest number of deaths from terrorism since 2005. The number of deaths from 2012 to 2013 decreased from 171 to 131. However, there were 116, or 54 per cent more terrorist attacks over this period. Three quarters of terrorist attacks were not claimed nor attributed to any group.

Terrorist activity is overwhelmingly confined to the south of the country where there is an ongoing insurgency between Muslim separatists and the Thai government, with Malay Muslims opposed to the Thai Buddhist minority and supporters of the government. This conflict has been ongoing since 2004 with estimates of 5,000 deaths and 10,000 casualties. The majority of attacks have historically occurred in the four southern border provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, Songkhla and Yala. Terrorist activity is so localised that out of the seventy-six provinces of Thailand, only 11 suffered from attacks. Five provinces only had one attack and six provinces had more than one attack. Peace talks hosted in Malaysia resumed in August 2014 after leaders of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) called to continue dialogue.

332 INCIDENTS

DEAD  131INJURED  398

INCREASE IN DEATHS SINCE 2002



-  **MAJOR ATTACK**
-  **WORST ATTACK**
6 killed and 1 injured when 4 gunmen on motorcycles opened fire on a grocery store. Unknown, but Barisan Revolusi Nasional suspected.



It is suspected that the majority of attacks are committed by a group of young independent militants not tied to any particular group. Militants are often young and are accordingly called Juwae. Older and more organised groups rarely claim responsibility for attacks. There is less evidence of groups working together, with groups appearing to be more fractured than in previous years.⁴

Only four terrorist groups are known to have committed terrorist attacks in 2013. BRN is the largest of these groups. Operating in the South, BRN is a separatist group with a membership estimated at 1,000. This group was responsible for 12 deaths from four attacks in 2013. Other separatist groups active in Southern Thailand include the Aba Cheali Group and Runda Kumpulan Kecil, both splinter groups of BRN. Armed assaults were much more deadly than bombings or explosions. The number of bombings increased 50 per cent between 2012 and 2013, with 170 separate bomb attacks. However, the majority of bomb attacks resulted in no fatalities with 44 total deaths as opposed to 77 deaths by firearms. The biggest targets were businesses followed by police. The majority of terrorist attacks in Thailand have relatively low death rates, with an average of 1.2 deaths per attack. No attack killed more than six people in 2013.

TRENDS

LARGEST INCREASES AND DECREASES IN TERRORISM 2012 TO 2013

Analysis of the year-to-year trends in terrorist attacks underscores its dynamic nature showing it can quickly intensify yet also fall away. As has been highlighted in the results section, the majority of terrorist attacks are concentrated in a small number of countries and this is where most of the year-to-year change is observed.

While this section focuses on number of deaths, this is not always perfectly reflective of changes in overall terrorist impact as some countries may experience more incidents but fewer deaths, as was the case in Yemen in 2013.

In 2013, 102 of the 162 countries included in this report did not experience a fatal terrorist attack. Of the remaining 60 countries, 40 experienced an increase in the number of fatalities when comparing 2012 to 2013. Conversely, there were 26 countries that had fewer deaths from terrorism in 2013 than 2012.

Eighty-seven countries experienced a terrorist incident in 2013, only slightly up from 81 in the 2012. This trend has remained fairly stable over the last 14-year period reflecting the fact that many terrorist incidents can manifest themselves in very small, non-lethal attacks.

The five countries with the biggest increases in deaths from 2012 to 2013 are also the countries most impacted by terrorism. The number of deaths in these five countries has increased by 52 per cent over this period. The country with the biggest increase in deaths was Iraq, which saw nearly 4,000 more fatalities from terrorism in 2013 than 2012,

representing a 164 per cent increase. The reason for the increase in Iraq is largely due to the actions of ISIL.

The country with the second largest increase in the numbers of deaths was Pakistan. However, Pakistan saw a much smaller increase than Iraq with 520 more deaths in 2013 than 2012. Pakistan saw a substantial increase in the number of deaths per attack. In particular, the second and third biggest terrorist groups, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jundallah, averaged 20 more fatalities per attack in 2013 than the previous year. This highlights the growing lethality of the groups.


Syria saw the third largest increase in the number of deaths between 2012 and 2013, increasing by 71 per cent. The increase in deaths in Syria is partly a result of the ongoing civil war which has displaced millions since its start in 2011. Most of the deaths in Syria have been classified as war deaths rather than terrorist deaths.

The increase in terrorism in Nigeria is due to Boko Haram which has increased in both members and resources. There was a significant increase in terrorism from 2009 after the founder and leader of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf, was killed.

The country with the fifth largest increase in deaths from terrorism is Afghanistan, where there was an increase of 13 per cent or 350 deaths from 2012 to 2013. This increase is largely due to further activity by the Taliban, which killed almost 2,350 in 2013 up from 2,050 in 2012.

FIGURE 6 LARGEST INCREASES IN DEATHS FROM 2012 TO 2013


The five biggest increases in deaths were in the countries where terrorism has the biggest impact.



Source: GTD

FIGURE 7 LARGEST REDUCTIONS IN DEATHS FROM 2012 TO 2013

Countries with the largest reduction in deaths from terrorism have all had relatively high historical rates of terrorism.



Source: GTD

The five countries with the biggest decrease in deaths from 2012 to 2013 still maintain high levels of terrorist activity, with Yemen and Thailand being amongst the ten countries suffering the most from terrorism.

The country with the biggest fall in deaths was Yemen, falling by 52, or 15 per cent. However, that does not mean that terrorism is no longer a significant threat. There were nearly 100 more attacks in 2013 than 2012. Similarly, the number of injuries from terrorism in Yemen increased from 2012 by 56 per cent to nearly 600. Yemen continues to confront a dual terrorist threat from the Houthis in the north of the country and al-Qa'ida in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) in the south.

Colombia experienced the second biggest improvement, with the death rate decreasing by 48 per cent to 55 deaths from 105 in 2012. This represents a substantial improvement over the decade average which was three times higher, averaging approximately 150 per year. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the largest terrorist group, have been in peace talks with the Colombian Government since 2013 and have substantially reduced the number of people they have killed.


The third biggest improvement was seen in Turkey, which experienced 57 deaths from terrorism in 2013, down from 100 in 2012. The decline in Turkey was largely due to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) decreasing terrorist attacks in Turkey in 2013. In 2012 the PKK killed 86 people, whereas in 2013 the PKK was responsible for only one death. However, the emergence of ISIL, which killed at least 53 people in Turkey in 2013, is a significant concern.

The fourth biggest improvement occurred in Thailand which saw 23 per cent less deaths in 2013 than 2012. At 131 deaths, 2013 was the lowest number of fatalities from terrorism in Thailand since 2005.

The fifth biggest improvement occurred in Cote d'Ivoire, which saw deaths decrease by 85 per cent with only four fatalities in 2013 compared to 27 in 2012. 2012 was the deadliest year for terrorists in Cote d'Ivoire since 2005. Terrorism in Cote d'Ivoire sometimes takes the form of periodic attacks with high casualties. This was the case in 2012 when a group loyal to the former President Gbagbo, who was arrested and imprisoned by the International Criminal Court, attacked a UN peacekeeping patrol and killed ten people.

FIGURE 8 TARGETS OF TERRORISM, 2000-2013

The primary target of terrorism has historically been private property and citizens. However since 2009 there has been a substantial proportional upsurge in incidents targeting police.



Source: GTD

PATTERNS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY SINCE 2000

This section summarises the overarching patterns and characteristics of terrorist activity over the last 14 years in terms of targets, weapons used, tactics, lethality, ideology and location.

The primary target of terrorism has been private property and citizens, followed by attacks on police. In MENA and South Asia explosives are primarily used, while in Central America, the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa, firearms are more regularly used. In North America, incendiary devices/firebombs are common.

Suicide attacks have been used in five per cent of all incidents since 2000.

Most terrorist attacks do not result in heavy loss of life. In 2013 over 50 per cent of all attacks claimed no fatalities and only 10 per cent claimed more than five lives. The most lethal terrorism occurs in MENA, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.


Around five per cent of all deaths from terrorism since 2000 have occurred in OECD countries.

Over the past 14 years there has been a large increase in religion as the motivator for terrorist activity. However in 2000, nationalist separatist movements were a more prominent motivation for terrorism than religion. Today, political and national separatist aims are still a significant driver of terrorism but unlike religion, they have seen comparatively little change over the period.

Figure 8 highlights that the primary target of most terrorist attacks has been private property and citizens, however from 2009 onwards the preferred target group gradually switched to police. These two groups in 2013 accounted for around 50 per cent of all incidents. Attacks on private property and citizens decreased from 35 per cent of total attacks to 25 per cent, while attacks on police increased from 10 per cent of total attacks in 2009 to 24 per cent in 2013. The trends of these two target groups show large fluctuations since 2000 rising and falling with subsequent events in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

FIGURE 9 WEAPONS TRENDS IN TERRORISM, 2000-2013


The proportion of weapons used in terrorist acts has remained relatively constant globally with approximately 60 per cent of all attacks using explosives, 30 per cent using firearms and 10 per cent using other weapons.



Source: GTD **Note:** Suicide attacks are dashed to indicate that they are included regardless of weapon used and therefore should not be included when adding proportions to total 100 per cent.

FIGURE 10 WEAPONS TYPES IN TERRORIST INCIDENTS BY REGION, 2000-2013

Explosive weapons are the predominant tactic used by terrorists in South America, MENA, Russia and the CIS, South Asia and Europe. Terrorists in Central America, the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa largely use firearms.



Source: GTD

Over the 14-year period attacks on business, transportation and religious figures have all been significant but proportionally have remained roughly the same. These trends are once again largely driven by events in the five countries with the highest levels of terrorism.

Figure 9 highlights that explosives have consistently been the most prevalent type of weapon used in attacks accounting for over 60 per cent of all incidents globally. Firearms are the next most common weapon being used around 30 per cent of the time. Only 10 per cent of attacks used some other form of weapon in 2013. Once again these global trends are highly dependent on the five countries with the highest levels of terrorism.

In North America, for example, incendiary weapons have been the primary mode of attack, with 132 instances since 2000. In Sub-Saharan Africa, firearms are far more prominent than explosives. This is highlighted with the recent upsurge in Boko Haram, which has used firearms in over 50 per cent of their attacks since 2009.

Figure 9 also highlights that only five per cent of all terrorist attacks in 2013 have been suicide attacks. Suicide attacks peaked in 2007 largely due to unrest in Iraq between terrorist groups and the then recently-formed Maliki Government, where 13 per cent of all terrorist incidents were suicide attacks.


Whilst the total number of attacks using suicide bombing, as well as the numbers of terrorist attacks in general has risen substantially in 2012 and 2013, suicide attacks have decreased as a proportion of total attacks. In 2012 and 2013 suicide attacks constituted five and six per cent respectively of all terrorist incidents compared to 2007 when suicide attacks accounted for 11 per cent of all attacks.

Figure 12 highlights the changes in ideological drivers of terrorist organisations since 2000. Grouping over 350 of the most active organisations in the world into either religious, political or nationalist separatist groups shows that religious organisations have seen the largest rise in activity over the period.⁵ The prevalence of nationalist separatist and political terrorist organisations has remained relatively stable by comparison. Notably, religious ideology in the year 2000 was less a motivation for terrorism than nationalist separatism.

Once again, these global trends are dominated by the five countries with the highest levels of terrorism. Figure 13 highlights that each region has its own profile. Since 2000,

FIGURE 11 LETHALITY TRENDS IN TERRORISM, 2000-2013


Since 2007, there have been proportionally fewer incidents recorded that have killed more than five people while the per cent of non-fatal attacks has increased.



Source: GTD

FIGURE 12 TRENDS IN TERRORIST GROUP IDEOLOGY, 2000-2013


Religion as a driving ideology for terrorism has dramatically increased since 2000. However, in 2000 Nationalist Separatist movements were more prominent. Political and National Separatist movements are still significant in 2013 but have seen little change in activity over the period.



Source: GTD **Note:** Only 358 of the most active terrorist organisations have been classified in this analysis. Therefore, the number of incidents will not match the total numbers shown in previous figures.

FIGURE 13 TRENDS IN REGIONAL TERRORIST IDEOLOGIES, 2000-2013

Religious ideologies as a motivation for terrorism is not a global phenomenon. While it is predominant in Sub-Saharan Africa, MENA and South Asia, in the rest of the world terrorism is more likely to be driven by political or nationalistic and separatist movements.



Source: GTD

terrorist activity in Europe, Central and South America has been almost entirely due to nationalist separatist movements and political organisations.

Due to the conflict with Chechnya and Georgia, terrorism in Russia has been largely separatist in nature. In China and the Asia-Pacific, terrorist activity is approximately evenly split between all three ideological strains. Domestic terrorist incidents in North America have been primarily of a political nature.

RELIGION AS A DRIVING IDEOLOGY FOR TERRORISM HAS INCREASED SINCE 2000.

TRENDS AND PATTERNS OF SUICIDE ATTACKS


Suicide attacks in general are confined to only a few countries. Figure 14 shows that of the 2,500 suicide attacks since 2000, over 90 per cent occurred in MENA and South Asia. In these two regions, suicide attacks average between 11 and 13 fatalities per incident. These are the highest averages for all regions with the exception of North America due to the attacks of September 11.

Overall, suicide attacks average 11 deaths per attack while other terrorist attacks average two. By these numbers it can be derived that suicide attacks are on average four and a half times more lethal than other forms of terrorism.

Statistically, suicide bombing assassination attempts are less successful than other forms, with 56 per cent of assassination attempts using suicide bombing ending in failure. Six per cent of suicide attacks are assassination attempts. However, suicide attacks are much more deadly than other forms of terrorism.

FIGURE 14 SUICIDE ATTACKS BY REGION FROM 2000 TO 2013

Since 2000, only five per cent of all incidents have been suicide attacks. Of these 2,500 events, over 90 per cent of attacks occurred in South Asia and MENA.



Source: GTD

TABLE 1 NUMBER OF SUICIDE ATTACKS BY ORGANISATION FROM 2000 TO 2013

The Taliban, al-Qa’ida and ISIL have claimed the most suicide attacks in the period. However Hamas has proportionally used suicide attacks the most since 2000.

ORGANISATION	SUICIDE ATTACKS SINCE 2000			LAST ATTACK
	Total number of attacks	Number of suicide attacks	Percentage	
HAMAS (ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT)	195	46	24%	2008
AL-AQSA MARTYRS BRIGADE	152	35	23%	2008
AL-QA’IDA IN IRAQ	579	105	18%	2013
ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT	492	84	17%	2013
AL-QA’IDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA (AQAP)	298	42	14%	2013
TEHRIK-I-TALIBAN PAKISTAN (TTP)	778	97	12%	2013
LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM (LTTE)	499	35	7%	2009
AL-SHABAAB	630	43	7%	2013
BOKO HARAM	750	37	5%	2013

The Taliban, al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and ISIL have used suicide bombing the most since 2000, with a combined total of approximately 2,000 attacks. For these groups this represents between 12 and 18 per cent of their total attacks. All three of these organisations used suicide attacks in 2013.

Whilst suicide attacks constitute a minority of total terrorist attacks, different terrorist groups use it as a tactic proportionally more than others. Hamas has historically had the highest prevalence of suicide attacks in their operations with 24 per cent of all incidents being suicide attacks. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, another group based in the West Bank and Gaza, have used suicide attacks the second most at 23 per cent. However, neither Hamas nor the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade has used this tactic since 2008.


The majority of suicide attacks have been committed by jihadist groups in the Middle East. Whilst many of the groups which employ suicide tactics are associated with al-Qa'ida in some way, suicide bombing is not necessarily directed by al-Qa'ida.⁶ Many jihadists follow their family and peers rather than orders from afar.⁷

Over the last 14 years the numbers of suicide attacks have increased and the areas where the majority of attacks occurred have changed. From 2000 to 2003 the majority of suicide attacks occurred in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza. A truce started in 2003 and led to the gradual decline of attacks and it wasn't till 2006 when Hamas won a majority in the Palestinian legislative election and denounced the use of suicide bombing that the tactic ended. In 2003, with the invasion of Iraq and subsequent war, suicide bombing started in Iraq. Iraq accounts for 43 per cent of all deaths from suicide attacks in the last decade. Proportionally however suicide attacks still remain low.

SINCE 2000, OVER 90% OF SUICIDE ATTACKS TOOK PLACE IN MENA AND SOUTH ASIA.

FIGURE 15 NUMBER OF DEATHS FROM SUICIDE ATTACKS, 2000 - 2013

After 2002 the number of suicide attacks in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza significantly declined, whereas the attacks that occurred in Iraq drastically increased.



Source: GTD

TERRORISM IN THE OECD

Since 2000, seven per cent of all terrorist incidents and five per cent of all fatalities have occurred in OECD countries resulting in 4,861 deaths from 3,151 attacks. Excluding the September 11 attacks, OECD countries on average suffered approximately 229 attacks annually and lost on average 130 lives per year to terrorist acts.

The U.S. accounted for the largest loss of life with 3,042 fatalities, however the September 11 attacks accounted for 2,996 of these deaths. Israel was the country with next highest number of fatalities at 841 representing 17 per cent of total fatalities followed by Turkey with 445 fatalities, representing 9 per cent of OECD fatalities.

Excluding the September 11 attacks, there were still 1,865 deaths from terrorism in OECD countries over the 14 years from 2000 to 2013. Luxembourg is the only OECD country not to be covered by the GTI.

Although OECD countries represent a minority of terrorist attacks globally, they have suffered from several of the most deadly attacks of the last 14 years. This includes the September 11 attacks which killed nearly 3,000 people, the Madrid train bombings which killed 191, the Norwegian massacre which killed 77 and the London bombings which killed 56.

As the security situation varies from nation to nation, this report does not provide a detailed analysis of each individual country; instead it analyses the overall level of activity in OECD countries, which organisations historically have presented the greatest

risks and what are the most common types of attacks.


In 2013 Turkey and Mexico were the countries in the OECD with the highest number of deaths from terrorism losing 57 and 40 lives respectively; however the UK recorded the highest number of incidents at 131 of which 88 per cent occurred in Northern Ireland.

Other countries which suffered fatalities from terrorism were the United States, United Kingdom, Greece, Israel, Chile and the Czech Republic, collectively losing a total of 16 lives. Terrorist incidents were much higher in European OECD countries than North American and Latin American countries with 244 and 20 incidents recorded respectively in 2013.

According to data from the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), of the 34 OECD countries, 20 are believed to have citizens fighting in Syria against the Assad Government.⁸ Figure 26 (on page 57) summarises available data from a variety of sources on foreign fighters.

FIGURE 16 TERRORIST FATALITIES IN OECD COUNTRIES, 2000-2013

Five per cent of all 107,000 terrorist fatalities since 2000 have occurred in OECD countries.



Source: GTD

TABLE 2 DEATHS FROM TERRORISM IN 2013 FOR OECD COUNTRIES

Terrorism killed 57 people in Turkey and 40 people in Mexico in 2013. The United States, United Kingdom, Greece, Israel, Chile and the Czech Republic also had fatal terrorist attacks, collectively losing 16 lives.

COUNTRY	ATTACKS	DEATHS	COUNTRY	ATTACKS	DEATHS
Turkey	34	57	Germany	0	0
Mexico	4	40	Netherlands	0	0
United States	9	6	Belgium	0	0
UK*	131	3	Australia	0	0
Greece	53	2	Austria	0	0
Israel	28	2	Portugal	0	0
Chile	4	2	Estonia	0	0
Czech Republic	1	1	Iceland	0	0
Ireland	24	0	Hungary	0	0
Italy	7	0	Japan	0	0
France	5	0	Finland	0	0
Spain	5	0	New Zealand	0	0
Canada	3	0	Poland	0	0
Switzerland	2	0	Slovakia	0	0
Denmark	1	0	Slovenia	0	0
Norway	0	0	South Korea	0	0
Sweden	0	0			

THE MOST ACTIVE TERRORIST GROUPS IN THE OECD

This section of the report covers the last five years in which 447 people died from terrorism in the OECD from 1,284 incidents. During the five years from 2009 to 2013, terrorism in the OECD was predominately concentrated in two countries, Turkey and Mexico, which had 58 per cent of all deaths over the last five years.

Lone individuals who were not affiliated with any terrorist group accounted for 25 per cent of the deaths in OECD countries over the last five years with for 113 fatalities. The four groups covered below as well as individual actors accounted for 338 deaths or 76 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in OECD countries over the last five years.

Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)

- OECD countries attacked in last five years: Turkey
- Incidents in last five years in OECD countries: 156
- Fatalities in last five years in OECD countries: 129
- Injuries in last five years in OECD countries: 303

The PKK are responsible for the most terrorist deaths in the OECD in the last five years. They were established in 1978 and initially sought an independent Kurdish state.⁹ However, in recent years the group has focussed more on Kurdish autonomy within a Turkish state. Operating primarily in Turkey and Iraq, waves of violence waged by the PKK in the 1990's are estimated to have caused approximately 40,000 casualties.¹⁰ In the past five years the PKK has been responsible for 29 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in the OECD.

Individual Actors

- OECD countries attacked in last five years: Belgium, France, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden and the United States.
- Incidents in last five years: 35
- Fatalities in last five years: 113
- Injuries in last five years: 144

Individual actors are the second major cause of terrorist deaths in the OECD in the last five years. They are people who are not formally members of a terrorist group but may work in cooperation with one. In the last five years individual actors have been responsible for over a quarter of all terrorist deaths in OECD countries. These individuals could either be attempting to promote their own cause or to support another group. One prominent example of lone wolf terrorism occurred in Norway in July 2011 when a right-wing extremist killed 77 and injured over 300 in two attacks in part to promote his manifesto. Another example is in 2013 with the Boston Marathon Bombing on April 15 which was conducted by two brothers who learned ideology and terrorist tactics from al-Qa'ida publications.¹¹

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)

- OECD countries attacked in last five years: Turkey
- Incidents in last five years in OECD countries: 2
- Fatalities in last five years in OECD countries: 53
- Injuries in last five years in OECD countries: 140

Over the last five years ISIL was responsible for a quarter of all deaths from terrorism in Turkey. This makes them the fourth most active group in the OECD. What is striking is that they have not been active in Turkey for long and in a short period of time have replaced the PKK as the most deadly group in the country killing 53 people in 2013. It is important to note that these numbers only count up to the end of 2013.

Individualidades Tendiendo a lo Salvaje (Individuals Tending Toward Savagery)

- OECD countries attacked in last five years: Mexico
- Incidents in last five years in OECD countries: 2
- Fatalities in last five years in OECD countries: 37
- Injuries in last five years in OECD countries: 102

This group, based in Mexico, have branded themselves as anarchist eco-terrorists opposed to nanotechnology.¹² They have claimed responsibility for an explosion at the Pemex state oil company offices which killed 37 people in January 2013. They have also claimed responsibility of shooting a biotechnology researcher, Ernesto Mendez Salinas to death in 2011.¹³ If responsible for both attacks then they are the fourth most deadly terrorist group in the OECD in the last five years. Deaths from the drug wars which have been active in Mexico over the last decade are not classified as terrorism because they are organised criminal groupings without unified political or ideological objectives.

LONE INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE NOT AFFILIATED WITH ANY TERRORIST GROUP ACCOUNTED FOR 25 PER CENT OF THE DEATHS IN OECD COUNTRIES.

Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Cephesi (DHKP/C)

- OECD countries attacked in last five years: Turkey
- Incidents in last five years in OECD countries: 10
- Fatalities in last five years in OECD countries: 6
- Injuries in last five years in OECD countries: 16

The DHKP/C, a Marxist-Leninist party formed in Turkey in 1978 is the fifth most active terrorist group in the OECD over the past five years.¹⁴ It aims to establish a socialist state within Turkey and is strongly opposed to the United States, NATO and Turkish establishment.¹⁵ They have claimed responsibility for the suicide bombing outside the U.S. Embassy in Ankara in 2013 which killed an embassy guard and injured one.¹⁶

ASSESSING TERRORISM RISK

This section describes how the results of the statistical analysis carried out for the GTI can be used to develop a quantitative understanding of the future risk of terrorism.

Using terrorist incidents and events data dating back to 1970 and comparing it to over 5,000 socio-economic, political and conflict indicators, three groups of factors related to terrorist activity have been identified. Countries that are weak on these factors and do not have high levels of terrorism are assessed as being at risk.

The correlations section of this report details the most significant socio-economic correlates with terrorism. There are three groups of factors:

- Social hostilities between different ethnic, religious and linguistic groups, lack of intergroup cohesion and group grievances.
- Measures of state repression such as extrajudicial killings, political terror and gross human rights abuses.
- Other forms of violence such as violent crime, organised conflict deaths and violent demonstrations.

Terrorism risk can be clearly grouped into three categories or contexts:

1. The risk of terrorism in the context of a larger ongoing conflict.
2. The risk of terrorism in countries without conflict.
3. The risk of 'black swan' attacks.

This analysis finds that meaningful risk factors can be identified for two of the three risk categories, (1) risk of terrorism in a context of a larger conflict, and (2) risk of terrorism in countries without conflict. 'Black Swan' events are by their nature very difficult to predict, but statistical analysis can provide important context to their overall likelihood. The methodology for conceptualising each category of risk is detailed further within this section.

Understanding the statistical patterns of terrorist activity and its socio-economic drivers is a useful starting point for conceptualising the key risk factors. Over 5,000 datasets, indexes and attitudinal surveys were statistically compared to the GTI to find the most significant socio-economic factors linked to terrorist activity. This process identified several key indicators which were significantly correlated to terrorism.

These factors were compared to the literature on the conditions that are considered conducive for breeding terrorist violence. There was significant overlap between the IEP statistical analysis and the literature.¹⁷ Several key variables were then chosen and a multivariate analysis was performed to understand key causal factors. This process is further detailed in the correlations section. Key factors analysed were:

- Weak state capacity.
- Illegitimate and corrupt governments.
- Powerful external actors upholding corrupt regimes.
- Extremist ideologies.
- Historical violence and conflict.
- Inequality in power.
- Repression by foreign occupation or colonial powers.
- Discrimination based on ethnic or religious origin.
- Failure of the state to integrate dissident groups of emerging social classes.
- Social injustice.

To determine which countries are most at risk of a large increase in terrorism, the 162 countries covered in the GTI were compared to these factors to find which countries performed poorly on these measures and were not already suffering from high levels of terrorism.

KEY FINDINGS

Based on measuring these factors IEP has identified the following 13 countries as being at risk of substantial increased terrorist activity from current levels:

- Angola
- Bangladesh
- Burundi
- Central African Republic
- Cote d'Ivoire
- Ethiopia
- Iran
- Israel
- Mali
- Mexico
- Myanmar
- Sri Lanka
- Uganda

One of the most important findings in this report is that there is not a strong statistical link between poverty and terrorism.¹⁸ Many people who join terrorist groups in wealthy countries are well educated and come from middle class families.¹⁹ A detailed understanding of what is statistically associated with terrorism is contained in the correlates section of this report. Other measures which didn't correlate include life expectancy, mean years of schooling and economic factors such as GDP growth.

In comparison to other forms of violence, in 2012 the number of people killed by homicide was 40 times greater than those killed by terrorism. Furthermore, terrorist incidents that kill more than 100 people are rare and represent only 1 in 1000 terrorist incidents. The required resources and the planning needed to conduct such attacks are more likely to be outside the capabilities of most existing groups.

BOX 1 TERRORIST ACTIVITY AND THE PILLARS OF PEACE

Countries with higher levels of terrorism perform significantly worse on the Pillars of Peace, a framework developed by IEP to assess the positive peace factors that create peaceful societies. The ten countries with the most deaths from terrorism in 2013 performed 26 per cent worse on the Pillars of Peace compared to the international average. These countries performed particularly poorly on three out of the eight Pillars of Peace. These three Pillars are:

- Free flow of information, which captures the extent to which citizens can gain access to information, whether the media is free and independent. Peaceful countries tend to have free and independent media, which disseminate information in a way that leads to greater openness and helps individuals and civil society work together. This leads to better decision-making and rational responses in times of crisis.
- Good relations with neighbours, which refers to the relations between individuals and between communities as well as to cross-border relations. Some of the countries with the highest levels of terrorism border each other.

- Acceptance of the rights of others, which includes both the formal laws that guarantee basic freedoms as well as the informal social and cultural norms that relate to behaviours of citizens. Yemen is the worst performing country in this Pillar, with Nigeria and Pakistan also performing in the bottom ten.

The countries with the highest rates of terrorism also have certain commonalities in behaviours and attitudes. Corruption is generally higher among the 10 countries with the highest number of deaths from terrorism. According to the Gallup World Values Survey, these countries experience 11 per cent more people facing a bribe situation than the international average. All ten countries have significant Muslim populations and there are relatively more people expressing the view that the West is in conflict with the Muslim world. The rates of political terror and political instability are also significantly higher in these ten countries than the international average.

TERRORISM IN THE COUNTRIES WITH ONGOING CONFLICT

The most common context for the onset of terrorist violence is within an ongoing conflict. According to the GTD there were around 40,000 terrorist attacks in which at least one person was killed between 1970 and 2013. This number spans 178 countries. Of these 40,000 terrorist attacks, around 70 per cent occurred in countries that were at the time already immersed in serious political, civil, ethnic or international conflicts.²⁰ This statistic remains true even if you remove terrorist attacks that have occurred in MENA and South Asia.

Table 3 lists countries that are currently suffering from ongoing conflict of this nature.²¹ Of these, only six are not in the twenty countries with the highest levels of terrorism, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Israel, Mali, Mexico and Myanmar.


TERRORISM IN COUNTRIES NOT IN CONFLICT

In contrast to countries immersed in significant conflict, there are terrorist activities in countries where there is no ongoing conflict. Two factors with a strong statistical relationship in these environments are political terror and low levels of intergroup cohesion.

To further explore these linkages, IEP has compared the levels of political terror and intergroup cohesion of countries since 1996 that have suffered a major terrorist attack.²² Of the 6,100 major terrorist acts analysed, over 90 per cent occurred in countries which at the time were in the lowest quartile of societal group cohesion as measured by the Indices of Social Development.²³ A similar statistic exists when looking at political terror with over 90 per cent of the countries that suffered major terrorist incidents having the highest levels of political terror and political instability. High levels of extrajudicial killings and disappearances were common in about 70 per cent of the countries targeted by major terrorist attacks.

FIGURE 17 PER CENT OF TERRORIST ATTACKS DURING ONGOING CONFLICT 1970-2012

Over 70 per cent of terrorist attacks occur within a country during periods of major conflict.



Source: GTD and Center for Systemic Peace, Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2013

TABLE 3 COUNTRIES THAT MAY EXPERIENCE INCREASES IN TERRORISM DUE TO ONGOING CONFLICT

The following countries are currently suffering from ongoing conflict. Of these only six are not in the twenty countries with the highest levels of terrorism as measured by the GTI. These six are determined at risk of increases in terrorist activity.

COUNTRY	
Afghanistan	Myanmar*
Central African Republic*	Nigeria
Colombia	Pakistan
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Philippines
Egypt	Russia
Ethiopia*	Somalia
India	South Sudan
Iraq	Sudan
Israel*	Syria
Mali*	Thailand
Mexico*	Turkey
Yemen	

*Note: not in the twenty countries with the highest levels of terrorism as measured by the GTI.

BOX 2 DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN TERRORIST ACTIVITY AND WARTIME ACTIVITY

The **Global Terrorism Database (GTD)** and the **Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)** classify terrorism as actions outside the context of legitimate warfare activities. That means only acts which are contrary to international humanitarian law, such as the deliberate targeting of civilians, conducted by sub-national actors are viewed as terrorism. The actions of governments do not get counted in the GTD and are therefore not included in the GTI. The GTD and START do not count state terrorism and only record incidents by sub-national actors.

Battle deaths when state actors are involved are not defined as acts of terrorism, but rather the result of war. As such, a group such as ISIL attacking a Syrian Army regiment would not be classified as terrorism by either side but as a wartime activity. Terrorism often invokes a distinct political or ideological message to be conveyed to a larger audience than the immediate victims, which is another reason that battle conflicts are not regarded as terrorism.

Political terror refers to human and physical rights abuses as measured by Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department. This includes violations of human rights, state-sanctioned killings, torture and political imprisonment.²⁴ Intergroup cohesion refers to relations of cooperation and respect between identity groups within a society.²⁵ A breakdown of this social fabric increases the risk of violent conflict between groups within a country. Importantly, poverty and other development indicators do not show strong relationships to high levels of terrorism. Both of these findings are corroborated with literature in the field.

By analysing the countries that are in a state of peace but have high levels of political terror and low levels of intergroup cohesion it is possible to identify countries that have the risk of increased terrorist activity. IEP has analysed the most up-to-date data on these factors globally. Table 4 lists countries that are currently not in outright war or conflict but have the characteristics of those countries that suffer from high levels of terrorism and are outside of the 20 countries with the highest levels of terrorism in the GTI 2014.

TABLE 4 COUNTRIES NOT IN CONFLICT BUT AT RISK OF HIGHER LEVELS OF TERRORISM

The following countries exhibit traits that are normally associated with countries with higher levels of terrorism.

COUNTRY	EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING	LACK OF WOMEN'S POLITICAL RIGHTS	LACK OF INTERGROUP COHESION	POLITICAL INSTABILITY	RANK IN GTI 2014
Bangladesh	✓	✓	✓	✓	23
Iran	✓		✓	✓	28
Sri Lanka	✓	✓	✓	✓	37
Burundi	✓	✓		✓	39
Cote d'Ivoire	✓	✓	✓	✓	40
Uganda	✓	✓	✓	✓	52
Angola	✓	✓	✓	✓	95

*Note: ticks show where countries score in the bottom 25 per cent globally.

'BLACK SWAN' ATTACKS

Not all terrorist incidents are equally devastating, and not all terrorist groups are equally effective. 'Black Swan' events are by their nature, unknown, unpredictable and devastating. Understanding the statistical properties and patterns of these attacks in the context of all terrorist attacks can provide information that can help with prediction and risk assessment.

Whilst the fear of large scale and unpredicted black swan terrorist incidents loom large in the public imagination, the reality is that most terrorist incidents result in no deaths. Only one terrorist attack has resulted in more than a thousand deaths, that being the attacks of September 11th, with 49 attacks resulting in more than one hundred deaths. Just over half of all terrorist attacks recorded in the GTI led to one or more deaths, with the vast majority of those resulting in less than ten deaths.

The majority of terrorist organisations are relatively ineffective, with the vast majority of deaths from terrorism being the responsibility of the four largest terrorist organisations in the world, each of which has the resources, manpower, experience, and expertise in order to carry out successful attacks. Even with these resources, most large terrorist organisations have had very limited success in pulling off large scale attacks, especially beyond the territories in which they operate.

By analysing the distribution and intensity of terrorist activity it can be seen that the majority of deaths from terrorism occur from a relatively small percentage of attacks.

Figure 18 shows in fact around 50 per cent of all incidents claim no lives and most of the remainder claim less than ten. By analysing the cumulative distribution of deaths Figure 19 shows that 80 per cent of all deaths were caused by only 17 per cent of all the attacks since 2000. Such statistical properties lead to the observation that deaths from terrorism follows a power-law probability distribution.


Based on purely mathematical assumption of the power-law distribution there may even have been slightly fewer terrorist attacks claiming between 100 and 1000 casualties than expected. Logical explanations for this include successful counter-terrorism efforts, or that large scale terrorist organisations focus on encouraging either small or independent terrorist cells to pursue smaller scale attacks.

If deaths from terrorism do follow a power-law distribution, it is expected to see a logarithmic relationship between deaths in a given incident and the number of incidents with at least that many deaths. This is indeed what is observed, as shown in figure 20. Large scale terrorist attacks like the September 11 attacks, 7/7 London attack, the Madrid train bombing, or the Beslan hostage crisis are rare but not completely unexpected.

Terrorism as a tactic of sustained mass destruction on a large scale is mostly ineffective. However, large scale explosions and mass deaths cause large, unpredictable and unintended consequences whereas individual deaths have much smaller flow-on effects. Therefore comparing 'black swan' events with smaller incidents is difficult as these large events can be profoundly course changing and result in significant domestic and international consequences well beyond their initial impact.

FIGURE 18 NUMBER OF INCIDENTS CATEGORISED BY DEATHS.

Just half of all terrorist incidents result in no fatalities.



Source: GTD

FIGURE 19 CUMULATIVE DEATHS FROM TERRORISM SINCE 2000

80 per cent of all deaths have occurred from only 17 per cent of all attacks.





FIGURE 20 NUMBER OF DEATHS PER INCIDENT VS NUMBER OF INCIDENTS WITH AT LEAST THAT MANY DEATHS

Terrorist incidents with extremely high casualties rarely occur.



Source: GTD Note: Log Scale

COMPARING HOMICIDE TO TERRORIST DEATHS

Comparing the number of deaths from homicide versus the number of deaths from terrorism from 2000 to 2011 in the four countries that experienced 'black swan' events it is possible to compare the ratio between homicides and terrorism. Four examples of significant 'black swan' incidents since 2000 include the 2011 Norway attack, the 2004 Madrid bombings, the 2005 7/7 London attacks and September 11. A comparison of deaths from these four events to national homicides of each country over the period of 2000 to 2011 is shown in Table 5. What is apparent is that even in countries which have experienced a devastating terrorist attack in the last ten years; significantly more people were killed by homicide than by terrorism over the period.

At the global level, the difference between deaths from intentional homicide and terrorism is very significant. Figure 21 shows that in 2012 a total of around 437,000 lives were lost due to homicide, by contrast in the same year, a total of 11,000 people were killed from terrorism representing a number 40 times less than homicide.²⁶ Therefore the likelihood of being killed through intentional homicide is much greater than being killed in a terrorist attack.

Of course while it should be noted that while terrorism may claim fewer lives, its effect on a community is traumatic, creating fear, changing daily habits and producing substantial economic costs.

AN INDIVIDUAL IS 40 TIMES MORE LIKELY TO BE A VICTIM OF HOMICIDE THAN BE KILLED IN A TERRORIST ATTACK.

X40

TABLE 5 DEATHS BY HOMICIDE VS. DEATHS FROM FOUR LARGE 'BLACK SWAN' EVENTS

Even in countries which have experienced a devastating terrorist attack in the last ten years; significantly more people were killed by homicide than by terrorism over the 2000-2011 period.


TOTAL NUMBER OF DEATHS 2000 - 2011

Country	Deaths from terrorism (T)	Homicides (H) [1]	Ratio = (H - T)/(T)
Norway	75	518	1:6
Spain	249	5,897	1:23
United Kingdom	57	10,776	1:188
United States	3029	195,948	1:64

Source: UNODC, Homicide Statistics, <http://www.unodc.org/gsh/en/data.html>, 2013, (accessed 7 October 2014).

FIGURE 21 NUMBER OF DEATHS BY HOMICIDES VS. TERRORISM GLOBALLY, 2012

Around 40 times more people were killed globally by homicide than terrorism in 2012.



Source: GTD, UNODC Global Study on Homicide 2013

ECONOMIC COST OF TERRORISM

The economic costs of terrorism go further than the destruction of property and the loss of life. The increased costs of security, military expenditure and insurance often outweigh the original attack. Further, terrorist activities increase uncertainty in the market, decrease foreign investment, alter trade and change consumption and savings behaviour.²⁷ Long run effects can be long lasting and have a significantly larger effect on the economies of developing economies.

In 2001 the IMF estimated that terrorism cost the U.S. 0.75 per cent of GDP or approximately US\$75 billion per year, while increases in terrorism in Nigeria in 2010 was associated with a decline of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by 30 per cent the following year.²⁸

The total costs of terrorism can be divided into two categories, primary or direct costs and secondary or indirect costs. Primary costs refer to the immediate damage caused by an act of terrorism. For example, the primary costs include the loss of life, injury and damage to infrastructure. These are the immediate costs in the aftermath of an event. Secondary costs are more complicated and can span a greater time period. These are disruptions to an economy due to a terror event or threat. This may take the form of increased security costs, changed consumption patterns, decreased FDI, decreased trade, and decreased tourism.

Trying to quantify the total global cost of terrorism is difficult. While direct costs of terrorism are largely agreed upon in the literature, secondary costs, however, are wide ranging. For example, studies trying to assess the cost of the September 11 attack have estimates ranging from \$35 billion to \$109 billion.²⁹ In addition, terrorism as a term covers such a vast array of attacks that generalisation is almost impossible. For example a bioterrorist attack could be delivered using a poison, virus or bacteria, each of which would have varying degrees of damage. The estimated economic cost of such an attack could range from \$477.7 million to \$26.2 billion for every 100,000 persons exposed.³⁰

Other economic costs of terrorism included in a report published by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade which estimated in 2013 the extra trade costs due to terrorism alone could be as high as \$180 billion. A report by RAND published in 2011 outlined three different levels of terrorism and associated costs within the U.S. These were moderate, severe and nuclear. Table 6 is a rough estimate of the associated direct costs of each category of an attack according to their calculations.

TABLE 6 RAND ESTIMATED DIRECT COSTS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS WITHIN THE U.S.

A RAND study published in 2011, estimated the costs of terrorist attacks on the US economy by dividing attacks into three groups. Severe attacks such as the 9/11 bombings are estimated to cost the economy 1 per cent of GDP, while a nuclear attack would double this. These are rough estimations and the location of the attack would have major effects on the outcome.

	MODERATE	SEVERE	NUCLEAR
Cost per year	\$11 billion	\$183 billion	\$465 billion
Cost of life	\$4 million per person	\$4 million per person	\$4 million per person
Cost of injury	\$40,000 per person	\$40,000 per person	\$40,000 per person
Annual resource cost	\$10 billion	\$200 billion	\$300 billion
GDP	0.05%	1%	2%

The primary costs of terrorism can incur huge totals, especially large scale events such as the London and Madrid bombings and the September 11 attacks. The large loss of life and destruction of infrastructure from September 11 totalled \$55 billion in New York alone, while secondary effects such as increased security (\$589 billion), decreased economic activity (\$123 billion) and other costs have been totalled to as much as \$3.3 trillion.³¹

THE LONG TERM
INDIRECT COSTS OF
TERRORISM CAN BE
TEN TO 20 TIMES
LARGER THAN THE
DIRECT COSTS.

TERRORISM, INVESTMENT AND TRADE

Trade and FDI are negatively affected by acts of terrorism. However there are exceptions, single incidents, even when major events, do not seem to affect FDI. Studies have shown that the 9/11 terrorist attacks had little effect on U.S. FDI,³² while FDI in Spain actually increased by \$6 billion in 2005 following the 2004 Madrid train bombings and by another \$11 billion in 2006.³³

Decreased FDI flows due to terrorism were recorded in Greece and Spain in the 1980s and 1990s and were worth up to half a billion for each nation.³⁴ The effect has been more dramatic in Nigeria where it has been estimated that FDI flows dropped \$6.1 billion in 2010 due to Boko Haram's acts of terrorism.³⁵ This represents a decline of almost 30 per cent from the previous fiscal year. This is shown in Figure 22.

As developing economies or fragile states are generally more volatile, investment comes at a higher risk. As a result, terrorism in high risk countries drastically lowers investment. These acts also increase the security premium, further increasing the cost of economic activity and leading investors to look elsewhere. This is one reason why acts of terror within developing nations have a more drastic effect on FDI than in developed nations.

The average FDI within the ten countries most affected by terrorism is less than half of that of OECD countries. Trade as a per cent of GDP is 51 per cent for these countries, while OECD countries are on average 87.5 per cent.³⁶ As many developing economies depend on trade flows with the developed world and rely on FDI inflows, these decreases have substantial long-term economic and developmental effects.

Figure 23 shows the correlation between terrorist incidents and trade activity as a per cent of GDP in Colombia. While not all change can be attributed terrorism, it demonstrates there can be a notable potential impact.

BOX 3 OTHER FLOW-ON COSTS OF TERRORISM

Increased costs of insurance

Following the 9/11 attacks, insurance premiums on large infrastructure within the U.S. skyrocketed, Chicago's O'Hare airport annual insurance policy increased in cost from \$125,000 to \$6.9 million while its insurance coverage for terrorism decreased from \$750 million to \$150 million per annum.³⁷ This resulted on the creation of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), which was passed resulting in the government reimbursing up to 85 per cent of losses due to acts of terrorism. Similar policies have been seen in Australia following the Bali bombings, the UK, Germany and France.

GDP Decrease

Changes in consumer behaviour, decreased investment, and decreased trade, destruction of human and physical capital all combine to decrease a country's GDP.

Increased government spending


Governments often have to take on the financial burden of any terrorist acts which result in damage to property or people. The opportunity cost of such large scale expenditure has the potential to take funding away from other infrastructure investments and social investments in education, the health sector, transport and R&D.

Changes in consumer behaviour

The way people act within an economy changes as a result of terrorism. Consumption patterns change, people invest more wealth into insurance which as a result is diverted from other expenditure. In extreme cases individuals are reluctant to move in public spaces due to the fear of attack thereby decreasing expenditure and economic activity.

FIGURE 22 CHANGES IN FDI AS A PER CENT OF GDP IN NIGERIA AND BENIN, 2006-2013


Since increased violence from Boko Haram in 2009, FDI in Nigeria has decreased sharply from five per cent of GDP to just one per cent, while FDI in neighbouring Benin has shown increases.



Source: World Bank

FIGURE 23 COLOMBIA: TERRORIST INCIDENTS COMPARED TO TRADE AS PER CENT OF GDP, 2008-2013

While a large drop in trade in 2008 was attributed to the global financial crisis, there is a significant statistical relationship between trade and terrorism of $-R=0.79$ over the last 6 years.



Source: World Bank Data, GTD

TERRORIST GROUP CASE STUDIES

In 2013 four terrorist groups were responsible for 66 per cent of all deaths from claimed terrorism incidents. These four groups are the most deadly terrorist groups in the last fifteen years, and have killed at least 25,000 people in a decade. The deadliest terrorist group is the Taliban and the TTP, which has killed over 12,000 people, closely followed by al-Qa'ida and its major affiliates that have killed at least 8,585 people.

The two other largest terrorist groups have shorter histories. Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Boko Haram both became more active in 2009, which was the first year that either group killed over 300 people. Based on data up to the end of 2013, these two groups have killed in excess of 3,000 people in four years, half of which was in 2013 alone.

The ten largest terrorist groups have varying agendas and are a combination of religiously motivated groups, separatist movements and ideological groups wanting a change of system. The four most deadly organisations all ascribe broadly to the Wahhabi sect of Sunni Islam and have an association with al-Qa'ida.

The origins of al-Qa'ida can be traced to the Soviet war in Afghanistan, where they were one of the many groups fighting the Soviet Union. Similarly, the Taliban was involved in opposing Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

The two groups have had close ties since 1996 when they trained together in Afghanistan. In recent times al-Qa'ida has decentralised and its direct affiliates continue to be significant. Of its major branches or affiliated organisations al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) has been responsible for the most deaths. Following the death of AQI's leader and a split over tactics, Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) emerged from AQI. ISI was renamed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and is the biggest terrorist group operating in Iraq today. It has since adopted the name of Islamic State, but this report uses the ISIL designation.

Other large affiliates of al-Qa'ida include al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) based in Yemen which has been responsible for nearly 1,000 deaths and al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM) based in Algeria and

responsible for over 500 deaths. There have been reports that Boko Haram is affiliated with al-Qa'ida, with founding member Mohamad Yusuf reportedly receiving early funding from Usama bin Ladin.³⁸ There are only two other terrorist groups among the ten most deadly groups which are also motivated by religion. The Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda and South Sudan is driven in part by Christian fundamentalism.³⁹ The other religiously motivated group, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, is an al-Qa'ida affiliate.


Al Qa'ida affiliates are defined as either being an ally or as having a familial relationship to al-Qa'ida. The activity of these 30 organisations span South Asia, MENA, Europe, Africa, North America and the Asia-Pacific and have claimed 27,169 lives over the period. Activity since 2009 has been largely in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Algeria and Nigeria.

BOX 4 THE MANY NAMES OF ISIL

The changing name of ISIL reflects the many changes of the organisation. Originally al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI), the group changed their name to Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) when they split off from al-Qa'ida. In April 2013 the group changed its name to Islamic state of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to reflect that it was engaged in the Syrian civil war. Due to translation ambiguities it is also known as the Islamic State of or Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In June 2014 the group solely referred to itself as the Islamic State or IS reflecting its shift of focus from a regime change in Syria to a desire to create a 'caliphate' or sovereign state. It has been referred to as Da'ish (or Daesh) as that is the Arabic acronym, although ISIL supporters dislike this name in part because it sounds similar to unpleasant words in Arabic.⁴⁰ This report uses the ISIL designation.

FIGURE 24 10 MOST DEADLY TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS BY NUMBERS KILLED (2000-2013)

The four biggest terrorist groups in 2013 are also the deadliest groups of the last fifteen years.




Source: GTD Note: Taliban includes Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban.


COMPARING TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS

INCIDENTS, DEATHS & INJURIES

In 2013 these four groups are responsible for 66 per cent of all deaths from terrorist attacks in which the perpetrator is known. Deaths from other groups operating in Pakistan, Syria, Somalia, India, and Kenya account for a further 21 per cent of deaths in the same year. Prominent groups operating in these countries include the Al-Nusra Front in Syria, Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in Pakistan and Maoists in India.




TRENDS, 2000-2013




TARGETS & TACTICS, 2000-2013


FREQUENCY AND TYPES OF ATTACKS /  Firearms /  Explosives /  Others **Key** 1 icon = 50 incidents



TARGETS OF ATTACKS /  Private citizens & property /  Government, police & military /  Educational & religious institutions /  Others



CAPACITY, NUMBER OF FIGHTERS*



Note: al-Qa'ida includes al-Qa'ida and all major affiliates.
* Sources detailed in endnotes.

ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT (ISIL)

HISTORY

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has emerged as the largest Sunni terrorist organisation active in the Middle East. The group was originally al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI). However following the death of the head of AQI, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and disagreements over tactics, a group split from AQI and formed the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI).

ISIL became known for extreme violence and terror tactics as a major actor in the Syrian civil war in 2013 and with its rapid expansion into Syria and then Iraq in 2014. In February 2014 al-Qa'ida formally broke ties with ISIL, with leader Ayman al-Zawahiri stating ISIL disobeyed directions from al-Qa'ida to kill fewer civilians.

IDEOLOGY

ISIL is an extremist Wahhabi insurgency with the primary goal of establishing a regional caliphate, or state, under Salafist oriented Islamic law.⁴¹ The group promotes violence to those who do not adhere to its interpretations. ISIL aspires to control the Levant region which includes Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. It is opposed to the Alawite Assad regime and the Shia Iraqi Government of both former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his successor Haider al-Abadi. ISIL has also claimed to be fighting a holy war against Shia Muslims, Christians and Yezidis, a Kurdish ethno-religious group in Iraq and Syria.

LEADERSHIP

The entire organisation is led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who is known as the Caliph or political successor. The 'governor' of the Syrian territories of ISIL is run by Abu Ali al-Anbari, a former Major General under the Hussein regime. The 'governor' of the Iraqi territories of ISIL is run by another former army General under Hussein, Abu Muslim al-Turkmani. Both men engage in military strategy and govern areas through the oversight of local councils.

FUNDING

ISIL has emerged as one of the wealthiest terrorist organisations, with at least three main revenue streams. The first is through selling what they have captured. This includes oil sales to local consumers, the Syrian regime and black marketers as well as exporting crude oil to Turkey.⁴² It is believed that ISIL controls a dozen oil fields and refineries in Iraq and Syria generating revenues of between one to three million U.S. dollars per day.⁴³ ISIL captured some of the oil fields from Al-Nusra Front in 2014. As well as oil, it is believed that ISIL has access to 40 per cent of

Iraq's wheat growing land. The second main source of revenue is through foreign investors.⁴⁴ The third revenue stream is through looting and controlling resources. Kidnapping and extortion, as well as the charging of electricity, fines and religious taxes, are also major revenue streams for ISIL.⁴⁵

MEMBERSHIP

Recent estimates suggest that ISIL has access to up to 31,500 soldiers.⁴⁶ This represents up to a fifteen fold increase on the numbers of AQI in 2011 which the U.S. Department of State estimated at 1,000 to 2,000.⁴⁷ The majority of these soldiers are from Syria and Iraq, attracted in part by steady wages. ISIL reportedly pays soldiers \$400 per month and a bonus every year with added premiums for a dependant which is a good wage for the region.⁴⁸ ISIL actively recruits foreign fighters, posting on social media in multiple languages and publishing its propaganda magazine, Dabiq, in English. The war in Syria has attracted at least 12,000 foreign fighters. As the Syrian civil war has continued, foreign fighters have been more attracted to extremist groups like ISIL over more mainstream rebel groups.⁴⁹

ACTIVITIES

The military and intelligence wings remain significant as ISIL attempt to gain and maintain control over land. Military operations include training camps as well as military incursions and terrorist activity. Terrorist activity takes the form of bombings targeting private citizens, police and businesses. In 2013 there were 350 terrorist attacks by ISIL which killed 1,400 people and injured 3,600. ISIL conducted over 50 suicide bombings which killed an average of nine and injured 17 people.

ISIL is both an insurgency and a quasi-government for the regions it controls in both Iraq and Syria. ISIL has developed a governing bureaucracy since shifting its focus from overthrowing the Assad regime in Syria to establishing a state. There are departments which draft and implement ISIL policies.

Responsibilities include developing laws, recruitment, controlling financial matters including a 410 page annual report and oil and weapon sales, propaganda and media outreach. As well as internal organisational roles, councils have adopted governance responsibilities including the establishment of Islamic courts as well as policing and punishment. There are also reports that ISIL have taken on service delivery functions including electricity, repairing roads, food kitchens and, in some areas, post offices.⁵⁰

BOKO HARAM

HISTORY

Boko Haram is a Nigerian based terrorist group founded in 2002. The name has been interpreted to mean 'Western education is sin' or 'Western Civilisation is forbidden.' The group began as members of a mosque in the north-east which sought to implement a separatist community under Wahhabi principles.⁵¹ Boko Haram was founded as a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist sect advocating a strict form of sharia law and developed into a Salafist-jihadi group in 2009, influenced by the Wahhabi movement.⁵² After a dispute with police which killed 70 members, a new group was formed under Imam Mohamad Yusuf who built a new mosque for the group. Following the death of Mohammed Yusuf while he was in police custody in 2009 the group became markedly more violent. Before 2009 the group engaged in few acts of violence, but it has been responsible for 3,500 civilian deaths since.⁵³

IDEOLOGY

The group is Sunni Islamist and seeks to abolish the secular system of government to implement Wahhabi interpretations of Sharia law in Nigeria.⁵⁴ Sharia law is fully implemented in nine and partially implemented in three of the 36 states of Nigeria, all of which are in northern Nigeria. However, Boko Haram is seeking full implementation of Sharia throughout the entire country. They aim to use acts of terror to further the social divide between Muslim, Christian groups and the Federal Government. As such, they have issued an ultimatum to Christians living in north-east Nigeria to 'leave or die.'⁵⁵ The group is against any Western influence and, like the Taliban, attacks educational institutions to highlight its opposition to western education.⁵⁶

LEADERSHIP

After the death of founder Mohamad Yusuf in 2009, deputy leader Abubakar Shekau took over until he was killed by Nigerian forces on 26 September 2014. The group is largely decentralised. Different states host cells which often have little communication with each other. Hence it is difficult to dissect the organisational structure, size and leadership. What is known is that Boko Haram has two main sections: the larger section is focused on discrediting the Nigerian government; whereas the smaller section is more focused on conducting increasingly sophisticated and lethal attacks.⁵⁷

FUNDING

Boko Haram has multiple revenue streams. This includes the sale of goods, extracting the profits of supportive businesses, child beggars which are also used as spies for the organisation,

extorting local traders and cross-border smuggling of arms and cash.⁵⁸ They also receive funding from wealthy members and supportive benefactors. There are also major narcotic trafficking routes to Europe in West Africa and it is suspected that Boko Haram has links with al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in trafficking narcotics as another major source of revenue.⁵⁹

MEMBERSHIP

The exact number of Boko Haram members is unknown⁶⁰ however higher estimates are around 9,000.⁶¹ Recruitment has targeted disaffected youths in the poorest areas of Nigeria, namely Yobe, Kano, Bauchi, Borno and Kaduna all in the north. The 12 most northern states where Boko Haram operates have almost double the poverty rates and four times the child malnutrition rates of the rest of the country.⁶² Members are often disaffected youths, unemployed graduates and members of Almajiris which are homeless youth supposedly under religious guidance.

ACTIVITIES

Boko Haram wants to bring about Sharia law rather than control areas and service delivery. As such, the majority of its activity is aimed at destabilising the Nigerian Government and increasing religious tensions rather than becoming the government. Apart from recruitment, fundraising and increasing political influence, Boko Haram is predominantly engaged in terrorist activity. The group has been increasing its deadliness each year, with 2013 being four times as deadly as 2009. In the period between 2009 and 2012, over 3,500 Nigerians have been killed by the group through shootings and bombings.⁶³ Around 60 per cent of attacks and fatalities are armed assaults using guns, with a quarter of attacks and fatalities from bombings. They have used at least 35 suicide bombings, 28 of which occurred in 2012. Suicide bombings account for five per cent of all attacks.

Boko Haram is known for instigating sectarian violence between Christian and Muslim groups and has attacked both churches and mosques in an attempt to instigate hatred and unrest among the two groups. In 2013 Boko Haram killed 64 people who were attending services in mosques and 16 attending church services in over 11 separate attacks. In 2013 there were 11 private citizens who were beheaded.

Like other large terrorist groups, Boko Haram shows concern over the way it is depicted in the media. The group has specific journalists which they contact directly to claim responsibility for various attacks. They regularly release videos online, including in response to the international 'Bring Back Our Girls' campaign which was started in protest of the school girls kidnapped in Chibok.

AL-QA'IDA

HISTORY

Al-Qa'ida was formed in 1988 by Usama bin Ladin, a Saudi Arabian who was killed in 2011, and Abdullah Azzam, a Palestine Sunni scholar who was killed in 1989. The group, like the Taliban, rose during the Soviet war in Afghanistan. It strives for international jihad, and is the only international jihadi group to have successfully conducted large scale attacks in the West. The group was responsible for large scale attacks in New York, London and Madrid and were a main target of the NATO-led War on Terror following September 11. As a result, many of al-Qa'ida's leadership have been killed and al-Qa'ida now adopts a decentralised structure using regional cells and affiliated organisations instead of a centrally controlled organisation. While direct acts of terrorism attributed to al-Qa'ida have been relatively lower since 2011, activity by al-Qa'ida affiliated groups has risen.

IDEOLOGY

Al-Qa'ida is a Salafi jihadist group inspired by the teachings of Wahhabism and seeks to use armed conflict to advance Islam. The group is opposed to other forms of Islam including Shia, and other major religions well as Judaism. Al-Qa'ida also views the West as allied to Israel, and determines this relationship as responsible for the poverty of many Muslim countries.⁶⁴ The organisation seeks to rid the Muslim world of any western influence and implement an Islamic caliphate, or state, under sharia law.⁶⁵

LEADERSHIP

Following the capture or assassination of many of the group's leaders, the structure and leadership of the organisation has decentralised into regional cells. The current leader is Ayman al-Zawahiri, who reportedly was one of the architects of the September 11 attacks and served as bin Ladin's physician in the 1980s. His whereabouts have remained unknown since he went into hiding following the overthrow of the Taliban.

Nasser Abdul Karim al-Wahuyshi is the leader of al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the most active franchise of al-Qa'ida. Khalid al-Habib was named as the organisation's military commander after it was falsely believed he had been killed in U.S. drone strikes in 2006. He is believed to oversee internal operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

FUNDING

Originally the organisation was funded by bin Ladin's personal wealth and fundraising as well as through the opium trade.⁶⁶

Recently, ransoms for hostages have been a major source of revenue for al-Qa'ida. According to a New York Times report, al-Qa'ida has raised \$125 million from ransoms since 2008, with \$66 million from 2013 alone.⁶⁷ The source of the majority of ransom payments is reportedly European governments and companies.

MEMBERSHIP

The size of al-Qa'ida is hard to measure as many significant leaders from al-Qa'ida have been killed or imprisoned and the organisation is largely decentralised. The central organisation has decreased in size in recent years, with the former CIA Director, Leon Panetta, claiming in mid-2010 that there were fewer than 100 al-Qa'ida members in Afghanistan. However, its affiliation with other organisations and reach, especially in Africa, has increased.⁶⁸ Al-Qa'ida and its affiliates are estimated to have 3,700 to around 19,000 members.^{69 70}

While the organisation is split into sects such as al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Qa'ida in Syria, al-Qa'ida in Somalia, al-Qa'ida in the Indian Subcontinent and al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, the organisation is also indirectly affiliated with at least 18 other terrorist groups and has connections with Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab.

ACTIVITIES

Prior to the death of bin Ladin the group were responsible for a number of high profile attacks within western countries such as September 11, the London and Madrid bombings, as well as a string of smaller attacks. However, recently it hasn't committed large scale acts of terror. This may be because of the much reduced organisational capacity. Other attacks such as suicide bombings, armed attacks, IEDs, kidnapping and hijackings have also been employed by the organisation. The number of terrorist attacks attributed to al-Qa'ida dropped significantly in 2013 to 166 from 405 in 2012, while the organisation was still responsible for the death of 559 people and injury of 1,245 others.

TALIBAN

HISTORY

Founded in 1994 by Mohamad Omar, the group were originally a mixture of Mujahedeen who fought against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s and a group of Pashtun tribesmen. The Taliban took control of Afghanistan in 1996 and ruled until 2001, when they were overthrown by the American-led invasion of Afghanistan. They have since regrouped as an insurgency movement to fight the now former Karsai administration and the NATO-led International Security Forces (ISAF). Now known as the 'Neo-Taliban' or the Quetta Shura Taliban due to the current location of their leadership, the organisation has rebranded itself as an independence movement in an attempt to gain support as it endeavours to recapture and take control of Afghanistan.

IDEOLOGY

Its beliefs are a mixture of Wahhabism, Deobandi, a form of Hanafi Sunni Islam, and Pashtun local tribe codes known as Pashtunwali.⁷¹ The group has rebranded itself as an independence movement rather than a fundamentalist organisation.⁷² The new structure forcibly recruits men and children into their ranks.

LEADERSHIP

Since the collapse of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in 2001, the leadership of the Taliban is based in Quetta, Pakistan, known as the Quetta Shura Taliban. Mullah Omar who began his involvement with the Taliban in 1996 is said to head the organisation. While there have been several reports of his death, none have been confirmed.

FUNDING

Al-Qa'ida had provided the Taliban with financial support and imported fighters from Arab countries and Central Asia. While also dependant on smuggling and drug trafficking, opium and heroin production is believed to be the equivalent to four per cent of Afghanistan's GDP and the global heroin trade has historically been a major source of revenue for the Taliban.^{73 74} In 2008 it was estimated that the opium trade financed as much as 40 per cent of the Taliban's activities.⁷⁵ The U.S. has also accused Iran for supplying militants with Iranian-made weapons including road side bombs, one of the main forms of attacks used by the Taliban.⁷⁶

MEMBERSHIP

In 2010 the estimated size of the Taliban was said to be 36,000 to 60,000.^{77 78}

ACTIVITIES

While the Taliban has been responsible for 75 per cent of civilian casualties in Afghanistan since 2010, its main targets are government administration, police and military personnel, specifically targeting coalition and Afghan forces as it stages an insurgency campaign to recapture the state. In 2013 the Taliban were responsible for 649 acts of terrorism with 234 associated deaths. While suicide bombings are used for around 10 per cent of attacks the majority of Taliban incidents have been via roadside bombs, explosive devices or armed attacks. There has been an increase in targeting of military and police in recent years.

Major attacks in 2013 included:

- A suicide bomber detonated a bomb outside of Kabul's Supreme Court killing 17 and wounding 40.
- In December 2013 an armed assault on Afghan security forces in Jurn district, Badakhshan province, Afghanistan killed a total of 19 people including two soldiers.
- In November of 2013 an assault on the national army in Bala Morgab district, Badgis province, Afghanistan killed eight people including two soldiers and injuring 23 others. No group claimed responsibility; however the attack was attributed to the Taliban.
- The organisation has been using Twitter and text messages to communicate with the media and claim responsibility for attacks as well as operating a clandestine radio station "voice of the Shariat" to claim responsibility for attacks and spread their agenda.⁷⁹

BOX 5 FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN SYRIA

Following the beginning of the Syrian war there is growing interest surrounding the increases in foreign fighters, particularly 'western' born jihadists. Central to this interest is the concern that foreign fighters returning from the conflicts in Iraq and Syria will commit terrorist attacks once they have returned to their country of origin. Statements made by ISIL have said that they wish to encourage 'lone wolf' terrorism committed by fighters once they return home.

As a result of these concerns, there has been a great deal of debate regarding the number of foreign fighters currently fighting for ISIL. Estimates vary depending on sources, with some counting total numbers, including those killed in action or those who have returned home, whilst others try

to estimate only the number of currently active fighters only. Figure 26 shows an estimate of the total number of active foreign fighters in Syria based on government reports and the International Centre for the Study of Radicalism (ICSR). High and low estimates are provided by ICSR as well as a comprehensive account of how these estimates were derived.

The vast majority of foreign fighters in Syria came from surrounding Middle Eastern countries. Low estimates suggest that there were four times as many foreign fighters from the Middle East and North Africa, compared to Western European countries.

BOX 6 HOW TERRORIST GROUPS END


Comprehensive counter-terrorism efforts are concerned not only with stopping specific terrorist attacks, but also disrupting, breaking up, and eventually ending terrorist groups. Thus, it is important to understand how, historically, terrorist groups come to an end in order to hasten the demise of currently active terrorist groups.

A report by the RAND Corporation, which looked at terrorist groups over a forty year period, found that the majority of terrorist groups ended by either joining the political process, meaning either the whole organisation, or via a political wing of the organisation and becoming a legitimate political party, or were destroyed by policing and intelligence agencies breaking up the group and either arresting or killing key members. Military force in of itself was rarely responsible for ending terrorist groups, as shown in Figure 25.

The report also found that the manner in which a terrorist organisation developed was closely related to the goals of that organisation. Terrorist groups with narrow goals were much less likely to engage in widespread violence, were more likely to find common ground or at least negotiate a settlement with the acting government, and thus more likely to seek legitimisation through the political process. Conversely, groups with broad goals or those groups with an international focus and a religious orientation were much less likely to achieve their goals, and are more likely to continue operating, increase in size, and need military intervention to halt them. Of all the terrorist groups tracked in the report between 1968 and 2006, 62 per cent ended, but of these only 32 per cent of religious terrorist groups ceased operating.

FIGURE 25 HOW TERRORIST GROUPS END, 268 TERRORIST GROUPS (1968-2006)


Political engagement and policing were the most successful strategies in combating terrorist groups in the long run.



Source: RAND

FIGURE 26 ACTIVE FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN SYRIA

Most foreign fighters come from surrounding Middle-Eastern countries.



Source: ICSR Data. Report: "ICSR Insight: Up to 11,000 Foreign Fighters in Syria; Steep Rise Among Western Europeans" (<http://icsr.info/2013/12/icsr-insight-11000-foreign-fighters-syria-steep-rise-among-western-europeans/>); Govt. Agency Data. Report: "Foreign Fighters in Syria", The Soufan Group (<http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf>).

Note: Data refers to fighters in total, does not subtract for fighters who have been killed, or who have returned to their home countries. Other estimates exist in the media, these two sources represent the most reliable estimates at the time of publication. Not every foreign fighter in Syria is a terrorist or joined with the explicit desire to fight for ISIL. However, as the conflict has gone, foreign fighters have tended to become more radical.

THE RISE AND FALL OF TERRORIST GROUPS SINCE SEPTEMBER 11

The RAND study on how terrorist groups end focuses on the period 1968 to 2006 as outlined in Box 6 on page 56.

However, there has been a tremendous growth in the total level of terrorist activity in the last decade with a shift from small nationalist and ethnic terrorist groups towards large scale groups or even insurgencies with broad religious and political based goals.

Despite this increase, there are some large terrorist groups that have seen significant declines in terrorist activity over the last six years, when compared to total terrorist activity in the prior six years from 2002 to 2007.

Of the 20 terrorist groups which saw the largest declines in activity over this period:

- Ten are still active to some degree, although most of them are operating with much reduced capacity.
- Nationalist and separatist terrorist groups had the biggest decreases in terrorist activity, the key developments were:
 - FARC in Colombia have seen large declines in activity by partially entering a political process.
 - The Tamil Tigers were defeated by the military in Sri Lanka.
 - Activity by the Chechen Rebels has declined partly due to military intervention but also due to the dispersion of members into other terrorist groups.
 - In Israel, a combination of political process and counterterrorism activities has led to a significant reduction in terrorist activity from Hamas, the Al-Asqa Martyr's Brigade, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. This is based on data up to the end of 2013.
 - There was also a significant reduction in terrorism in India by Maoist separatists but that trend has since plateaued.

However, most of the religiously motivated terrorist groups with broad goals which had large decreases in terrorist activity either merged with other terrorist groups or morphed into slightly different organisations. For instance:

- Tawid and Jihad, a terrorist organisation founded by al-Zarqawi in 1999, began operating in Iraq in 2002 before becoming known as Al-Qa'ida in Iraq. It has merged with other groups several times, and was the precursor to ISIL.
- Similarly, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) which was active in Algeria from 1998 to 2006, became known as Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb in 2007, after a loss of popular support saw its resources dwindle.

The pattern of terrorist group declines in the last decade follows the outline suggested in the RAND study on how terrorist groups end. Nationalist groups have either partially entered a political process or been completely defeated, whilst those groups with mixed ideologies and broad goals have mutated or merged with other groups. In some areas, ethnically motivated groups have been displaced by religious groups with links to broader terrorist networks, and even when efforts to quell these groups have been successful, they have been able to draw upon networks of likeminded groups to rebrand and help rebuild resources and capacity.

IN THE LAST DECADE THERE HAS BEEN A SHIFT FROM SMALL NATIONALIST AND ETHNIC TERRORIST GROUPS TOWARDS LARGE GROUPS WITH BROAD RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL GOALS.

CORRELATES OF TERRORISM

The most significant socio-economic correlates with terrorism can be grouped into three main factors.

- Measures of social hostilities between different ethnic, religious and linguistic groups, lack of intergroup cohesion and group grievances.
- Measures of state sponsored violence such as extrajudicial killings, political terror scale and poor human rights.
- Measures of other forms of violence including perceptions of criminality, violent demonstrations and levels of violent crime.

Importantly, there is no systematic link to poverty measures, and several broader economic development factors such as the Human Development Index or its subcomponents such as mean years of schooling or life expectancy. Similarly, economic indicators such as GDP growth also do not correlate.

When conducting a more in-depth multivariate analysis it can be seen that the measures of violence, state-sponsored violence, social hostility indicators and governance indicators have the most significant explanatory relationship with the GTI. This suggests, as shown in the previous correlations, that political violence in combination with social hostilities is the dominating factor which influences the level of terrorism within a country.

Table 7 highlights the correlations of the 2014 GTI with a range of indexes and indicators associated with the level of terrorism. Social hostilities and political violence are the key correlates of terrorism. While these figures only show correlation, not causation, the results provide evidence as to the factors that are associated with terrorist activity. Social hostilities, ongoing conflict, a lack of social cohesion, and a lack of political stability have a strong statistical relationship to the GTI.

Terrorism can be linked to a range of factors which span economic, social and political dimensions. However there is not one predominant variable responsible for spawning terrorist activity. There are a range of factors which jointly develop the climate for terrorist activity to thrive.

TABLE 7 THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CORRELATIONS WITH THE GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX

The most statistically significant correlates with terrorism include measures of social hostilities and lack of intergroup cohesion and group grievances, but also measures of state sponsored violence such as extrajudicial killings, political terror scale and poor human rights.

INDICATOR	STRENGTH OF CORRELATION	NUMBER OF COUNTRIES
Social Hostilities Index	0.75	155
Political stability	-0.72	162
Ongoing conflict	0.7	162
Intergroup cohesion	-0.69	153
Security effectiveness	0.68	161
Deaths in conflict	0.68	151
Global Peace Index	0.65	162
Security legitimacy	0.61	161
Extrajudicial killing	-0.61	160
Political Terror Scale	0.6	162
Were there crimes, malicious acts or violence motivated by religious hatred or bias?	0.59	161
Physical Integrity Rights Index	-0.59	160
Guerrilla acts per capita (log)	0.59	158
Did organised groups use force or coercion in an attempt to dominate public life with their perspective on religion, including preventing some religious groups from operating in the country?	0.58	161
Was there mob violence related to religion?	0.56	161
Were there acts of sectarian or communal violence between religious groups?	0.55	161
Group grievances	0.54	157
Religious tensions rating	-0.53	133
Order and security	-0.52	96

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX VS GLOBAL PEACE INDEX: HOW DOES TERRORISM RELATE TO OTHER FORMS OF VIOLENCE?

When the GTI is correlated with the indicators in the Global Peace Index (GPI), other forms of violence which are related to acts of terrorism can be further assessed. Out of the 22 indicators used to calculate the GPI, several are highly significant with the GTI. As would be expected, levels of terrorism correlates strongly with internal deaths from conflict and levels of political terror.

Levels of internal organised conflict, likelihood violent demonstrations, violent crime, and deaths from conflict are all significantly related to levels of terrorism. This highlights how the persistent targeting of police forces and instability generated by terrorism can possibly undermine rule of law and lead to the increase in other forms of violence.

TABLE 8 CHANGE IN CORRELATION BETWEEN GTI AND GLOBAL PEACE INDEX INDICATORS.

The correlation between the GPI and GTI is very strong indicating the link between terrorism and broader societal peacefulness.

GLOBAL PEACE INDICATORS	CORRELATION 2013	CORRELATION 2014	CHANGE IN CORRELATION 2013-2014
Safety & security	0.53	0.51	-0.02
Militarization	0.43	0.45	0.02
Ongoing conflict	0.66	0.65	-0.01
Internal peace	0.59	0.58	-0.02
External peace	0.48	0.50	0.02
Deaths from conflict (internal)	0.66	0.70	0.04
Political terror scale	0.63	0.59	-0.04
Level of organised conflict (internal)	0.56	0.57	0.00
Likelihood of violent demonstrations	0.33	0.38	0.05
Level of violent crime	0.37	0.38	0.01
Perceptions of criminality in society	0.32	0.36	0.04
Access to small arms and light weapons	0.43	0.35	-0.07
Nuclear and heavy weapons capability	0.26	0.33	0.07

Table 8 continued.

Military expenditure (% of GDP)	0.11	0.33	0.22
Displaced people (% population)	0.32	0.33	0.01
Deaths from conflict (external)	0.13	0.32	0.19
Relations with neighbouring countries	0.29	0.32	0.02
Total conflicts (internal and external)	0.33	0.31	-0.02
Political instability	0.29	0.27	-0.02
Homicide rate (per 100,000 people)	0.28	0.18	-0.10
UN peacekeeping data	0.16	0.11	-0.05
Armed services personnel (per 100,000 people)	0.10	0.10	0.01
Police (per 100,000 people)	-0.01	0.01	0.01
Incarceration rate (per 100,000 people)	-0.02	-0.01	0.01
Weapons exports (per 100,000 people)	-0.03	-0.02	0.00
Weapons imports (per 100,000 people)	-0.03	-0.08	-0.05
OVERALL GPI SCORE	0.65	0.64	-0.01


POLITICAL TERROR AND EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS

The level of political violence and terror that a country experiences in a particular year is measured by the Political Terror Scale developed by Wood and Gibney based on U.S. State Department and Amnesty International human rights reports. The data is presented on a 1 to 5 'terror scale', 5 being the highest level of political terror. Terrorism correlates significantly with the Political Terror Scale with $r = 0.59$.

This can be viewed in two ways. Either increased terrorism leads governments to implement stricter, authoritarian and illegal acts toward its citizens through torture or state violence, or the repression results in terrorist acts as

FIGURE 27 GROUP GRIEVANCES VS. GTI

Group Grievances are positively correlated with the GTI. This shows increased tension and violence between ethnic, religious and social groups is related to increased levels of terrorism.



Source: IEP, Failed States Index

retaliation. This can create a vicious cycle of violence making it difficult to clearly identify causality.

Extrajudicial killings measured by the CIRI data project hold a significant correlation of $r = -0.61$ with the GTI. Extrajudicial killings measure the killings by government officials without due process of law. This also includes murders by private groups that have been instigated by the government.

SOCIAL FACTORS, SOCIAL COHESION, GROUP GRIEVANCES

The group grievance indicator correlates significantly with the GTI with an $r = 0.54$. The positive correlation means that high levels of group grievances are associated with higher levels of terrorism. Conversely, low levels of group grievances are associated with low levels of terrorism.

The intergroup cohesion indicator is compiled by the Institute of Social Studies (ISS). The indicator measures the relations of cooperation with respect between identity groups within a society. When cooperation breaks down between prominent identity groups, there is the potential for conflict including killings, assassinations, rioting, and acts of terrorism. ISS measures intergroup cohesion using composite data on 'inter-group disparities, perceptions of being discriminated against, and feelings of distrust against members of other groups'.

DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

While countries that record high levels of terrorism tend to be under-developed, development indicators do not correlate with levels of terrorism globally. This suggests that while these characteristics such as poor life expectancy, educational attainment and GNI per capita may be common in areas with increased levels of terrorism, they are not unique to them.

TABLE 9 CORRELATION WITH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS AND THE GTI

While a negative relationship is shown, suggesting that high levels of terrorism are related to low development, none of the relationships are significant, suggesting that development is not a major contributor to the development of terrorist activity.

HDI INDICATORS	CORRELATION
Human Development Index (HDI)	-0.20
Life expectancy at birth	-0.14
Mean years of schooling	-0.27
Expected years of schooling	-0.21
Gross national income (GNI) per capita	-0.24

FINANCE AND TRADE

While the table below shows a negative relationship with the GTI for five of the six economic, trade and investment indicators, there is only one moderately strong statistical relationship; trade as a per cent of GDP with a R= -0.40. The 2012 GTI was correlated with 2013 economic statistics to see if terrorist activity has an effect on future economic indicators. While there was a stronger relationship between the GTI and decreased levels of economic activity, the relationships were not significant.


TABLE 10 CORRELATION BETWEEN GTI AND KEY ECONOMIC STATISTICS, 2012 - 2014

While the GTI shows negative relationships with the economic statistics below, the correlations are not significant. However, trade as a per cent of GDP notably correlates.

ECONOMIC STATISTICS	2012	2014
FDI net inflows	0.10	-0.07
Trade as a % of GDP	-0.41	-0.40
Natural resources as a % of GDP (2012)	-0.06	-0.09
Youth unemployment	-0.14	-0.02
Male youth unemployment	-0.18	-0.08
GDP growth	-0.01	-0.05

FIGURE 28 TRADE AS A PERCENT OF GDP VS. GTI

Trade as a per cent of GDP shows a negative correlation with the level for terrorism. While this is not overly significant, it does suggest that acts of terrorism could affect trade.



Source: IEP, World Bank

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

This section seeks to explore what explanatory power a range of variables have on the GTI. This is done through multivariate regression analysis, a statistical tool which enables comparison against multiple variables. The multivariate regression analysis reveals the interplay between the GTI and 11 different variables, such as economic performance, governance and violence, demonstrating the nature of the relationship between various indicators. IEP does not suggest that these are the only indicators which affect the level of terrorism, these were selected due to the strength of statistical relationship with the GTI and the literature review of the factors that create terrorism.

The economic indicators used in the analysis are foreign direct investment (net inflows) and trade as a per cent of GDP. Both indicators are taken from the World Bank data bank. Political stability, legitimacy of the state, the level of human rights and the number of refugees and IDPs are taken from a range of sources. The police rate, homicide rate and incarceration rate per 100,000 people are based on GPI data.

Of the indicators used in this analysis, only three show a multivariate significant relationship with the GTI:

- Political stability
- Intergroup cohesion
- Legitimacy of the state

Surprisingly, while none of the violence or economic indicators are significant, three political indicators are significantly related to terrorism. This suggests that a weak political system and a lack of legitimacy of the government combined with group grievances may be more influential in the rise of terrorist organisations than economic performance or violence.

TABLE 11 MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Governance and intergroup cohesion related indicators are the only indicators to show a significant relationship with the GTI. This suggests that the political climate in combination with intergroup cohesion is the dominating factor which influences the level of terrorism within a country.

GTI	ESTIMATE
(Intercept)	9.48E+00***
Trade as a percent of GDP	-4.40E-03
FDI	-2.68E-12
Political stability	-1.88E+00**
Intergroup cohesion	-8.26E+00*
Refugees and IDPs	-2.46E-01
Group grievance	2.47E-01
Legitimacy of the state	-5.65E-01**
Human rights	2.50E-01
Police per 100.000 people	1.40E-03
Homicide rate per 100.000 people.	-7.12E-03
Incarceration rate per 100.000 people	3.72E-05
Adjusted R-squared	0.71

A WEAK POLITICAL SYSTEM AND A LACK OF LEGITIMACY OF THE GOVERNMENT COMBINED WITH GROUP GRIEVANCES ARE MORE INFLUENTIAL IN THE RISE OF TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS THAN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OR EXISTING LEVELS OF VIOLENCE.

EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS

According to the findings of the Global Terrorism Index, the level of global terrorist activity has greatly increased in the last decade. Most of the public conversation about terrorism has focused on conventional counter-terrorism efforts: intelligence gathering, policing, and military force. However, such efforts are often ineffective, and even counterproductive. In this essay, Larry Attree from Saferworld and David Keen from the London School of Economics, outline six conventional approaches that should be scaled back and six constructive alternatives to conventional counter-terrorism that could help reverse the alarming rise in global terrorism.

ENVISAGING MORE CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVES TO THE COUNTER-TERROR PARADIGM

Larry Attree, Head of Policy, Saferworld & David Keen, Political Economist and Professor of Complex Emergencies, London School of Economics

INTRODUCTION

'Terrorism' has come to dominate current affairs in the western world, and dealing with it is one of the foremost priorities on the domestic and foreign policy agendas of western nations. As IEP's valuable work has highlighted, the urgency surrounding the agenda has not always facilitated sober reflection on the available facts regarding the nature of the problem and what they show us.

The urgent priority afforded to counter-terror has impacted on the actions of practitioners in many walks of public life. Particularly affected by the imperatives of counter-terrorism and its conceptual framing have been stabilisation and statebuilding—those emerging fields poised at the intersection of defence, foreign affairs, intelligence, peacebuilding and development. Building on a forthcoming discussion paper prepared for

Saferworld by Prof. David Keen (LSE), this paper identifies some key questions about how counter-terrorism, and related stabilisation and statebuilding efforts, are being pursued, and suggests some constructive peacebuilding alternatives.

The public debate on how to respond to 'terrorist' threats tends to revolve around the most horrific outrages and sensational crises. Whether the option in question is to bomb a reviled spoiler, to arm those opposing an evil regime, or to sponsor a regional partner to take on the dangerous militants, public debate tends to focus minds on apparently simple choices between action and inaction. In this climate, the pressure on leaders to appear strong and act decisively—especially in the face of violent provocation—is very powerful. However, when the media directs its

fickle gaze to newer stories, the success or failure of policy responses to 'terrorism' threats overseas over the long term is rarely publicly discussed.

For this reason, it is perhaps not widely known that:

- In Somalia, thousands of weapons and hundreds of vehicles and high-frequency radios provided by the international community as security assistance during the 1990s ended up in the hands of local militias. In addition, from 2004 onwards over 14,000 Somali soldiers trained by Ethiopia reportedly defected or deserted with their weapons and uniforms, while UN-trained police were implicated in violent abuses against civilians;¹
- In Iraq, heavy handed military action, such as the assault on Falluja in the wake of the

lynching of four American security contractors in April 2004, resulted in the deaths of hundreds of people, including many women and children, and served to fuel further insurgency;²

- In Afghanistan, because of local codes of revenge in Pashtun areas, killing insurgents has often served ‘to multiply enemies rather than subtract them’.³ Studies have also ‘found little evidence that aid projects are “winning hearts and minds” in the country: “instead of contributing to stability, in many cases aid is contributing to conflict and instability”;⁴
- In Yemen, external counter terror support served to reduce the Saleh regime’s need to be responsive to its own constituents and institute reforms.⁵

It is remarkable that such failures have led neither to detailed public debate on how peace can best be achieved in the wake of ‘terrorist’ violence, nor to any serious accountability for the leaders and officials that presided over them. But what is even more striking is that the mistakes of the present echo those of past decades: for example, the practice of bombing large swathes of the countryside and the diversion of aid to corrupt purposes that fed public support for the Viet Cong in Vietnam;⁶ or the government emergency measures, including the attempt to use ‘development’ and forced relocation as instruments of counterinsurgency, that strongly fuelled the Mau Mau insurgency under British rule in Kenya during the 1950s.⁷ While such problems are, tragically, familiar to scholars and experts working to document the track record of counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding approaches around the world, attention to the lessons of the past is strikingly absent from the public debate on how to do better in future.

In recent months, Saferworld has attempted to take the long view on efforts to deal with conflicts related to rebel or ‘terrorist’ groups and their sponsors in past decades, considering contexts as diverse as Afghanistan, Cambodia, DRC, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Vietnam, and Yemen. Despite the investment of huge resources in such contexts by Western governments, the results have been mixed at best: the current long-term instability of the Middle East, North and East Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan, the spread of al-Qa’ida into multiple new regions, and the mushrooming of other transnational militant groups suggest that something is seriously

wrong with the Western response to such problems.

Long-standing problems appear to lie in three main areas. Firstly, by setting national security above human security objectives the West has – whether directly or through proxies—too frequently responded to the threat of ‘terrorism’ with the use of violence. Such violence has, all too often, been indiscriminate, and has had a tendency to exacerbate conflict dynamics rather than contribute to sustainable peace. Secondly, counter-terrorism efforts and related actions taken under the label of ‘stabilisation’ and ‘statebuilding’ have often failed to address drivers of conflict in meaningful ways. In fact, they often clumsily reinforce the most serious drivers of conflict – especially patterns of abusive and exclusive governance and corruption. Thirdly, the Western response has typically neglected to focus on sustainable solutions to conflict that involve and respond to the concerns, priorities and potentials of conflict-affected people in constructive ways.

There is much detail that could be added to this critique, and many examples that could be offered of these shortcomings in action and their impacts. If policy alternatives are to be brought to the fore, more thorough analysis is needed to examine why similar shortcomings are repeated from one decade to the next with diminishing public scrutiny. However, what is perhaps more challenging, and more useful, is to envisage what constructive alternatives are available.

One caveat before discussing these alternatives: all approaches to peacebuilding have shortcomings, and the challenges of conflict frequently present choices between a range of sub-ideal alternatives. The policy directions that are set out in this paper are neither a call to side with the ‘enemy’, nor to evade the imperatives to respond to conflict swiftly and effectively. Instead, they are a call for the lessons of the past and the available alternatives to be more carefully considered, with the overarching objective of working towards long term peace in mind.

SIX THINGS TO DO LESS OFTEN

1 THINKING SHORT TERM

There needs to be more effort to avoid investing in short-term reactions with no clear long-term solution in mind—especially when there are clear risks of contributing to long-term drivers of conflict through short-term action. Similarly, more thought needs to be put into whether approaches

require long-term commitment to be sustainable, and whether such commitment is feasible.

2 REINFORCING POOR GOVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION

Governance deficits are perhaps the single most significant factor in driving conflict. This means that support for repressive and corrupt actors and regimes needs, as a priority, to be avoided because of its potential to lessen accountability and worsen governance deficits. Governance deficits known to have a significant role in driving conflict include corruption, violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and exclusive political systems. Importantly, where international actors support leaders, governments and security forces that are not committed to addressing these failures, they reduce the pressure on them to be inclusive, accountable, responsive and fair toward their own societies. This in turn tends to fuel conflict. The apparent strategic advantage to be gained from alliances with regimes not committed to inclusive, fair, responsive and accountable governance is often illusory—not least because such alliances typically stoke the grievances that fuel insecurity.

3 MISTAKING PARTNERS’ MOTIVES

Past experience shows that assumptions about the motives and behaviours of apparent ‘allies’ in counter-terror, stabilisation and state-building endeavours need to be interrogated more deeply. The consequences of working with allies whose motives differ from one’s own have included appalling abuses against civilian populations, the diversion of money, arms and other resources into fuelling conflict, and the reinforcement of corruption, bad governance and grievances. All of these are known drivers of conflict. One of the clearest lessons from past failures is that the motives of ‘allies’ are hard to understand clearly: they may differ between individuals and across institutions, and can shift over time. An expressed aim of defeating terrorism, for example, may differ dramatically from the actual aims of any given actor. Importantly, the actions of ‘allies’ are also affected by the resources on offer for counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding processes, which may even serve as an incentive for prolonging conflict. Conflict sensitivity requires much more careful monitoring of these issues

and more determination to minimise harm by factoring this better into decision-making.

4 USING AID IN THE SERVICE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM

Casual assumptions about aid contributing to counter-terrorism, stabilisation and statebuilding objectives are called into question by the significant evidence that the use of aid to reinforce military action and stabilisation efforts has in many contexts proved either ineffective or harmful. In particular there is a need to revisit the assumption that local action to address socio-economic drivers of radicalisation can provide an adequate solution when wider structural drivers of conflict are not simultaneously addressed—including the role of international actors and their proxies in contributing to grievances and injustice. While development processes are likely part of the solution to the conflicts that are being defined as problems of ‘terrorism’, ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’, the holistic pursuit of positive peace should include a wider range of measures, including avoidance of policies and actions that create the grievances that fuel conflict.

A related issue is the tendency to overlook the way in which aid and other resources (such as military equipment) provided to allies is diverted for harmful or corrupt purposes by conflict actors. Because corruption is known to be such a visible driver of conflict, and diversion of resources away from their intended purpose is such a common failing, corruption and diversion need to be more systematically prevented and monitored – even when they involve apparent ‘allies’ of the international community. Too often, declaring a particular government to be an ‘ally’ has given it a green light for corruption and abuse. In practice, there has often been much more concern about the way aid might be misused by ‘terrorists’ than the way it is being misused by governments.⁸

Attempts to co-opt aid agencies into support for any particular side in a conflict—as providers of intelligence, as offering relief and assistance only to one group or side – are also counterproductive: they compromise the principle of impartiality, render assistance ineffective, alienate the local population, and make aid agencies a target for attack.

5 USING FORCE

International actors should be much less ready to use force to resolve conflict. In particular, more caution is needed in designating any particular actor as a ‘spoiler’. The staying power of ‘spoilers’ needs to be assessed much more realistically, and greater awareness is needed of the potential for conflict dynamics to spin out of control as a result of intervention. In particular, military force should not be used simply to demonstrate the resolve or power to retaliate in response to violent provocation—indeed, military responses of this kind often play into the intentions of ‘terrorists’.⁹

6 LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ABUSES

Significant efforts are also needed to strengthen adherence to international humanitarian and human rights law by international actors and those they co-operate with: torture and indiscriminate use of violence are not only wrong in principle – they also deepen the grievances that can fuel violence and make sustainable peace much harder to achieve. Demonstrating full accountability for irresponsible use of force and abuses that have taken place is vital to efforts to minimise grievances.

SIX DIRECTIONS FOR CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVES

1 A DIFFERENT CONCEPTUAL FRAMING AND APPROACH

The first and most important shift in the pursuit of constructive alternatives to the counter-terrorism paradigm should be to reaffirm long-term sustained peace for all actors involved as the overall objective—rather than ‘victory’ over a particular enemy or ‘national security’ defined in narrow terms. To construct a strategy oriented towards lasting and positive peace it is then crucial – especially in relation to conflicts involving the most reviled of ‘spoilers’—to develop an impartial picture of all dimensions of the conflict. One key starting point for achieving this is perhaps offered by developing a conflict analysis.

Conflict analysis can provide an important opportunity to avoid biased actor analysis and narrow analysis of the causes of a conflict. In the counter-terrorism paradigm, designating certain actors as ‘spoilers’, ‘radicals’, ‘terrorists’ or ‘extremists’ risks framing the problem from the outset as

lying with those actors alone – the solution being to change their wrong-thinking (or physically eliminate them) rather than seeking to identify what all relevant actors—including national, regional and international governments—can change to contribute towards lasting peace.

Similarly, approaching conflict as a problem of ‘extremism’ or ‘radicalisation’ has sometimes encouraged a focus on the socio-economic disadvantages experienced by the individuals who perpetrate acts of violence. Looking at local poverty or unemployment may be helpful, but it must not preclude a focus on other causes of conflict – including the actions of governments enjoying various degrees of immunity to international criticism. Grievances created by powerful political actors at national, regional or international levels may well prove especially important in driving conflicts defined as ‘terrorism’, ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. Framing the problem impartially as one of ‘conflict’ may enable much more comprehensive identification of causes that require fresh approaches – not only by extremists and local actors but also by national, regional and international leaders, governments, security forces and so on.

Conflict analysis may also provide an opportunity to connect apparently local or national dynamics to transnational factors: it may be crucial to recognise that ‘extremism’ is not only driven by the transnational spread of problematic ideologies based on misperceptions, but also by the moral objection of conflict actors in one country to policies and actions taken in other countries, which are indeed unjust or unlawful and which they feel powerless to change through constructive means. Peacebuilding strategies in such contexts could valuably include the creation of effective channels for grievances to be constructively raised and addressed.

Given the need to avoid the common challenges of short-term thinking, failure to learn from past mistakes and incoherence between development, diplomatic, economic and military-security approaches, conflict analysis also provides opportunities to consider how different responses to conflict will play out through the development of forward-looking scenarios, examine lessons from past engagement, and facilitate diverse actors to recognise their roles and responsibilities within a shared long-term peacebuilding strategy.

2 CHANGING INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL POLICIES THAT HAVE FUELLED GRIEVANCES

If conflicts defined as stemming from ‘extremism’, ‘radicalisation’ or ‘terrorism’ are driven in part by moral objections to policies and actions which are unjust or unlawful, part of the strategy for achieving sustainable peace should be to reconsider those policies and actions. Just as apartheid needed to be brought to an end, and many former colonies were awarded their independence following struggles by rebel organisations now viewed as liberation movements, in the same way there is a need to examine the justice of policies that are the focus of rebellion and protest around the world.

Such unjust policies may be military (indiscriminate use of violence, military aid to actors who are perpetrating abuses), economic (sanctions perceived to be unjust, failure to regulate markets in goods and resources from conflict-affected countries, imposition of unequal trade rules, or prioritisation of natural resource access over other priorities), diplomatic (support for allies who are violating human rights and/or international law), or developmental (further support for such allies). A greater effort to demonstrate consistent support for international law and human rights is surely one of the most promising options for reducing the grievances of the victims of unjust international policies and practices, and those who claim to represent them.

3 SEEKING TO NEGOTIATE PEACE – AND BUILDING TOWARDS INCLUSIVE AND JUST POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS

There are many challenges inherent in deciding whether and how to negotiate peace. Overall, however, negotiating solutions is currently a less favoured option than it was during the 1990s. Clearly it is neither desirable nor practical to welcome every militant or rebel group into a power-sharing deal. Both inviting and excluding rebel movements to the dialogue table has incentivised armed violence in the past. At the same time, long-term peace can of course be undermined when only a relatively narrow and elite group is accepted into negotiations and into the political settlement that results.

While the dilemmas involved are complex,

the counter-terrorism paradigm has in certain contexts ruled out the possibility of negotiation with (or even assistance to) large sections of whole societies (as in Somalia and Afghanistan). In this context, it seems important to reflect that long-term peace will eventually be sustainable only if those who survive the conflict are prepared to accept the eventual settlement that is made. Moreover, as Greenhill and Solomon argue, even an apparently ‘implacable’ spoiler may sometimes change – in new circumstances – into a less violent entity.¹⁰ In this context, alongside the inclusion in peace processes of those who have not resorted to violence, and ongoing efforts to ensure broader inclusion in political settlements of the public, including women, youth and any marginalised groups, more effort is needed to pursue communication with and understand all actors involved in any given conflict – even those ‘terrorists’, ‘violent extremists’, ‘radicalised groups’ and ‘spoilers’ that are most reviled.

4 USING LEGAL-JUDICIAL RESPONSES AND TARGETED SANCTIONS

An important option for approaching conflict is to use the law (national or international) to punish and deter violence and to protect those who may otherwise feel marginalized and resort to violence as a last resort. Legal approaches to insecurity are complex, and only a few points can be made here. Prosecutions offer the prospect of reducing impunity, deterring violence (both within a particular country and more broadly), and of course incarcerating those responsible for violence (and thus taking them ‘out of the game’). In many cases, a policing response to disorder (apprehending and trying criminal suspects) will be more appropriate than a military response. Sometimes, it is a heavy-handed military response that turns a small rebellion into a large one or gives life to a weakening ‘terrorist’ movement.

When due process is applied and the rights of defendants to fair trials are visibly upheld, legal approaches offer the considerable advantage of guaranteeing rights of defendants and their equal treatment before the law—thereby helping to dispel perceptions of discrimination against particular groups.

The option to deploy sanctions comes with certain drawbacks. Sanctions can be used by those targeted to shore up their

economic advantages and their political support base. They can also do great harm to the general population and create grievances among those they were intended to help. Yet, when they are carefully targeted, sanctions can offer an important option for pressurising conflict actors, including armed groups, to change their approach.

5 SUPPORTING TRANSFORMATIVE GOVERNANCE EFFORTS

Of course, governance reforms are explicitly part of the stabilisation and statebuilding policy agenda. However, this policy agenda is typically coloured by the imperatives provided by counter-terrorism to boost a counterinsurgency or a new political order with external aid or military support. Likewise, the international discourse on peacebuilding and statebuilding enshrines ownership of processes by nation states in a way that tends towards the exclusion of other actors and far-reaching reforms in practice. The ‘mainstream’ approach to all three (counter-terrorism, stabilisation and statebuilding) thus leans visibly towards aligning behind and reinforcing the capacities of the state as it is (including states recently installed by military action) rather than prioritising wider social empowerment models that seek to transform the state from within and foster lasting and positive peace.

Peace indeed cannot be built in the absence of institutional capacities, but these capacities also need to be oriented towards beneficial purposes. This makes the objective of achieving wider reform and the transformation of state-society relations (widely acknowledged in policy discourse but rarely pursued effectively in practice) absolutely central to efforts to respond to conflicts labelled as ‘terrorism’, ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. After all, such conflicts often emerge from the grievances and injustice that are created by poor governance, and prove difficult to manage in the wake of institutional breakdown and civic unrest.

Past research by Saferworld¹¹ suggests that to support lasting peace, transformative governance reform should include significant efforts to:

- Ensure inclusive political dialogue and decision making
- Provide people-focused security and justice

- Reduce corruption and bribery in conflict-sensitive ways
- Offer fair access to social services, resources and opportunities to all social groups
- Resolve grievances and disputes constructively

An example of the shift that is needed can be found in the security sector. While much development work is oriented to social empowerment and community driven models, when it comes to responding to conflict and insecurity, bottom-up approaches are not pursued on the scale that is required to achieve a transformative effect. Thus 'Security Sector Reform' and efforts to negotiate peace settlements tend to be relatively top-down and exclusionary. Therefore, to a certain extent, they tend to lack the legitimacy to be both successful and sustainable. Application of 'community security' approaches at a greater scale has the potential to deliver a different kind of result.¹²

6 BRINGING A PEACEBUILDING PERSPECTIVE TO THE FORE IN PUBLIC DEBATE

One of the challenges inherent in trying to move beyond mainstream approaches is the way in which problems of 'rogue regimes', 'terrorism', 'radicalisation' and 'extremism' and relevant responses are presented in public debate. Leaders, journalists and news outlets are in some ways responsible for establishing prevailing notions of enmity, while at the same time public interest and public opinion has a role in shaping and underpinning policy directions that leaders come under pressure to adopt. Thus the success of peace efforts partly depends on much more systematic questioning of the fault-lines of conflict, the prevailing definitions of the enemy, and the impacts of potential policy responses. Demonising particular enemies too often serves as 'cover' for those claiming to confront them; but those making these claims may not only be failing to confront these enemies but even actively reinforcing them in various ways.

In many contexts, the declaration of a 'war on terror' remains a convenient banner to call for public unity in support of a common enemy, bolstering the power base of political leaders. When the status of an 'enemy' has been well established in public discourse, this seems to lead to journalistic

failures to question the tactics to be used, the allies to be supported, and the coherence of longer term strategies.

A further problem is that, especially within conflict-affected contexts, those who oppose an officially-approved persecution or question the approved 'fault-lines' in a conflict, risk themselves being labelled as 'enemies', 'terrorists' and so on—and sometimes face intimidation, violence or prosecution as a result. This affects the willingness to speak out not only of journalists, the public and local activists but also international aid agencies and multilateral bodies. Particular definitions of the enemy have often been 'policed' in this way, and those who are in a position to question these definitions have a particular responsibility to do so.

While politicians, diplomats and human rights organisations tend to remain vigilant and critical regarding human rights in conflict situations, much more systematic efforts are needed to question the definitions of enmity that create—and recreate—mass violence, as well as to challenge the methods that are justified through this discourse at different levels.

CONCLUSION

This paper has offered a summary of constructive alternatives to the counter-terrorism paradigm and to some of the approaches taken to stabilisation and statebuilding under the influence of this paradigm. Alongside these, it is important to mention one further option, noting: that in some cases 'terrorist' atrocities frequently produce a sense of revulsion even among those the terrorists claim to represent; that if conflict resolution demands reform (as suggested above), the best way to encourage this may in some circumstances be not to provide support to the current leadership and institutions in conflict-affected contexts; and that international actors may not be able to influence the dynamics of each and every conflict effectively. Given these points, in some contexts choosing not to engage should be considered a valid option.

These issues will be discussed in more detail in Saferworld's forthcoming research studies on constructive alternatives to counter-terrorism in a range of different country contexts.

NOTES

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2. Hills, Alice, 'Fear and Loathing in Falluja', *Armed Forces and Society*, 32 (2006), 623-639; Barnard A, 'Death toll near 500 in Fallujah, Baghdad', *Boston Globe*, 22 April 2004; Dodge, Toby, testimony to US Committee on Foreign Relations on 'The Iraq Transition' (20 April 2004).
3. The words are those of Major General Michael Flynn, United States' deputy chief of staff for intelligence in Afghanistan: see Flynn, Major Gen. Michael, Captain Matt Pottinger and Paul Batchelor, 'Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan', Center for a New American Security, Washington DC (2010), p.8.
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The methodology for the Global Terrorism Index incorporates a lagged scoring system, in which a single terrorist incident is not only counted in the year that it was committed, but also for five years afterwards, in order to reflect the lingering emotional, social, structural, and economic impact of terrorism. This essay, from Action on Armed Violence, traces the long term impact of a suicide bombing in a busy marketplace, which occurred in Lahore, Pakistan in December 2009.

ANATOMY OF A SUICIDE BOMBING MOON MARKET ATTACK, LAHORE, PAKISTAN

Henry Dodd, Senior Weapons Researcher, Action on Armed Violence (AOAV)

Edited by: Steven Smith MBE, Chief Executive, AOAV

BACKGROUND

For the last three years, Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) has been monitoring the levels of harm caused by explosive weapons around the world. In this time, we have watched the recorded toll continue to climb, year-on-year. Perhaps most startling is the fact that by far the greatest proportion of casualties are civilians. For example, in 2013, 82% of the total reported casualties from explosive weapons were civilians. Another statistic of major concern is the rise in casualties attributable to improvised explosive devices (IEDs). While IEDs are often seen as being the weapons of choice for non-state actors against conventional military forces, the staggering fact is that they are far more likely to kill civilians than soldiers. In 2013, 73% of civilian casualties (22,829) from all forms of explosive violence were caused by IEDs.¹

But the bare casualty figures alone only show part of the picture. Reports in the immediate aftermath of attacks tend to provide the number of fatalities, sometimes the number of injured, a description of the scene of the blast, and some reaction quotes. Small attacks barely warrant a mention. Little or no focus is directed at the wider effects of explosive violence. What does it mean for a health system to receive over 100 trauma patients within just a few minutes? What happens to a market that has witnessed a major blast, and is forever associated with the tragedy? Who supports a family when they lose their principal earner, or when a relative suffers complex injuries? In order to answer these questions and more, AOAV returned to the scene of a double-suicide bombing attack that had been inflicted on a busy market in Lahore, Pakistan, in 2009.

THE BLAST

The Moon Market, in Iqbal, in the south-west of Lahore, is considered to be the second busiest market in the city after the more fashionable Liberty market. Stalls and shops are closely packed together, leaving a narrow pathway for shoppers to squeeze through. Spread across two floors, the top floor has a selection of beauty salons and a gym, as well as the upper storeys of the largest and most prosperous market businesses. The lower floor has a selection of shops selling fabrics, children's clothes, jewellery, books, furniture, shoes, and pharmaceuticals. Each shop has around five or six stalls, most only a few feet wide, pitched in front. Stall owners pay a few rupees to hook a wire up to their shops to power a bare bulb over their wares. The scene is vibrant and congested.

There had been warning signs before that

the Moon Market might be a target for violence. The previous year, on 14 August—the eve of Pakistani Independence Day—a suicide bomber had approached a police line at the roundabout by the market and detonated his explosive vest. Eight people were killed, but it would have been more, had not a policeman bravely wrestled the bomber away from the crowd, losing his own life in the process.²

2009 had been another violent year across Pakistan. Bomb blasts at a funeral in Dera Ishmail Khan, in February, had killed over thirty people, and left hundreds more injured.³ In October, 55 people were killed in a blast at the Khyber Bazaar in Peshawar. A few days later, the same city also saw over a hundred people killed by a car bomb at the Meena Bazaar.⁴

Attacks like these, on targets seemingly unconnected to the sectarian violence in Pakistan, may have provided a warning to the Moon Market shoppers. However, even with such threats ever-present, people need to live their lives, buy clothes for their children, and prepare for weddings.

The first blast happened at 8.40 pm on 7 December 2009, when the market was at its busiest. At an intersection of three roads, the first bomber detonated a vest containing 10kg of high explosive and ball bearings.

As people ran from the area in panic, they were funnelled by the narrow streets into a tightly-packed crowd. Around a minute after the first explosion, a second bomber detonated an identical explosive vest outside the National Bank in the corner of the market. It was this second bomb, surrounded by people, unprotected, in the open, which caused the most casualties.⁵

The first explosion started fires, which spread rapidly. Electrical points in the market are stuffed with wires, and the electrical fire moved quickly into shops and stalls. The fires were fed by the fuel of the many generators in the market and by the petrol in the hundreds of motorbikes parked nearby. Combined with the highly flammable clothes and textiles inside the shops and stalls, a massive blaze quickly started. People who sought shelter inside shops were trapped by flames, and many died from smoke inhalation.⁶

At 20:42, the 1122 Rescue Service received a call reporting that there had been an explosion.⁷ There is a rescue station, with ambulances and fire engines, approximately 100 metres from the market, so emergency

responders were able to reach the scene within a minute of the call being received. That's where the good luck ended.

The fire engines were unable to reach the blast site, as shopkeepers had placed bollards and barricades around the market to prevent cars entering. The rescue services then had to use cranes to remove obstacles and cut through iron bars to get close to the fire. A collapsed electricity transformer meant that the closest fire hydrants could not be used. Hoses had to be run to hydrants further away from the market.

Rescue workers were further hampered by an uncooperative crowd. At one point, the crowd burst through the police cordon and demanded that the rescuers deal with the dead bodies that were being left behind. As families heard the news, they rushed to the scene, causing traffic jams that hampered rescue vehicles. It took two hours to put the fires out and another hour to rescue people from the rubble.⁸

DEATHS AND INJURIES

It is likely that around 60 people died as a result of the Moon Market bombings. The death toll was initially reported as 34, but this number quickly rose.⁹ The official record of casualties maintained by the City District Government documented 49 people killed and 131 injured. These figures were obtained from hospitals and mortuaries four days after the bombing. They do not include victims who did not seek treatment at hospitals.

In addition to the 49 people officially recorded as being killed in the blast, there were a further three dead who were suspected as being perpetrators. In addition, the mortuary of King Edward's Medical University received a shopping bag filled with limbs two days after the incident. These body parts were not counted in government records.

After four days, around half of the injured (66) had been discharged from hospitals. However, some of those recorded as injured in the initial assessment eventually succumbed to their wounds. For example, at the Sheikh Zayed hospital, a state hospital near the blast, which received the largest number of casualties, eight of those admitted died over the following weeks.¹⁰

One family told AOVAV that their son, Shahn, who owned a stall selling children's clothes, could only be identified by his underwear. Shahn received burns to 70% of his body and had seven pieces of shrapnel in his chest.

He was in hospital for 26 days before he eventually died following complications during his second surgery.

Victims were taken to a variety of hospitals, with some of the closest facilities quickly overwhelmed and forced to divert casualties.

Dr Sajud Sharif, the consultant in charge of the Accident and Emergency department at the Sheikh Zayed hospital, said the biggest challenge his department faced was keeping track of who had received what treatment.

The situation was made more difficult by overcrowding. As well as receiving over 50 casualties in just a few hours, the hospital was packed with families looking for relatives, and with media reporting on the attack. In Pakistan, it is quite normal for camera crews to come right inside the hospital to film victims receiving treatment. Zafari Iqbal, a security guard in the hospital, remembers having to break up scuffles between the crowds and trying to placate devastated families searching for someone to blame.

Within this chaos was the additional challenge of tackling the complex nature of the wounds suffered by the victims. Professor Maheed, Trauma Surgeon at the Sheikh Zayed hospital, who operated on many of the injured, explained that bomb blasts present a particular series of challenges. Unlike in the case of gunshot victims, bomb blast patients arrive with multiple traumatic injuries. Their treatment is therefore more complicated and their condition harder to manage. Maheed also acknowledged that it is possible to miss injuries or trauma.

Victims of the Moon Market blast in Sheikh Zayed hospital were treated for: penetrating injuries from ball bearings, and even from other people's bone fragments; blunt trauma injuries; severe burns and smoke inhalation; collapsed lungs; amputations; eardrum damage and eye injuries.¹¹

Salman Zaib was a 21-year-old student at the time of the attack. He was at the Moon Market to collect money from a jeweller for his father, and was standing about a metre away from the second bomb when it detonated. He was spared almost certain death when a woman happened to walk in front of him just as it exploded.

Zaib had to have stitches on his back for injuries from shrapnel and pieces of the woman's bones. Both his legs were broken. They were so badly damaged that they required expensive plastic surgery and bone grafts. He was in bed for 4-5 months, and it took over one and a half years before he was able to walk again. Even



Police search through the ashes of the market for evidence

four years later, he is unable to put in the same hours at his father's furniture business or move around easily.

The day after the bomb blast, Zaib was due to take the final exams for his accountancy qualification. The time he spent in hospital recovering from his injuries meant that he fell behind with his studies and eventually had to drop out.¹²

PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM

Other injuries can be less visible, but have equally devastating effects. Witnessing horrific violence and seeing the bloody aftermath can lead to psychological trauma and impact negatively on psycho-social wellbeing.

Many of the people who AOV spoke to had displayed symptoms associated with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) at some point in the years following the bombing. People complained of unending headaches, reliving the event through flashbacks, and feeling constantly on guard. Some described the incident in vivid terms, and were clearly overwhelmed by the sudden change in their physical surroundings. Some people found their entire moods changed after the blast.

Muhammad Arif Saleem was visiting the market with his wife to buy new school

uniforms for his children, as the weather was getting colder. He received a deep cut to the head and damaged his hearing, but these physical injuries were treated within a week. Emotionally though, he was deeply disturbed.

Saleem went back to working in a restaurant a few weeks after the bombing, but was still having nightmares about the attack. He found that his temper had changed since the incident, and lost his job as a result. His restaurant sent him home as he had clearly not fully recovered. When he came back after a few days, his job had been given to someone else.¹³

INDIRECT EFFECTS ON HEALTHCARE

Responding to bombings like the one in the Moon Market, and preparing for the possibility of future attacks, have deep consequences. These activities drain hospitals of resources and have knock-on effects on their patients.

A few hours after the bombing, hospitals received calls from government officials telling them that treatment for all victims of the bombing should be provided free of charge. In most cases, this meant that victims received free treatment and medication, at least initially, unless they went to private hospital.

In practice, this gesture is less generous than it first appears. The free treatment and medication provided by the hospitals was not met with extra money from the government. The additional costs that emerged had to be absorbed by the existing budgets. According to senior hospital officials, no additional funds were offered by the government to either the Jinnah or Sheikh Zayed hospitals, which had received the majority of victims after the Moon market bombing.

In order to respond to future incidents of the scale of the Moon Market blast, hospitals have had to purchase specialist medical equipment for trauma patients, like chest tubes for up to 50 patients. Staff members have also had to receive extra training for responding to mass casualty disasters.¹⁴

General concerns about the security situation in Pakistan mean that hospitals also invest heavily in defending themselves from potential attacks. For instance, the Sheikh Zayed hospital currently employs 104 security guards, costing around 1% of its annual budget. Hospitals in Pakistan are further hampered by difficulties in retaining their best and brightest doctors, who are keen to move abroad because of the security situation across the whole of the country.



Rescuers were quick to the scene of the incident but faced a number of difficulties in fighting the fire

DAMAGE TO THE MARKET

The Moon Market bombing had severe economic effects on both the businesses in the market and on families of victims. Before the attack, the Moon Market was one of the busiest markets in Lahore, with several hundred shops, stalls and restaurants. There are 18 plazas in the market, and each contains around 70-80 shops and stalls. Shoppers would travel from across the city to buy goods, conduct business and meet with friends.

According to Abdul Jabar, President of the Traders' Union in the market, 61 shops were damaged, along with 90 smaller stalls. Jabar was on the committee with government officials to determine how compensation was awarded to businesses in the market. He claimed that businesses in the market suffered for 3-6 months after the blast, when it was partially closed. He argued that they are now trading at roughly the same level as before the bombing. Part of the reason for this, he suggested, was that the Punjab provincial government awarded compensation ranging from Rs150,000 and Rs1.5 million (US\$2,100 to US\$21,000).¹⁵

However, not everyone interviewed was as positive about the market's recovery, and some were critical of the process for awarding compensation to businesses. Rao Mubarak, Executive Vice President of the rival Quami Tajir Ittehad traders' Union, claimed that the money provided by the government was well short of the Rs500 million (US\$6.9 million) of damage estimated by the District Coordinator's Office. He claimed that some money was paid to bogus claimants. In

Mubarak's estimation, the market is trading at around 30% of the level it was before the bombing. While small eateries are doing well, the cloth and jewellery shops are suffering. Many traders would have left, but are forced to stay because the value of their assets has decreased so much that they do not want to sell for a loss.¹⁶

Some relatives of the stall owners who were killed in the bombing missed out on the compensation to which they were entitled. The family of Shan, the young stall-holder who was in hospital for 26 days before he died from his injuries, were told by the market union that they had applied late, and were not awarded any compensation for the approximate Rs300,000 (US\$2,550) of stock which was lost. The family said that they were anxious not to appear greedy, or somehow not sufficiently mournful, at the death of their son, which is why they did not apply for money straight away, so missed the deadline for applications.

LONG-TERM IMPACTS ON FAMILIES

It was not just businesses in the Moon market that suffered economically after the blast. Many victims and their families were left with their primary earner either injured or killed. Some people lost jobs because they could no longer work. Despite help with initial medical treatment, most people also faced large medical bills for subsequent treatment.

Victims of the bombing were entitled to compensation from the provincial government. Families who lost loved-ones received Rs500,000 (US\$4,350). People who were severely injured received Rs200,000 (US\$1,650), and those with slight injuries

Rs50,000 (US\$450). Compensation was only given to those with physical injuries.

Government officials acknowledge that this system of flat rates of compensation was imperfect, and did not address the fact that some injuries are more debilitating and long-lasting than others. However, it was felt that devising a new system based on needs would be subjective, overly complicated and expensive.

For most of the families AOV spoke to, the support offered did not come close to covering the losses and expenses they endured following the bombing. In particular, there was a collective failure by government and civil society to appreciate just how long-lasting the effects of the bombing were. The uncle of one victim said, 'You can't give a man a meal for a day. After a week, he'll starve.'

Abdul Qadir, who works at a stall selling children's shoes in the market, received shrapnel injuries to his stomach, and his had was cut by broken glass. He had to have a colostomy operation, and his large intestine was shut down for 4-5 months. When AOV visited, four years later, he was still in pain, and had recently been told that he needed more surgery. Most of the treatment that he received in the hospital was free, even in the months after the blast. However, he did have to pay around Rs4,000 (US\$45) for the colostomy bags, which needed to be changed four times a week for several months. Qadir's stall was completely destroyed in the blast, and he was awarded Rs100,000 (US\$900) for the damage. He took the difficult decision to rebuild his stall. He started his business up again, but had to buy all his supplies on credit

and now works off a smaller stall that has cheaper rent.¹⁷

Some victims AOA V spoke to found that after their recovery they had no jobs to return to or they were no longer able to perform them.

THE PERPETRATORS

Nearly four years after the bombing, no convictions have been made in relation to the Moon Market attacks. Pakistan has been widely criticised for failing to successfully prosecute people accused of involvement in bombings like the one at Moon Market.¹⁸ Out of the 559 cases brought against alleged terrorists in Punjab Province in 2012, 414 (71%) were acquitted.¹⁹

In part, these figures are misleading. Unlike in other countries, the Pakistani justice system does not allow for prosecutors to drop a case, even if they think the evidence is insufficient to go to trial. However, lawyers AOA V spoke to identified several areas that made securing convictions particularly difficult for prosecutors in Pakistan.²⁰

Firstly, they have repeatedly found that witnesses are reluctant to testify. With no witness protection programme in Pakistan, they are especially vulnerable to threats and intimidation by militant groups.

Secondly, the quality of evidence obtained by police investigating the bombing is not of a high enough quality to be admissible. Sometimes, this is due to the high standards demanded of the evidence, but at other times, it is because the police are either under-resourced or poorly-trained.

Finally, with the actual perpetrators of the bombing killed in the blast, it is difficult to link members of the same group to that particular incident.

CONCLUSION

AOA V's research has shown that IED attacks in Pakistan have an impact far beyond the headline casualty figures. Alongside those directly killed and injured are the countless others who suffer psychologically and financially: the children who are terrified when a firework goes off; the hospital staff who cannot eat barbecued food again after smelling the burning flesh of the victims; the stall owner whose takings are down now that the market is less popular.

The stories of the people impacted by the Moon Market bombings are just a few of thousands. There were 22 suicide bomb attacks in Pakistan in 2012; five of them

occurred in markets. The whole of Pakistani society is impacted, and vital resources are having to be diverted to help victims and to prevent future violence.

But this is not just Pakistan's problem. It is one that is proliferating world-wide. The humanitarian harm to civilians is catastrophic, and states must take action to address it. Responses should not be restricted purely to preventative security measures; they should also embrace: stigmatisation; the robust application of international humanitarian law; better control of the trade in components, such as detonators and explosive materials; tighter stockpile controls; addressing the financing of non-state actors; ensuring that the needs of victims are properly met; and embarking on campaigns of education and outreach. The annual civilian deaths from IEDs world-wide already vastly exceed those from landmines. This is a global problem that needs to be addressed now.

NOTES

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The 2014 Global Terrorism Index tracks the rise and fall of the world's largest terrorist organisations since 1998. Whilst the vast majority of terrorist groups are only responsible for a handful of deaths, a select few are responsible for the majority of death and destruction caused by terrorism in the last fifteen years. ISIL, which emerged out of Al-Qa'ida in Iraq, is one such group. In this essay, terrorism expert Ekaterina Stepanova from the Institute of World Economy & International Relations, outlines a shift in two main trends, the broader network fragmentation of the global jihadi movement and the shift from top-down to bottom-up regionalization of violent Islamic groups. She also tracks the complex evolution of ISIL as a regional force in the Middle East, and what its continued growth means for the world and region.

TRANSNATIONAL ISLAMIST TERRORISM NETWORK FRAGMENTATION AND BOTTOM-UP REGIONALIZATION

Ekaterina Stepanova, Head, Peace and Conflict Studies Unit, Institute of World Economy & International Relations (IMEMO)

The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL)¹ occurred in the broader context of the dominance of radical Islamist organizations among the world's most lethal militant-terrorist groups in the Middle East, Asia and Africa and the occasional outbreaks of homegrown, but transnationally inspired jihadist terrorism in the West. The ISIL phenomenon has also featured a higher-than-usual inflow of jihadists from other conflict hotspots and non-Muslim states. All this adds to the overall confusion about the different types and levels of transnational terrorism of radical Islamist bent and reinforces the demand for overly simplistic explanations. For instance, in official circles and media discourse both in the West and in the rest of the world the main direction of transnationalisation of Islamist terrorism is

often still interpreted as the top-down regionalization of al-Qaeda-centered 'global jihad' movement.

This article argues instead that the evolution of transnational Islamist terrorism is more complex and non-linear. Its cutting edge may be formed by two ideologically linked, but distinct and only partially overlapping processes:

- the network fragmentation of the global jihad movement, including in the West;
- the bottom-up, rather than top-down, regionalization of violent Islamism in the world's heavily internationalized centers of militant-terrorist activity in the Greater Middle East.

MAIN TRENDS IN TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

Of all trends in contemporary terrorism, the following three are of particular relevance to the evolution of transnational Islamist terrorism.

(1) Sharp increase in terrorist activity in the recent years, coupled with its disproportionately high concentration in two regions and two major trans-border conflict areas. No current international security crisis – from the outbreak of Ebola to the crisis around and conflict in Ukraine as the dominant European security issue – can undo or overshadow one simple fact: 2013 was the peak year in global terrorist activity not only in the early 21st century, but also for the entire period since 1970 that is covered by available

statistics. Disturbingly, the previous highs for terrorist incidents were recorded in 2011 and 2012 and for fatalities – in 2012.²

While terrorist activity is at its historical peak and continues to increase, it is very unevenly distributed around the world, with the bulk of it concentrated in just a handful of countries. The post-9/11 global terrorism statistics is heavily dominated by two regions (the Middle East and South Asia). The bulk of terrorist activity there is, in turn, accounted for by two regional centers of gravity – major armed conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan (and, more recently, in the broader Afghanistan-Pakistan and the Iraq-Syria contexts). The heavily internationalized wars in Iraq and Afghanistan both involved armed insurgent/terrorist movements in Muslim countries directed primarily against Western troops backing weak local governments. The Western withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan and changing forms of internationalization of the respective conflicts did not improve the situation.

(2) The general dominance of region-based radical Islamist groups and movements among the most active and lethal militant-terrorist groups. In 2012, the top 6 terrorist groups – all of the radical Islamist type – accounted for almost half (around 5000) of all terrorist fatalities in the world.³ In 2013, all of the most lethal terrorist groups in the world were radical Islamist organizations, including the Taliban in Afghanistan, ISIL (in Iraq and Syria), “Tehrik-e-Taleban” (Pakistan), “Boko Haram” (Nigeria), “Lashkar-e-Jangvi” (Pakistan), “Djabhat an-Nusrah” (Syria), “ash-Shabab” (Somalia). Remarkably, these groups, in addition to the use of terrorist means, have also been active combatants – military parties to major armed conflicts in respective states. All of them have or acquire a major trans-border dimension and evolve in the direction of further regionalization of militant and terrorist activity. In contrast to these groups, for instance, al-Qaeda as such has not committed a single terrorist act in 2012–2013.

(3) Further transnationalisation of terrorism at different levels that could be distinguished primarily by the ultimate scale of a group’s end goal(s) – local, regional or global. At the present stage of globalization, terrorism at different levels of world politics from local to global differs more in terms of degree and quality of transnationalisation, than by whether or not it is transnationalised. Furthermore, transnationalisation primarily manifests itself

in qualitative rather than quantitative terms. Despite the fact that out of a couple of thousands of terrorist groups tracked by the Global Terrorism Dataset (GTD) only few attack soft targets on foreign territory,⁴ the very boundary between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ terrorism gets increasingly blurred. Even terrorist groups with localized political agenda tend to increasingly transnationalise some or most of their logistics, fund-raising, propaganda and training activities. Terrorist actors of certain motivational/ideological types, such as the jihadist cells and individuals in the West, may address their terrorist acts to ‘the world as whole’ and act to advance explicitly transnationalised or global goals, even as they rely primarily or solely on local resources and do not necessarily travel out of their country of citizenship. In addition, in today’s globalized world, transnationalisation does not exclude – and is often dynamically interlinked with – the fragmentation of terrorism and other forms of collective violence.

In sum, as all terrorism today is transnationalised to some degree, of critical importance is to distinguish between different levels and qualities of transnational terrorism. In the world where even a group with localized agenda can develop a wide transnational fund-raising network or hit citizens of many states by attacking civilians in major urban centers, the main criterion to establish the qualitative level of transnationalisation of terrorism is the scale of an organization’s ultimate goals and agenda – local, regional or global.

NETWORK FRAGMENTATION OF ‘GLOBAL JIHAD’

The bulk of terrorist activity in the world is accounted for by militant actors that pursue relatively limited goals in local or regional contexts. In contrast, the more recent phenomenon of ‘global terrorism’ associated primarily with al-Qaeda advances an explicitly universalist agenda and ultimately pursues existential, non-negotiable and unlimited goals. Such terrorism is truly extraterritorial: while it is not specifically tied to any single local or regional political context, it does not have to be global in its physical reach to have a global impact. Despite minimal number of incidents, operatives and ideologues, al-Qaeda continued to attract disproportionately high attention well after 9/11. This may be partly explained by the fact that most of its high-profile targets have been either located in or associated with the

developed Western world, partly – by the significant anti-system potential of the supranational ideology of global jihad that offers a very radical and reactionary response to very modern challenges of a globalizing world.

However, in the mid-2010s, following a massive anti-al-Qaeda campaign and liquidation of most of its first generation leaders, including Osama bin Laden, the following question seems appropriate. How come that the al-Qaeda-centred global jihad is still considered to pose the main terrorist threat to international security, if in the early 2010s, al-Qaeda as such did not even make it into the top 20 most dangerous terrorist groups (in 2011, it was responsible just for one kidnapping out of over 5000 terrorist incidents⁵ and, in 2012–2013, did not commit any terrorist attacks)?⁶ The answer is complex and linked the dynamic structural transformation of the global jihad movement and its adaptation to changing circumstances.

There are two main interpretations of the evolution of the global jihad movement. While both imply a degree of fragmentation of the original ‘al-Qaeda’, the first framework interprets this process as top-down regionalization. Since the late 2000s, this approach has prevailed in mainstream expert and political discourses in the United States and in the West at large. It disaggregates ‘global jihad’ into three levels. First, it leaves some direct strategic command and control role to what remains of the ‘al-Qaeda core’ based in Pakistan/Afghanistan. Second, it argues that the movement’s main center of gravity has shifted towards several large, well-structured and organizationally coherent regional affiliates in Muslim regions (ultimately subordinate to ‘al-Qaeda Central’). This usually refers to ‘al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’, ‘al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb’, ‘al-Qaeda in Iraq’ and even ‘al-Qaedas’ in the Horn of Africa and in Southeast Asia. The third level is formed by al-Qaeda’s ‘ideological adherents’ – small cells and individuals, most active in the West itself, who ‘know the group only through its ideology to carry out violence in its name.’⁷ The loose network of these micro-cells, however, is commonly interpreted as a sign of al-Qaeda’s organizational degradation that is claimed to have resulted primarily from counterterrorist pressure by the United States and its allies.

The alternative approach promoted in this article emphasizes the genuine ‘network fragmentation’ of global jihad as the cutting

edge of the movement's evolution.⁸ It denies residual strategic command functions for 'the al-Qaeda core' at the present stage, beyond the symbolic and inspirational role of its ideology and remaining leaders such as Ayman az-Zawahiri. This approach does not in principle deny the existence of al-Qaeda's regional affiliates in Muslim regions (this role best fits 'al-Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula' that retains a genetic link with the original al-Qaeda and, to a lesser extent – 'al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb'). It does, however, question the vision of global jihad as the 'top down', hierarchically integrated 'Islamist International' clearly divided into large well-structured regional affiliates. It points at the fact that most of the so-called regional affiliates have long and solid local pre-history and strong homegrown roots. Their main agendas and priorities are inextricably tied to respective regional contexts and local/regional armed conflicts. When they upgrade and expand their activity to the regional level, it is by following the 'bottom-up' logic rather than any 'top-down' impulse or command from some master HQs. These groups' occasional statements of support or even pledges of loyalty to al-Qaeda have been more of a symbolic and declaratory than substantive nature.

Instead, smaller autonomous cells⁹ that are linked by a loose ideological network, are active in several dozen countries and promote an explicitly globalist agenda are seen as the most committed ideological adepts of global jihad and as the cutting edge of the evolution of its organizational patterns. Such network fragmentation was best captured by Abu Musab as-Suri's theory of 'jihad by individual cells' (and, in the West, by the 'leaderless jihad' theory).¹⁰ Network fragmentation does not imply aggressive recruitment into a pre-existing framework – rather, adepts are encouraged to start their own cells to further the shared ideology and the movement's ends. The idea of starting a violent cell appeals as much to young people's desire for glory and personal conscience as to their political or ideological beliefs. In contrast to Islamist groups and movements tied to the specific local/regional contexts and armed conflicts in the Middle East, Asia or Africa, this type of cell is truly extraterritorial in its outlook and goals, with most of such actors emerging in Western rather than Muslim states. These cells display diverse radicalization paths and are often not linked to one another in any formal way, but they share the ideology of global jihad and together form – and see themselves as part of

– an adaptive and resilient transnational network-type movement.

Despite its marginality, this movement can still pose a serious terrorist threat to international security in two main ways.

First, there has been a gradual rise in homegrown jihadist terrorism in the West, despite continuing fragmentation of such violence underscored by dominance of mini-cells and the growing proportion of single actors. Some of them – the so-called 'lone wolves' – act entirely on their own (e.g., Nidal Hasan in the 2010 Fort Hood shooting), others act either as network agents or on their own initiative, but with some operational or other network connections.¹¹ Fragmented jihadist terrorism in the West is hard to track as individuals or cells may not be in contact with other/known terrorist actors, do not necessarily get external training, and often acquire weapons and materials independently and from open sources. However, it also tends to produce a mismatch between the Western jihadists' high ideological ambition and their relatively limited capacity to launch terrorist attacks (they generally lack experience in violence unless a group involves a veteran/returnee from a foreign armed conflict or have got some professional training). This mismatch often results in failure and partly explains why, while half of jihadist plots in the West involved plans to cause mass casualties, very few have led to actual mass-casualty attacks.¹²

Secondly, the fragmented network of 'global jihad' adepts forms a natural pool for influx of Western jihadist fighters to various conflicts in the Muslim world. More limited connections – a few foreign contacts and visits to conflict-torn regions for ideological inspiration, sometimes also in hope to get some training – while not a must for jihadists¹³ in the West, have not been uncommon either. The two-way nature of such flows and links has become more disturbing than ever in view of the rise of radical Islamist organizations in the Iraq-Syria context (such as 'Jabhat an-Nusra' and, above all, ISIL). They have attracted more foreign Islamist fighters than any other theater since Afghanistan in the 1980s, with Western, mainly European, fighters comprising no less than a quarter of all foreign jihadists – a disproportionately high share. For the West, this has alarming implications. Possible return of some of these seasoned fighters could stimulate new extremist networks and do a lot to bridge the mismatch between jihadists terrorists'

ambition and qualification (even as only a limited percentage of such returnees from previous conflicts have turned back to terrorism so far).¹⁴

While certainly a serious concern, the network fragmentation of global jihad (that manifests itself more in the West than anywhere else) is a less critical international security problem than the challenge posed by the bottom-up regionalization of Islamist militancy and terrorism.

BOTTOM-UP REGIONALIZATION: ISIL

Regionalization of territorially based insurgent-terrorist Islamist groups could be traced in various regions. However, it only tends to become an issue of major international concern in regional contexts characterized by a combination of chronic state weakness or failure, protracted major conflicts and all-out civil wars and high degree of transnationalisation and/or even formal internationalization (foreign military presence). It is in these conditions that regionalization of a more localized movement is coupled with consolidation rather than fragmentation of its military-political potential and with a qualitative upgrade of its militant/terrorist activity, rather than decline in its intensity. Nowhere does this trend manifest itself better than in the context of the ongoing crisis in and around Iraq and the trans-border ISIL phenomenon.

Iraq has led the list of countries most affected by terrorism since the mid-2000s – well before ISIL has taken full shape (in the first post-9/11 decade Iraq alone accounted for over third of all terrorism-related fatalities worldwide).¹⁵ However, a decade later, it is the activity of ISIL and some smaller radical Islamist groups in the extended, cross-border Iraq-Syria context that has become the main impulse and driver of anti-government militancy, terrorism and sectarian violence in the region. Acting in two (semi-)failed state contexts – in Iraq as a chronically failing post-intervention state and in Syria seriously weakened by an ongoing bloody civil war – ISIL provides an even more impressive example of the full regionalization of a militant-terrorist movement with a powerful ideology, major state-building ambitions and quasi-state potential than the cross-border activity and phenomenon of the Taliban in the Afghanistan-Pakistan context.

The emergence and evolution of ISIL in the direction of 'bottom-up regionalization' has to be addressed in two main contexts: (1)

internal dynamics and conflicts in Iraq and Syria, including the overlap with intra-regional dimension and (2) broader links and connections to transnational Islamism.

First, no other major regionalizing Islamist movement has been so strongly driven by intra-state and intra-regional factors, even as these dynamics were partly distorted, stimulated or set in motion by previous external intervention in Iraq. The informal transnationalisation of a civil war in Syria on both sides has also largely, although not exclusively, been a product of intra-regional dynamics.

Of all the factors and conditions that can explain the rise of ISIL and its major military and modest state-building successes since the summer of 2014, the more specific and directly relevant ones are internal to the countries and the region in question. They include the genuine discontent by very diverse groups of Iraqi Sunnis – from the former Baathists to tribal groups to radical Islamists – with their growing political and socio-economic marginalization and repression. This rising discontent had earlier helped feed the anti-U.S. insurgency, but continued to accumulate during the rule of the increasingly sectarian al-Maliki government. That was coupled with the general limited functionality and low legitimacy of the unpopular, but increasingly authoritarian Iraqi regime inherited from the times of the foreign security presence. The bloody civil war that erupted in the neighboring Syria provided an ideal ‘window of opportunity’ to ISIL as the most radical part of the Iraqi Sunni opposition to get a haven, secure the second country-base, continue fighting and acquire financial self-sufficiency through control of the cross-border smuggling of oil and almost anything else, even before it shifted its main center of activity back to Iraq.

Not surprisingly, the worst and most direct implications of the ISIL activity once it has taken its full shape affect, first and foremost, the region itself. The ISIL phenomenon threatens to deal a massive, if not necessarily final, blow to at least two already failing or seriously weakened states at once, adding new quality to the broader destabilization in the region that has already for over a decade been the world’s main center of terrorist and militant activity.

Second, ISIL’s links to transnational Islamist terrorism remain a contested issue. In policy and media circles ISIL, as well as its previous

‘editions’, are often portrayed not as self-sufficient organizations but as a branch of al-Qaeda-inspired ‘global jihad’. This interpretation usually emphasizes two issues: (a) ISIL’s pre-history in Iraq, with a focus on the so-called ‘al-Qaeda in Iraq’ and (b) the unprecedentedly large presence of foreign jihadist fighters among ISIL’s command and rank-and-file alike.

The Islamist core of what is now known as ISIL (and was previously known as Islamic State in Iraq and earlier as ‘al-Qaeda in Iraq’) formed in the aftermath of the 2003 US-led intervention in the course of escalating and radicalizing resistance to foreign forces and their local allies. A few statements of support and loyalty to al-Qaeda made by the group’s first leader Abu Musab az-Zarqawi (a controversial figure with ambiguous connections in and beyond jihadist circles), the reference to al-Qaeda in the group’s name under Zarkawi (removed shortly after his death in 2006) and his increasing reliance on demonstrative use of mass-casualty terrorist sufficed to degrade the group to little but ‘al-Qaeda off shoot’. While this might have served well to discredit the genuine nature of the armed Sunni opposition to the US presence in Iraq, it did not reflect the real nature and composition of the group. Its main goal remained the liberation of Iraq and the establishment of an Islamist state in Iraq and the overwhelming majority of militants and commanders were Iraqi (while the proportion of foreign fighters did not exceed 4-10 per cent).¹⁶ By the end of 2006, the group became one of the largest insurgency forces in Iraq, formed the core of the coalition of the anti-government Islamist actors and renamed itself into Islamic State of Iraq.

The intensifying pressure by the US forces and some loyal Sunni tribes, as part of the ‘surge’ campaign of the late 2000s, and later also by the government and its Shia allies pushed part of the movement out of Iraq to the neighboring Syria. The escalating civil war there since 2011 gave the group a major boost and upgraded it to one of the largest forces on the radical Islamist flank of the armed opposition. While the group had joined the Syrian civil war on the side of the jihadist part of the opposition, after it upgraded itself to the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant and tried to unite other Islamist groups under its control, it fell out with the another largest jihadist organization ‘Jabhat an-Nusra’. Remarkably, in the conflict between ISIL and ‘an-Nusra’ in Syria the political and ideological support of ‘al-Qaeda Central’ was

not on the ISIL side. As the ISIL shifted the main focus of its activity back to Iraq and seized upon the rising tensions between the al-Maliki government and the Iraqi Sunnis, al-Qaeda’s main voice Ayman az-Zawahiri formally denied any support or affiliation to ISIL in February 2014, months before its victorious march deeper into Iraq.¹⁷

The absence of al-Qaeda blessing did not stop thousands of foreign fighters (some of whom switched the front from Syria) from joining ISIL, increasingly well-funded and well-organized militarily. Their overall numbers, proportion and composition are dynamic and yet to be clarified, but two preliminary conclusions can be made even on the basis of available information. First, while the ISIL army-style combat potential is largely attributed to the presence of the Iraqi ex-Baathist professional security and military cadre (who may comprise up to a third of ISIL’s leader al-Baghdadi’s deputies), foreign jihadists appear to play a disproportionately large role in the ISIL terrorist attacks and other atrocities, including beheadings. Second, it is the influx of ‘global jihad’ fighters from the West in particular, with their distinctively universalist agenda, that may provide the region-based ISIL with its main link to a truly globalized agenda. In this respect, they may play an even larger role than either the ideological symbolism of the historical al-Qaeda core or the influence of jihadists from other local/regional ‘fronts’ (that range from major conflicts in failed states such as Afghanistan, Somalia or Yemen to peripheral Islamist/separatist insurgencies in many fully functional states in Asia and Eurasia).

Obsessive attempts to trace or link any Islamist insurgency/terrorist movements in areas of heavily transnationalised armed conflicts to the ‘core al-Qaeda’ in line with the strict ‘top-down regionalization’ scheme might have played their own part in overlooking the rise of ISIL. This trans-border, regional movement is not only extremely radical in ideological outlook and methods, but also efficient in combat and, potentially, basic governance and quick to adapt to the limited anti-ISIL air campaign launched by the US-led coalition of Western and Arab states. The regionalization of ISIL largely followed the ‘bottom-up’ rather than ‘top-down’ pattern and was primarily driven by intra-regional dynamics, state weakness and sectarianism (exacerbated by previous international interventions). ISIL’s main link to

the 'global jihad' agenda and ideology is provided by the significant presence of foreign fighters, especially Western jihadists with their markedly universalist outlook.

However, in contrast to al-Qaeda or 'global jihad' adepts in and beyond the West, ISIL does not appear to pursue or prioritize totally abstract and utopian global goals. It is precisely the fact that ISIL is fully mired in the regional context, sets up more tangible and realistic goals and does not (dis)miss a chance of building a trans-border regional Islamic state *here and now* that makes it today a no lesser, or even a greater, challenge to international security than al-Qaeda and its direct off-shoots and self-generating micro-clones.

Whether the ISIL phenomenon is more of an outlier or signals a broader trend may yet to be seen. However, some of the deadliest Islamist militant-terrorist groups in the world's worst conflicts (ranging from the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban to 'Boko Haram' in Nigeria or 'ash-Shabab' in Somalia) – appear to or may evolve in the same direction, especially if a combination of dysfunctional or failing states, deep regional divisions and unsuccessful past of present external interventions is in place. This provides sufficient grounds to consider the 'bottom-up regionalization' as one of the most potentially disturbing trends in transnational Islamist terrorism.

NOTES

1. On 29 June 2014, the movement changed the name to Islamic State (IS), but is more widely known in English as ISIL or ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (the Arabic for Levant) or Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.
2. 2013 is the last year for which full GTD statistics was available at the time of writing. Global Terrorism Database (GTD) / National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland. <http://www.start.umd.edu/data/gtd>.
3. Testimony by W. Braniff, Executive Director, START, University of Maryland, before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee Hearing on the State of Al Qaeda, its Affiliates, and Associated Groups: View From Outside Experts. Washington, DC: United States House of Representatives, 4 Feb. 2014, P. 3.
4. Global Terrorism Database 2014.
5. Global Terrorism Index: Capturing the Impact of Terrorism in 2002-2011 (Sydney; N.Y.: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2012), p. 6 http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2012_Global_Terrorism_Index_Report.pdf
6. Testimony by W. Braniff. p. 3.
7. National Strategy for Counterterrorism (Washington D.C.: The White House, 28 June 2011), p. 19.
8. Stepanova E., 'The evolution of the al-Qaeda-type terrorism: networks and beyond', in L. Bossi et al. (ed.), Dynamics of Political Violence: A Process-Oriented Perspective on Radicalization and the Escalation of Political Conflict (Farnham, VA: Ashgate, 2014), pp. 288–305.
9. Al-Suri A.M., The Call to Global Islamic Resistance. CENTRA Technology, Inc. / trans. From Arabic (DCIA Counterterrorism Center, Office of Terrorism Analysis, 2004), pp. 1367–1368.
10. Sageman M. Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007).
11. See, e. g., Nesser P., 'Single actor terrorism: scope, characteristics and explanations', in Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 6, no. 6 (2012), pp. 61–73.
12. There were only 4 rarely successful mass-casualty jihadist attacks in the West after 2001: the 2004 Madrid bombings, the 2005 London bombings, the 2009 Fort Hood shooting and the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings.
13. For numbers on Syria, see Zelin A.Y., 'Up to 11,000 foreign fighters in Syria; steep rise among Western Europeans', ICSR Insight, 17 December 2013. Estimated numbers for foreign fighters in ISIL in the Iraq-Syria context are higher, but vary significantly.
14. For more detail, see Hegghammer T., "Should I stay or should I go? Explaining variation in Western jihadists' choice between domestic and foreign fighting," in American Political Science Review, vol. 107, no. 1 (Feb. 2013), p. 10.
15. Global Terrorism Index 2012, p. 12.
16. Baker J., Hamilton L. The Iraq Study Group Report (Washington D.C.: Iraq Study Group, 2006).
17. Bayoumi A., Harding L., "Mapping Iraq's fighting groups", Al-Jazeera (27 June 2014); The Evolution of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL): Relationships 2004-2014, START Fact Sheet, June 2014.

Terrorism in all its forms is a major threat to national security. Nuclear terrorism however is the most serious possible terrorist threat. Samantha Pitts-Kiefer from the Nuclear Threat Initiative, outlines the history and current reality of a nuclear terrorist threat, highlighting the urgent need to better strengthen global nuclear security. This contribution summarises the key global initiatives focused on this task and how the NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index aims to provide better evidence to measure amongst countries of the world, the quantities, security and control measures, global norms, domestic commitments and capacity and risk environment for nuclear materials.

NUCLEAR NIGHTMARES

Samantha Pitts-Kiefer, Senior Project Officer, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)

Thirteen years after the 9/11 attacks stunned the world and nearly a decade after the subsequent attacks in London, Madrid, and Bali made global terrorism a painful reality, public concern and awareness about the terrorist threat had started to fade. But the emergence this year of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), most notably with gruesome videotaped beheadings, has once again captured the attention of citizens across the globe.

Images of the barbaric ritualistic killings of American journalists and British aid workers sparked international outrage. At the same time, however, in many parts of the world, a sense remains that these kinds of deeply troubling events take place only in remote and far-off lands, and pose little threat closer to home. Unfortunately, it is naïve to think so. ISIL has tens of thousands of fighters, is well-financed, pays little respect to international borders and, in addition to individual acts of

barbarism, engages in large-scale attacks on civilians. Al Qaeda leaders made it clear they were seeking weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. What if ISIL decides it too wants them? World leaders and their publics have a duty to ask such “what-ifs.” What if ISIL, al Qaeda, or some other yet-as-unknown terrorist group obtained nuclear materials and fashioned a crude improvised nuclear device? What if they were able to ship it, undetected, through one of the world’s porous ports? What if they succeeded in detonating it in one of the world’s cities?

This is not just the stuff of Hollywood. Such “what-ifs” must be treated in capitals with seriousness and resolve from Washington, DC, to Moscow and beyond. World leaders, including U.S. presidents Barack Obama and George W. Bush, have identified nuclear terrorism as the number one security threat and have taken steps to address the threat through the Nuclear Security Summit process

and other programs such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. But much more needs to be done. Until all the materials needed to make a bomb are properly secured, the world will not be safe from terrorists bent on unleashing unimaginable horror.

THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union built up vast amounts of nuclear weapons and materials. The Cuban Missile Crisis heightened fears that the nuclear arms race could result in destruction on a massive scale, whether as a result of an intentional or accidental launch and detonation of a nuclear bomb. As the Cold War came to a close, a new threat emerged: nuclear terrorism. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons and

materials were left scattered across hundreds of sites in former Soviet states prompting urgent concern that smugglers or terrorists would steal enough material for a bomb. Russia and the United States worked together, through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, to dismantle and destroy thousands of weapons and to ensure that the nuclear materials from those weapons were disposed of safely. Despite all that has been achieved, the security of weapons-usable nuclear materials remains an urgent concern, while at the same time terrorist groups have grown more sophisticated and more adept at carrying out mass-casualty attacks.

So, today's leaders and citizens face a chilling prospect: the detonation of a crude nuclear weapon built by terrorists with materials stolen or purchased on the black market. Though the al Qaeda that attacked the United States on 9/11 has been much diminished, al Qaeda affiliates in the Arabian Peninsula and Northern Africa, ISIL, and terrorist organizations like al-Shabaab in Somalia remind us that the terrorist threat is dynamic, constantly evolving, and, most of all, enduring.

At the same time, the materials needed to build a bomb are spread around the world. Globally, there are approximately 2,000 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium or HEU) located at hundreds of sites—some of them poorly secured—scattered across twenty-five countries. Building one bomb requires only enough HEU to fill a five-pound bag of sugar or a quantity of plutonium the size of a grapefruit. Terrorists also have access to the technology and know-how needed to build a crude nuclear device, and a number of terrorist groups have in the past stated a desire to acquire and use a nuclear bomb. The consequences of detonating such a bomb in a major city would be staggering: hundreds of thousands of casualties; long-lasting environmental damage; economic losses in the hundreds of billions; and considerable political and social ramifications. No matter where a bomb is detonated, the consequences would reverberate around the globe.

To build a bomb the biggest challenge terrorists face is obtaining enough HEU or separated plutonium. Every step after acquiring the material—building the bomb, transporting it, and detonating it—is easier for terrorists to take and harder for the international community to stop. So it is imperative that terrorists don't get a hold of the materials.

Today, there are myriad ways that a well-organized and sufficiently-funded terrorist group could seize the materials they need to build an improvised nuclear device that would destroy the heart of a city. They could send a team of armed assailants to overwhelm guards at an understaffed nuclear facility or to attack a convoy transporting weapons-usable nuclear materials from one facility to another. A terrorist or criminal network could corrupt insiders or use a cyberattack to defeat security controls.

That is why ensuring that all weapons-usable nuclear material is properly secured to the highest standards is the key to preventing nuclear terrorism.

BUILDING A STRENGTHENED GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY SYSTEM

The Nuclear Security Summits, launched by the United States in 2010, have brought high-level attention to the threat of nuclear terrorism and have catalyzed actions by the 54 participating states to strengthen their own security and work collectively to strengthen global security. As a result of the Summit process, states have strengthened their nuclear security laws and regulations, signed on to international treaties that require them to secure nuclear materials and criminalize acts of nuclear terrorism, and provided financial or other assistance to states to help them secure their materials. Significantly, since the Summit process was launched in 2009, twelve countries have eliminated all of their inventories of these dangerous materials.

Yet, despite these important efforts, there is still no global system for securing all material. Incredibly, the security of some of the world's most dangerous material is not subject to any common international standards or "rules of the road" that all states must follow. Indeed, security practices vary widely across states. While several elements for guiding states' nuclear security practices do exist, they fall short of what is needed. In particular:

- The international legal agreement for securing nuclear materials—the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment—does not define standards and best practices and the 2005 Amendment, which strengthens the overall scope of the CPPNM, has not yet entered into force. Entry into force must be a priority and the United States, which has so far failed to complete ratification of the

2005 Amendment, must act swiftly to do so.

- Nuclear security recommendations and guidelines issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are not mandatory and are implemented inconsistently.
- Existing legal agreements and guidelines cover only 15 percent of all global stocks of weapons-usable nuclear material: those used in civilian programs. The remaining 85% are considered "military material" and are not subject even to those limited practices.

Not only is the current system devoid of an agreed-upon set of international standards or best practices, there is no governing body tasked with holding states accountable for lax security and no expectation that states should take steps to build confidence in others that they are effectively securing their materials. Even though poor security in one state can result in the detonation of a nuclear bomb anywhere else in the world, many states still consider nuclear security solely a sovereign, not a shared, responsibility, and continue to simply say, "Trust me."

NUCLEAR SECURITY LAGS BEHIND OTHER INDUSTRIES

The lack of global standards, information sharing, or accountability mechanisms in nuclear security is in stark contrast to other high-risk global enterprises, such as civil aviation, where public safety and security is at stake and where states understand and accept that all parties have an interest in the performance of others. In the case of aviation, for example, almost all states are members of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which sets safety and security standards for all airlines, conducts audits, and shares security concerns with others states. Yet with weapons-usable nuclear materials, where poor security can lead to a nuclear catastrophe with global consequences, there is no shared system of standards, assurance, or accountability.

If the threat of nuclear terrorism is to be taken seriously and all weapons-usable nuclear material secured, there must be a global system of international standards and best practices that covers all materials, including military materials, and provides mechanisms for states to be held accountable and to build confidence in their security practices. In addition, states must reduce risk by minimizing and, where possible, eliminating their stocks of

weapons-usable nuclear materials, for example by converting power and research reactors that use HEU fuel to low enriched uranium fuels.

STRENGTHENING GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

Securing vulnerable nuclear materials has been a priority at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) since its founding in 2001. In recent years, NTI's work in this area has followed two tracks: a public initiative that focused worldwide attention on the status of nuclear materials security, and a separate effort to engage governments and experts to shape the agendas and outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summits.

In January 2014, NTI published the second edition of the NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index (NTI Index), a unique public assessment of nuclear security conditions in 176 countries. The NTI Index provides a framework for analysis that has sparked international discussions about priorities for strengthening security. The NTI Index assesses 25 countries with one kilogram or more of weapons-usable nuclear material (HEU or separated plutonium) across five categories:

- **Quantities and Sites:** the quantities of material, number of sites at which the material is located, and whether material quantities are decreasing or increasing;
- **Security and Control Measures:** whether certain physical protection, control, and accounting measures are required by national laws and regulations;
- **Global Norms:** whether a state has joined international treaties, undertaken voluntary measures to support global efforts, and taken steps to build confidence in the security of its material;
- **Domestic Commitments and Capacity:** whether a state has implemented its international obligations; and
- **Risk Environment:** factors that though not directly related to the security of nuclear materials may still impact a state's ability to maintain appropriate security, including political instability, ineffective governance, corruption, and the presence of groups interested in illicitly acquiring material.

The NTI Index assesses an additional 151 countries with less than one kilogram of weapons-usable nuclear materials, or none at all, on the last three of these categories. These states are included in the NTI Index because all states, not just those with materials, have a

responsibility to prevent nuclear terrorism by ensuring that their territories are not used as safe havens, staging grounds, or transit points for terrorist operations. NTI plans to release a third edition of the NTI Index in early 2016.

SETTING PRIORITIES

One of NTI's recommendations in the 2012 NTI Index was the need for a dialogue on priorities for securing nuclear materials. Although the 2010 Summit had resulted in important commitments by states to strengthen their own security and support global nuclear security efforts, these commitments were not driven by an agreed set of priorities. To address this challenge, in July 2012, NTI convened the first of a series of meetings called the Global Dialogue on Nuclear Security Priorities, a Track 1.5 dialogue among government officials, experts, nuclear security practitioners, and other stakeholders to build consensus on the need for a strengthened global nuclear security system and the elements of that system. Leading up to the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, participants in the Global Dialogue developed the following set of principles that define such a system:

- **Comprehensiveness:** All weapons-usable nuclear materials and facilities should be covered by the system, including the 85% of all global stocks that are military materials.
- **International Standards and Best Practices:** All states and facilities with those materials should adhere to international standards and best practices.
- **Building Confidence:** States should help build confidence in the effectiveness of their security practices and take reassuring actions to demonstrate that all nuclear materials and facilities are secure (e.g., through peer review, best practice exchanges, and sharing of non-sensitive security information).
- **Material Minimization and Elimination:** States should work to reduce risk through minimizing or, where feasible, eliminating weapons-usable nuclear materials stocks and the number of locations where they are found.

The 2014 Summit Communiqué made significant headway on several of these fronts, calling for a strengthened international nuclear security architecture and emphasizing the value of countries building the confidence of others in the security of their weapons-usable nuclear materials. In addition, 35 countries (two-thirds of Summit participants) agreed to

put principles into practice by joining the "Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation" initiative, pledging to meet the intent of the IAEA's voluntary guidelines through implementing national regulations, committing to improve their nuclear security through internal assessments and peer reviews, and ensuring that those responsible for nuclear security are "demonstrably competent."

Despite this importance progress, challenges remain. The security of military material has largely remained unaddressed by the Summits. In addition, despite progress on minimizing stocks of HEU, discussions of the minimization and management of plutonium have been stymied by political and other challenges. Finally, at what is presumed to be the final Summit scheduled for 2016, leaders will need to agree on a way to sustain the nuclear security mission beyond 2016 or risk much of the positive work to strengthen nuclear security going unfinished or, worse, backsliding. To address these challenges, NTI has once again convened the Global Dialogue to continue our efforts to strengthen the global system in support of the 2016 Summit.

LOOKING AHEAD

Terrorism in all its forms presents a major threat to global security. Yet, the prospect of a terrorist using a nuclear bomb to destroy a city, killing and injuring hundreds of thousands, is the threat most likely to keep leaders and global experts awake at night. A nuclear nightmare like the kind seen in horror movies and television dramas could become a reality if the world does not do what we already know must and can be done to secure the materials that could be used in a nuclear bomb.

With the final Nuclear Security Summit approaching, the window of opportunity to put in place the global system necessary to get the job done is closing. We cannot stand aside and let the window close. States must agree to a path forward for sustaining the nuclear security mission and for building a truly global system for securing all nuclear materials—a system where materials are secured according to international standards and best practices, where states take actions to build the confidence of others that they are properly securing their materials, and where states continue to minimize and eventually eliminate stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear materials.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A: GTI RANKS AND SCORES, 2014

GTI RANK	COUNTRY	2014 GTI SCORE (OUT OF 10)	CHANGE IN SCORE (ACTUAL YEAR 2012 TO 2013)
1	Iraq	10	0.5
2	Afghanistan	9.39	0.26
3	Pakistan	9.37	0.23
4	Nigeria	8.58	0.34
5	Syria	8.12	0.6
6	India	7.86	0.01
7	Somalia	7.41	0.17
8	Yemen	7.31	0.15
9	Philippines	7.29	0.56
10	Thailand	7.19	0.03
11	Russia	6.76	-0.09
12	Kenya	6.58	0.52
13	Egypt	6.5	1.63
14	Lebanon	6.4	1.97
15	Libya	6.25	1.54
16	Colombia	6.24	-0.15
17	Turkey	5.98	-0.12
18	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	5.9	-0.05
19	Sudan	5.77	-0.15
20	South Sudan	5.6	1.28
21	Algeria	5.52	0.23
22	Mali	5.29	1.42
23	Bangladesh	5.25	1.27
24	Nepal	5.23	0.28

GTI RANK	COUNTRY	2014 GTI SCORE (OUT OF 10)	CHANGE IN SCORE (ACTUAL YEAR 2012 TO 2013)
25	China	5.21	0.38
26	Central African Republic	5.19	1.35
27	United Kingdom	5.17	0.72
28	Iran	4.9	-0.1
29	Greece	4.73	0.44
30	United States	4.71	0.85
31	Indonesia	4.67	0.03
32	Israel	4.66	-0.46
32	Mexico	4.66	1.53
34	Bahrain	4.41	0.89
35	Myanmar	4.24	0.02
36	Mozambique	4.01	2.89
36	Sri Lanka	4.01	-0.76
38	Rwanda	4	0.04
39	Burundi	3.97	-0.41
40	Cote d'Ivoire	3.76	-0.37
41	Tanzania	3.71	3.65
42	Ethiopia	3.7	-0.38
43	Paraguay	3.63	1.61
44	Norway	3.57	-0.68
45	Senegal	3.55	-0.12
46	Tunisia	3.29	1.56
47	Ireland	3.09	0.15
48	Malaysia	3.04	1.13
48	South Africa	3.04	0.79
50	Peru	2.96	0.17
51	Ukraine	2.95	-0.18
52	Uganda	2.93	-0.78
53	Belarus	2.85	-0.73
54	Kosovo	2.73	0.22
55	Saudi Arabia	2.71	-0.17
56	France	2.67	-0.41
57	Guatemala	2.61	1.02
58	Chile	2.59	0.33
58	Niger	2.59	0.57
60	Bulgaria	2.58	-0.57
60	Georgia	2.58	-0.43
62	Italy	2.55	-0.09
63	Eritrea	2.45	-0.71
64	Honduras	2.38	0.99
65	Kazakhstan	2.37	-0.47
66	Cyprus	2.3	2.14
67	Morocco	2.11	-0.69
68	Tajikistan	1.99	-0.67
69	Spain	1.84	-0.53
70	Jordan	1.76	-0.28

GTI RANK	COUNTRY	2014 GTI SCORE (OUT OF 10)	CHANGE IN SCORE (ACTUAL YEAR 2012 TO 2013)
71	Argentina	1.73	0.3
72	Brazil	1.72	1.02
73	Republic of the Congo	1.59	1.59
74	Trinidad and Tobago	1.54	1.54
75	Cameroon	1.45	-0.45
75	Macedonia (FYR)	1.45	-0.77
77	Switzerland	1.34	0.87
78	Madagascar	1.26	0.16
79	Ecuador	1.18	0.69
80	Zimbabwe	1.16	0.52
81	Guinea	1.12	1.12
82	Sweden	1.07	-0.7
83	Germany	1.02	-0.7
84	Canada	0.95	0
85	Czech Republic	0.81	0.55
86	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.76	0.17
87	Burkina Faso	0.7	0.7
87	Montenegro	0.7	0.7
89	Netherlands	0.58	-0.71
89	Serbia	0.58	-0.84
91	Mauritania	0.56	-0.7
92	Venezuela	0.54	-0.72
93	Belgium	0.53	-0.68
94	Dominican Republic	0.47	0.47
95	Angola	0.41	-0.6
95	Australia	0.41	-0.62
97	Guinea-Bissau	0.35	-0.47
98	Cambodia	0.31	0.25
99	Taiwan	0.31	0.29
100	United Arab Emirates	0.29	0.03
101	Moldova	0.28	-0.31
102	Armenia	0.27	0.19
103	Austria	0.24	-0.43
103	Bolivia	0.24	-0.24
105	Croatia	0.23	0.19
105	Portugal	0.23	-0.24
107	Albania	0.19	0.13
107	Denmark	0.19	0.11
109	Bhutan	0.16	-0.38
109	Estonia	0.16	-0.15
111	Uzbekistan	0.14	-0.13
112	Kyrgyzstan	0.1	-0.1
113	Iceland	0.08	-0.08
113	Laos	0.08	-0.08
113	Liberia	0.08	-0.08
116	Hungary	0.07	-0.11

GTI RANK	COUNTRY	2014 GTI SCORE (OUT OF 10)	CHANGE IN SCORE (ACTUAL YEAR 2012 TO 2013)
117	Azerbaijan	0.06	-0.29
118	Chad	0.05	-3.48
119	Kuwait	0.04	-0.04
119	Panama	0.04	-0.04
121	Equatorial Guinea	0.01	-0.01
121	Japan	0.01	-0.05
121	Lesotho	0.01	-0.01
124	Benin	0	0
124	Botswana	0	0
124	Costa Rica	0	0
124	Cuba	0	0
124	Djibouti	0	0
124	El Salvador	0	0
124	Finland	0	-0.03
124	Gabon	0	0
124	Gambia	0	0
124	Ghana	0	0
124	Guyana	0	-0.42
124	Haiti	0	0
124	Jamaica	0	0
124	Latvia	0	0
124	Lithuania	0	0
124	Malawi	0	0
124	Mauritius	0	0
124	Mongolia	0	0
124	Namibia	0	0
124	New Zealand	0	-0.05
124	Nicaragua	0	0
124	North Korea	0	0
124	Oman	0	0
124	Papua New Guinea	0	0
124	Poland	0	0
124	Qatar	0	0
124	Romania	0	-0.02
124	Sierra Leone	0	0
124	Singapore	0	0
124	Slovakia	0	0
124	Slovenia	0	0
124	South Korea	0	0
124	Swaziland	0	-0.03
124	Timor-Leste	0	-0.07
124	Togo	0	0
124	Turkmenistan	0	0
124	Uruguay	0	0
124	Vietnam	0	0
124	Zambia	0	0

APPENDIX B: 50 WORST TERRORIST ATTACKS IN 2013

RANK	COUNTRY	DATE	CITY	ORGANISATION	F	I	WEAPON TYPE
1	Nigeria	17/09/2013	Beni Shiek	Boko Haram	142	0	Firearms
2	Nigeria	24/10/2013	Damatura	Boko Haram	125	0	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
3	Syria	22/07/2013	Khan al-Assal	Al-Nusrah Front	123	0	Firearms
4	Pakistan	10/01/2013	Quetta	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	119	219	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
5	Afghanistan	2/08/2013	Sherzad district	Taliban	98	0	Firearms
6	Pakistan	16/02/2013	Quetta	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	91	169	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
7	Pakistan	22/09/2013	Peshawar	Jundallah	87	131	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
8	Afghanistan	18/08/2013	Gulistan district	Taliban	82	22	Firearms
9	Kenya	21/09/2013	Nairobi	Al-Shabaab	72	201	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
10	Nigeria	20/12/2013	Bama	Boko Haram	70	0	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
11	Syria	11/06/2013	Hatla	Al-Nusrah Front	70	0	Firearms
12	Algeria	16/01/2013	In Amenas	al-Mu'a'q'oon Biddam Brigade (Those who Sign with Blood)	69	8	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
13	Yemen	5/12/2013	Sanaa	Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	68	215	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
14	Syria	21/02/2013	Damascus	Unknown	62	201	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
15	Pakistan	26/07/2013	Parachinar	Mujahideen Ansar	61	151	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
16	Syria	6/02/2013	Al-Buraq	Al-Nusrah Front	61	0	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
17	Nigeria	7/05/2013	Bama	Boko Haram	55	0	Firearms
18	Central African Rep.	5/12/2013	Bangui	Anti-Balaka Militia	54	0	Firearms
19	Turkey	11/05/2013	Reyhanli	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant	53	140	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
20	Afghanistan	3/04/2013	Farah	Taliban	53	95	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
21	Syria	21/03/2013	Damascus	Unknown	50	84	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
22	Lebanon	23/08/2013	Tripoli	Islamic Unification Movement	47	300	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
23	Iraq	5/10/2013	Baghdad	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant	47	85	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
24	Nigeria	6/07/2013	Mamudo	Boko Haram	46	4	Firearms
25	Iraq	24/04/2013	Mosul	Unknown	46	0	Firearms
26	Pakistan	3/03/2013	Karachi	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	45	151	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
27	Iraq	21/09/2013	Baghdad	Unknown	45	80	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
28	Iraq	25/12/2013	Baghdad	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant	44	71	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
29	Nigeria	11/08/2013	Konduga	Boko Haram	44	26	Firearms
30	Pakistan	29/09/2013	Peshawar	Unknown	43	101	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
31	Iraq	23/01/2013	Tuz Khormato	Al-Qa'ida in Iraq	43	75	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
32	Iraq	12/07/2013	Kirkuk	Unknown	42	35	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
33	Iraq	29/09/2013	Musayyib	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant	41	50	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
34	Syria	1/08/2013	Homs	Liwa al-Haqq	40	160	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
35	Iraq	17/05/2013	Baqubah	Unknown	40	57	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
36	Nigeria	29/09/2013	Gujba	Boko Haram	40	18	Firearms
37	Dem. Rep. of Congo	25/12/2013	Kamango	Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)	40	16	Firearms
38	Nigeria	18/03/2013	Kano	Boko Haram	39	75	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
39	Pakistan	8/08/2013	Quetta	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	39	50	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
40	Somalia	13/04/2013	Mogadishu	Al-Shabaab	38	58	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
41	Mexico	31/01/2013	Mexico City	Individuals Tending Toward Savagery	37	101	Incendiary
42	Iraq	20/10/2013	Baghdad	Unknown	37	50	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
43	Iraq	3/02/2013	Kirkuk	Al-Qa'ida in Iraq	36	70	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
44	Pakistan	18/06/2013	Mardan	Unknown	35	43	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
45	Nigeria	19/08/2013	Baga	Boko Haram	35	14	Incendiary
46	Pakistan	2/02/2013	Serai Naurang	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	35	8	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
47	Iraq	14/11/2013	Sadiyah	Unknown	33	80	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
48	Pakistan	30/06/2013	Quetta	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	32	55	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
49	Iraq	14/03/2013	Baghdad	Al-Qa'ida in Iraq	32	50	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
50	Pakistan	10/01/2013	Mingora	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	31	70	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite

*F= FATALITIES, I= INJURIES

APPENDIX C: GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX METHODOLOGY

The GTI ranks 162 countries based on four indicators weighted over five years. The Occupied Palestinian Territories is the only region that records notable amounts of terrorism that is not included in the index.⁶⁰

The GTI score for a country in a given year is based on a unique scoring system to account for the relative impact of incidents in the year.

The four factors counted in each country's yearly score, are:

- Total number of terrorist incidents in a given year
- Total number of fatalities caused by terrorists in a given year
- Total number of injuries caused by terrorists in a given year
- A measure of the total property damage from terrorist incidents in a given year.

Each of the factors is weighted between zero and three and a five year weighted average is applied to try and reflect the latent psychological effect of terrorist acts over time. The weightings shown in Table 12 was determined by consultation with the GPI Expert Panel.

The greatest weighting is attributed to a fatality. It should be noted the property damage measure is further disaggregated into four bands depending on the measured scope of the property damage inflicted by one incident. These bandings are shown in Table 13, whereby incidents causing less than US\$1 million are accorded a weighting of 1, between \$1 million and \$1 billion a 2, and more than \$1 billion a 3. It should be noted a great majority of incidents are coded in the GTD as 'unknown', thus scoring nil, with 'catastrophic' events being extremely rare.

HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE OF A COUNTRY'S GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX SCORE

To assign a relative number to how a country has been directly impacted by terrorism in any given year, for every incident recorded the GTI calculates a weighted sum of all indicators. To illustrate, assume Table 14 depicts a hypothetical country's records for a given year.

Given these indicator values, the country for that year would be assessed as having an impact of terrorism of 195.5.

TABLE 12 INDICATOR WEIGHTS USED IN THE GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX

DIMENSION	WEIGHT
Total number of incidents	1
Total number of fatalities	3
Total number of injuries	0.5
Sum of property damages measure	Between 0 and 3 depending on severity

TABLE 13 PROPERTY DAMAGE LEVELS AS DEFINED IN THE GTD AND WEIGHTS USED IN THE GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX

CODE/WEIGHT	DAMAGE LEVEL
0	Unknown
1	Minor (likely < \$1 million)
2	Major (likely between \$1 million and \$1 billion)
3	Catastrophic (likely > \$1 billion)

TABLE 14 HYPOTHETICAL COUNTRY TERRORIST ATTACKS IN A GIVEN YEAR

DIMENSION	WEIGHT	NUMBER OF RECORDS FOR THE GIVEN YEAR	CALCULATED RAW SCORE
Total number of incidents	1	21	21
Total number of fatalities	3	36	108
Total number of injuries	0.5	53	26.5
Sum of property damages measure	2	20	40
Total raw score			195.5

FIVE YEAR WEIGHTED AVERAGE

To account for the lingering effect terrorist attacks have on a society in terms of fear and subsequent security response, the GTI takes into consideration the events of previous years as having a bearing on a country's score in the current year. For instance, the scale of the 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway will continue to have a psychological impact on the population for many years to come. The scoring system presented here is a simple attempt to account for this by weighting the country's previous scores using the values shown in Table 15.

LOGARITHMIC BANDING SCORES ON A SCALE OF 1-10

The impact of terrorism is not evenly distributed throughout the world; there are a handful of countries with very high levels of terrorism compared to many countries which experience only very small amounts, if not zero terrorism. Hence, the GTI uses a base 10 logarithmic banding system between 0 and 10 at 0.5 intervals.

As shown in Table 16, mapping the scores in this way yields the total number of 21 bands. This maps all values to a band of size 0.5 within the scale of 0-10. In order to band these scores the following method is used:

1. Define the Minimum GTI score across all countries as having a banded score of 0
2. Define the Maximum GTI score across all countries as having a banded score 10
3. Subtract the Minimum from the Maximum GTI scores and calculate r by:
 - a. $\text{root} = 2^{*}(\text{Highest GTI banded score} - \text{Lowest GTI banded score}) = 20^{*}(10-0) = 20$
 - b. $\text{Range} = 2^{*}(\text{Highest recorded GTI raw score} - \text{Lowest recorded GTI raw score})$
 - c. $r = \text{root} \sqrt{\text{Range}}$

The mapped band cut-off value for bin n is calculated by m .

Following this method produces mapping of GTI scores to the set bands as defined in Table 16.

In following this method of scoring, weighting and banding, the GTI can be seen as a relative indicator of how terrorism impacts a country compared to all other countries in the GTD. This importantly recognises that there are diminishing returns to terrorism in terms of its psychological, economic, political and cultural impact. Simply, a terrorist incident killing one person is likely to have a greater psychological impact in a country with zero terrorist incidents than in a country like Iraq where terrorism is a regular, if not daily occurrence.

TABLE 15 TIME WEIGHTING OF HISTORICAL SCORES

YEAR	WEIGHT	% OF SCORE
Current year	16	52%
Previous year	8	26%
Two years ago	4	13%
Three years ago	2	6%
Four years ago	1	3%

TABLE 16 BANDS USED IN THE GTI

BAND NUMBER	BANDS	BAND CUT OFF VALUES
1	0	0.00
2	0.5	1.64
3	1	2.69
4	1.5	4.42
5	2	7.25
6	2.5	11.89
7	3	19.52
8	3.5	32.03
9	4	52.55
10	4.5	86.23
11	5	141.48
12	5.5	232.15
13	6	380.93
14	6.5	625.06
15	7	1025.63
16	7.5	1682.91
17	8	2761.41
18	8.5	4531.07
19	9	7434.84
20	9.5	12199.51
21	10	20017.65

APPENDIX D: VERIFYING THE INCREASE IN TERRORISM FROM 2011 TO 2012

Until 2011 data collection for this exercise was largely a manual process with START employing many people to trawl through media articles and code each terrorist event by hand into the database. Since 2012 however, START began using automated machine coding to add new events to the database. This new technology not only increased the efficiency of the data entry process but also allowed more sources to be searched increasing coverage of terrorism at the global scale. While this new technology means that the GTD is now a more comprehensive data source, the change in the data collection methodology does create difficulties in analysing longitudinal trends.

There has been a large increase in the number of incidents since 1998. There has been a particularly significant increase in the number of recorded terrorist events since 2011. However, the change of methodology offers two possible reasons for such an increase.

1. The increase is a reflection of real-world events or
2. The increase is a product of more efficient database coding.

In regards to this, START report that their analysis suggests a combination of these two factors are the explanation for the dramatic increase in recorded terrorist events. The problem is how to estimate the percentage that can be attributed to factors (1) and (2). In turn an estimate can be assigned to the “real world” proportional increase in terrorism.

It is not possible to say exactly how much terrorism has increased given the changed methodology, however it is possible to give statistical estimates to this increase by only using data from 2012 that would have been collected in 2011 using the old methodology. What the analysis finds is that the dramatic increase from 2012 to 2013 is valid and that there is strong evidence indicating a large increase in terrorism from 2011 to 2013.

To estimate what the increase could have been based on the previous methodology, IEP used geospatial analysis to filter out events in regions of the world that previously had never been covered prior to the change in methodology. This represents a lower bound estimate because events in previously uncovered regions may actually be real increases, however, given the change of methodology it is not possible to say for certain.

The GTD geo-codes events with a latitude and longitude wherever possible. For data prior to 2011, around 75 per cent of the events within GTD are geocoded. Where the GTD has not geo-coded events, IEP has assigned a latitude and longitude to an event by the following process:

1. Matched the city name where the event occurred with two separate large world city databases to estimate a location for each event (19 per cent of events coded in this step).
2. Where (1) is not possible, IEP locates the event to the centre of the country that it occurred (remaining six per cent of events coded in this step).

Figure 29 highlights the results of this geocoding process for events between 1998 and 2011. During this period events were coded manually and so offer the baseline coverage to compare data from 2012 onwards. The assumption here is that if an incident occurs in 2012 that is near any other incident that was coded prior to 2012, then it would have been coded even if START had not introduced the more efficient data collection method. If an incident occurs in 2012 that is in a completely new location that has never before seen terrorist activity, there is no precedent to assume that it would have been included using the old data collection methodology. This technique has been developed by IEP and is referred to as the geospatial filtering approach (GFA).

There are shortfalls with this. Namely, it ignores the possibility of terrorism arising in new parts of the globe. While methodologically this is an issue, in regards to the nature of terrorism and the data collection from media, this is not believed to be a significant factor due to the following reasons:

1. Since 2002, most terrorism has occurred in five countries, all of which have had good coverage in the GTD throughout the period.
2. What would be generally termed “Black Swan” events occur in countries where terrorism is not a constant threat. The Madrid and London train bombings and the 2011 Norway attacks are examples of these. However, countries such as these have good media coverage and so it is very unlikely that these would be excluded using the geospatial filtering approach.

SELECTING A FILTERING RADIUS

To implement the GFA all incidents recorded in 2012 have been compared to the incident closest to it from the set of all incidents occurring between 1998 and 2011. This process follows the steps:

- Select Incident A from 2012 GTD
- Select the closest incident to Incident A from all incidents recorded in the GTD between 1998 and 2011, call this Incident B
- If A is within x kms of B then include Incident A in the calculation of the percentage increase in terrorism between 2011 and 2012
- If A is greater than x kms away from B, exclude A from further analysis
- Repeat for all incidents recorded in 2012.

Before applying the GFA it is therefore necessary to define what distance radius is to be used as the filtering mechanism. In essence this step makes an assumption of the coverage of media sources used in the GTD prior to 2012. To do this trials were run over all known year on year increases since 2000 using distances between 0 and 100 kms. Table 17 shows the filtering distance that provided an estimate that was within 5 per cent of the known year on year increase. The most restrictive filtering radii occurred in 2009 when 95 per cent of the increase in terrorism occurred within 19 kms of attacks that occurred in 2008.

Figure 29 plots the results from applying the GFA to 2011 to 2012 data and the baseline case of 2008 - 2009. If we assume that the GFA converges to within 5 per cent of the true increase at the baseline radii 19km, then the estimated like for like increase in terrorism between 2011-2012 is around 20% + 5% = 25%.


While the GFA only provides an estimate, it does suggest that a large part of the calculated increase in terrorism between 2011 and 2012 is due to real world events. These results concur with START’s analysis.⁸¹ However, Table 18 shows that even if a conservative approach is taken by assuming there was no increase between 2011 and 2012, terrorism would still have increased fivefold since 2000. Using a 45 per cent increase between 2011 and 2012, this statistic rises to being seven fold.

TABLE 17 CONVERGENCE OF THE GFA WITH PREVIOUS KNOWN YEAR ON YEAR PERCENTAGE

YEAR	GFA FILTER RADIUS TO CONVERGE TO WITHIN 5% OF TRUE PERCENTAGE INCREASE (KMS)
2001	90
2002	44
2003	60
2004	22
2005	41
2006	28
2007	21
2008	52
2009	19
2010	21
2011	26

FIGURE 29 CONVERGENCE OF THE GFA FOR 2011-2012.

The Geospatial Filtering Approach estimates a 25% increase in terrorist incidents between 2011-2012.



Source: GTD

TABLE 18 ESTIMATES OF THE INCREASE OF TERRORISM SINCE 2000

Estimates of the increase in terrorism range from five to seven fold since 2000.

YEAR	ASSUME NO INCREASE IN 2011 TO 2012 (Δ)	ASSUME 25% INCREASE IN 2011 TO 2012 (Δ)	ASSUME 45% INCREASE IN 2011 TO 2012 (Δ)
2012	Use 0.00% - conservative	Use 25.00% - GFA estimate	Use 45.00% - upper bound
Total % estimate of increase since 2011 Formula = $\pi(1+\Delta)-100\%$ for all year on year changes since 2000	44%	59%	109%
Terrorism in 2013 as a percentage of 2000 Formula = $\pi(1+\Delta) \%$ for all year on year changes since 2000	475% (approximately five fold)	594% (approximately six fold)	689% (approximately seven fold)

ENDNOTES

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